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If men were angels, no government would be necessary.  
If angels were to govern men, neither external nor internal 
controls on government would be necessary.  In framing a 
government which is to be administered by men over men, 
the great difficulty lies in this: you must first enable the gov-
ernment to control the governed; and in the next place oblige 
it to control itself. 
 
- James Madison1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
This Article is about deferred action and transparency in related 
immigration cases falling under the jurisdiction of the Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS).  While scholars from other genres have 
written extensively on the topic of prosecutorial discretion, the sub-
ject is largely absent from immigration scholarship, with the excep-
tion of early research conducted by Leon Wildes in the late 1970s 
and early 2000s,2 and a law review article I published in 2010 outlin-
  
    1.  THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 286 (James Madison) (Scott ed., 2002). 
 2. See Leon Wildes, The Operations Instructions of the Immigration Service: 
Internal Guides or Binding Rules?, 17 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 99, 101 (1980) [herein-
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ing the origins of prosecutorial discretion in immigration law and 
related lessons that can be drawn from administrative law and crimi-
nal law.3  That article ends with specific recommendations for the 
agency, such as codifying deferred action into a regulation and rec-
ognizing it as a formal benefit as opposed to a matter of “administra-
tive convenience,” and streamlining the array of existing memoranda 
of prosecutorial discretion floating within each DHS agency.4  An 
additional recommendation included increasing oversight of prose-
cutorial discretion to ensure that officers and agencies that fail to 
exercise prosecutorial discretion by targeting and enforcing the laws 
against low-priority individuals are held accountable. 
In this Article, and building upon recommendations published in 
The Role of Prosecutorial Discretion in Immigration Law,5 I de-
scribe the state of prosecutorial discretion and deferred action in par-
ticular by surveying the political climate, public reaction, and advo-
  
after Wildes, The Operations Instructions]; Leon Wildes, The United States Immi-
gration Service v. John Lennon: The Cultural Lag, 40 BROOK. L. REV. 279 (1974); 
Leon Wildes, The Nonpriority Program of the Immigration and Naturalization 
Service Goes Public: The Litigative Use of the Freedom of Information Act, 14 
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 42 (1977) [hereinafter Wildes, The Litigative Use of the 
FOIA]; Leon Wildes, The Nonpriority Program of the Immigration and Naturali-
zation Service - A Measure of the Attorney General’s Concern for Aliens, Part I, 
53 INTERPRETER RELEASES 25 (January 26, 1976) [hereinafter Wildes, The 
Nonpriority Program Part I]; Leon Wildes, The Nonpriority Program of the Im-
migration and Naturalization Service - A Measure of the Attorney General’s Con-
cern for Aliens, Part II, 53 INTERPRETER RELEASES 33 (January 30, 1976) [herein-
after Wildes, The Nonpriority Program Part II]; Leon Wildes, The Deferred Ac-
tion Program of the Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services: A Possible 
Remedy for Impossible Cases, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 819 (2004) [hereinafter Wil-
des, A Possible Remedy]. 
 3. Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, The Role of Prosecutorial Discretion in Immigra-
tion Law, 9 CONN. PUB. INT. L.J. 243 (2010). 
 4. ICE prefaced its most recent memorandum on prosecutorial discretion as 
building upon the pre-existing memoranda.  See John Morton, Exercising Prosecu-
torial Discretion Consistent with the Civil Immigration Enforcement Priorities of 
the Agency for the Apprehension, Detention, and Removal of Aliens, U.S. 
IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, 1–2 (2011) [hereinafter Morton 
Memo on Prosecutorial Discretion], http://www.ice.gov/doclib/secure-
communities/pdf/prosecutorial-discretion-memo.pdf.
 5. See Wadhia, supra note 3, at 293–99. 
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cacy efforts in the last two years.  I also chronicle my repeated Free-
dom of Information Act (FOIA) requests to DHS for information 
about deferred action, and the stumbling blocks I encountered during 
this 19-month journey.  The Article will show that while deferred 
action is one of the very few discretionary remedies available for 
noncitizens with compelling equities, it currently operates as a secret 
program accessible only to elite lawyers and advocates.  Moreover, 
the secrecy of the program has created the (mis)perception by some, 
that deferred action can be used as a tool to legalize the undocu-
mented immigrant population or ignore congressional will.  This 
Article explains why transparency about deferred action is important 
and makes related recommendations that include, but are not limited 
to, subjecting the program to rulemaking under the Administrative 
Procedures Act, issuing written decisions when deferred action is 
denied, posting information about the application process, and main-
taining statistics about deferred action decisions.  Without these 
remedies, noncitizens that possess similarly relevant equities will 
face unequal hardships. 
A. Background  
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is a cabinet-level 
agency with jurisdiction over many immigration functions.6  The 
Department has jurisdiction over immigration “services” such as 
asylum, citizenship, and green card applications;7 border-related en-
forcement actions such as border patrol and inspections;8 and interior 
enforcement activities, such as the detention and removal of nonciti-
zens.9  The immigration court system is called the Executive Office 
for Immigration Review (EOIR) and rests within the Department of 
  
 6. See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, 
http://www.dhs.gov/index.shtm (last visited Aug. 9, 2011). 
 7. See U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION SERVICES, 
http://www.uscis.gov/portal/site/uscis (last visited Aug. 9, 2011). 
 8. See U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION, http://www.cbp.gov/ (last 
visited Aug. 9, 2011). 
 9. See U.S. IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, http://www.ice.gov/ 
(last visited Aug. 9, 2011). 
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Justice.10  Removal proceedings are initiated by DHS and operate as 
adversarial hearings at which U.S. Immigration and Customs En-
forcement attorneys represent the DHS.  On the other hand, nonciti-
zens are entitled to find their own lawyers at no expense to the gov-
ernment.11  Many noncitizens in removal proceedings are unrepre-
sented because the proceeding itself is considered “civil” and with-
out guaranteed safeguards like court-appointed counsel.12  At a re-
moval proceeding, an Immigration Judge reviews allegations and 
charges with the noncitizen defendant, as well as enters pleas.13  If 
appropriate, the Immigration Judge presides over applications for 
relief from removal such as asylum, adjustment of status, and cancel-
lation of removal.14  The noncitizen bears the burden of proving that 
she is eligible for such relief.15  Decisions by the Immigration Judge 
may be appealed with the Board of Immigration Appeals.16  Not eve-
ry noncitizen residing or entering the United States without legal 
authority is placed in removal proceedings.17  Some are removed 
expeditiously by the Department through other means, while others 
are considered for prosecutorial discretion.18 
  
 10. See EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW, 
http://www.justice.gov/eoir/ (last visited July 17, 2011). 
 
 11. See Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) § 292, 8 U.S.C. § 1362 (2006). 
 12. For a more detailed look at noncitizens’ lack of representation, see Donald 
Kerwin, Revisiting the Need for Appointed Counsel, 2 INSIGHT (MIGRATION 
POLICY INSTITUTE) (Apr. 2005), available at 
http://www.migrationpolicy.org/insight/Insight_Kerwin.pdf; Andrew I. Shoenholtz 
& Hamutal Bernstein, Improving Immigration Adjudications Through Competent 
Counsel, 21 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 55, 55–56 (2008). 
 13. See Office of the Chief Immigration Judge, U.S. EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR 
IMMIGRATION REVIEW, http://www.justice.gov/eoir/ocijinfo.htm (last visited Aug. 
9, 2011). 
 14. Id. 
 15. See U. S. Dep’t of Justice, U.S. EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION 
REVIEW, http://www.justice.gov/eoir/press/04/ReliefFromRemoval.htm (last visit-
ed Dec. 30, 2011). 
 16. Office of the Chief Immigration Judge, supra note 13. 
 17. Id.  
 18. Note that this background section is intended as a brief review of the De-
partment of Homeland Security and the removal process.  For a more detailed 
discussion of the removal process and the agency components involved, see Wad-
hia, supra note 3.  For an organizational chart listing the different components of 
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A favorable exercise of “prosecutorial discretion” identifies the 
Department of Homeland Security’s authority to not assert the full 
scope of the agency’s enforcement authority in each and every 
case.19  The Department’s motivations for exercising prosecutorial 
discretion are largely economic and humanitarian.20  According to 
the agency’s own statistics, Immigrations and Customs Enforcement 
(ICE) has the resources to remove less than 4% of the total undocu-
mented population.21  Moreover, many individuals and groups who 
present redeeming qualities such as lengthy residence, employment 
or family ties in the United States, and/or intellectual, military, or 
professional promise are living in the United States, vulnerable to 
immigration enforcement and without a statutory vehicle for legal 
status.  In the first two years of the Obama Administration, such hu-
manitarian cases have swelled in the wake of congressional stale-
mates over even discrete immigration reforms.  At one time, prose-
cutorial discretion was called “nonpriority” and later “deferred ac-
tion,” but today, prosecutorial discretion is associated with many 
  
DHS and a description of each, see Organizational Chart, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF 
HOMELAND SECURITY, http://www.dhs.gov/xabout/structure/editorial_0644.shtm 
(last visited Aug. 9, 2011). 
 19. See, e.g., Morton Memo on Prosecutorial Discretion, supra note 4, at 5; 
memorandum from William J. Howard, Principal Legal Advisor, on Prosecutorial 
Discretion, 2, 8 (Oct. 24, 2005) [hereinafter Howard Memo], available at 
http://www.shusterman.com/pdf/prosecutorialdiscretionimmigration2005.pdf; 
memorandum from Doris Meissner, Commissioner of Immigration and Naturaliza-
tion Service, on Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion, 2 (Nov. 17, 2000) [hereinaf-
ter Meissner Memo], available at http://www.scribd.com/doc/22092970/INS-
Guidance-Memo-Prosecutorial-Discretion-Doris-Meissner-11-7-00; memorandum 
from John Morton, Director, Civil Immigration Enforcement Priorities for the 
Apprehension, Detention, and Removal of Aliens, 4 (March 2, 2011 ) [hereinafter 
Morton Memo on Civil Enforcement Priorities], available at 
http://www.ice.gov/doclib/news/releases/2011/110302washingtondc.pdf; memo-
randum from John Morton, Director, Prosecutorial Discretion: Certain Victims, 
Witnesses, and Plaintiffs (June 17, 2011) [hereinafter Morton Memo on Certain 
Victims, Witnesses, and Plaintiffs], available at http://www.ice.gov/doclib/secure-
communities/pdf/domestic-violence.pdf; memorandum from Julie L. Myers, As-
sistant Secretary, Prosecutorial and Custody Discretion, 4 (Nov. 7, 2007) (on file 
with author);  
 20. Morton Memo on Civil Enforcement Priorities, supra note 19, at 1. 
 21. Id. 
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different actions by the government.22  For example, a DHS officer 
can exercise favorable discretion by granting a temporary stay of 
removal, joining in a motion to terminate removal proceedings, 
granting an order of supervision, cancelling a Notice to Appear, or 
granting deferred action.23  Prosecutorial discretion can also be exer-
cised during different points in the enforcement process, including, 
but not limited to, interrogation, arrest, charging, detention, trial, and 
removal.24 
This Article is limited to the Department’s exercise of prosecuto-
rial discretion and deferred action in particular.  This Article does 
not discuss immigration adjudications before DHS (beyond deferred 
action) or the EOIR.  Notably, many scholars have written extensive-
ly about immigration adjudications in these contexts.25  On the other 
hand, I rely on process values that have been analyzed in other im-
migration adjudicatory contexts to analyze and advance the im-
portance of transparency in deferred action. 
B. Summary of Deferred Action Process 
In theory, any person who is in the United States without author-
ization may apply for deferred action before any component of DHS, 
including CBP, ICE, and USCIS.  Oft-times deferred action requests 
are reviewed by a local office, and following up to three levels of 
review, are either granted, denied, or unresolved.26  There is no for-
  
  22. Wildes, A Possible Remedy, supra note 2, at 820-23; see Morton Memo on 
Prosecutorial Discretion, supra note 4, at 2; Meissner Memo, supra note 19, at 2; 
Howard Memo, supra note 19, at 2.  
 23. See Morton Memo on Prosecutorial Discretion, supra note 4, at 2; Howard 
Memo, supra note 19, at 2; Meissner Memo, supra note 19, at 2. 
 24. See Morton Memo on Prosecutorial Discretion, supra note4, at 2; Howard 
Memo, supra note 19, at 2; Meissner Memo, supra note 19, at 2. 
 25. See, e.g., Jill E. Family, A Broader View of the Immigration Adjudication 
Problem, 23 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 595 (2009); Steven Legomsky, Restructuring Im-
migration Adjudication, 59 DUKE L. J. 1635 (2010); Dana Leigh Marks, An Urgent 
Priority: Why Congress Should Establish an Article I Immigration Court, 13-1 
BENDER'S IMMIGR. BULL. 1, 3 (2008).  
 26. See, e.g., Ombudsman Recommendation: Recommendations on USCIS De-
ferred Action Processing, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY (July 11, 
2011), http://www.dhs.gov/files/programs/cisomb-recommendation.shtm (citing 
the Homeland Security Act (HSA) of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, § 442(c), 116 
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mal deferred action application form or fee.  Upon receiving de-
ferred action, the person may remain in the United States and may 
apply for work authorization unless, and until, the agency decides to 
target the person for enforcement under the immigration laws.27  
Specifically, the regulations governing immigration contain a specif-
ic subsection for individuals applying for work authorization on the 
basis of deferred action.28  If a person is denied deferred action, there 
is no mechanism for review by the Department or the immigration 
court, nor is there a guarantee that the person will receive a notifica-
tion about the Department’s decision.29  Because deferred action is a 
function of prosecutorial discretion, decisions are generally immune 
from judicial review in the absence of equal protection claims in-
volving “outrageous discrimination.”30  Moreover, decisions about 
deferred action often rest with one agency and in many cases non-
attorney employees of the Department, despite the fact that grave 
consequences attach when an agency fails to consider or denies a 
person deferred action status.31  As of this writing, the Department 
does not keep public records about deferred action grants, nor does it 
  
Stat. 2135, 2194); Department of Homeland Security  Secretary Tom Ridge, Dele-
gation to the Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services (Mar. 1, 2003) (del-
egating authority to grant voluntary departure under section 240B of the INA 8 
U.S.C. § 1229c, and deferred action). 
 27. See id. 
 28. See 8 C.F.R. § 274a.12(c)(14) (2011) (“An alien who has been granted de-
ferred action, an act of administrative convenience to the government which gives 
some cases lower priority, if the alien establishes an economic necessity for em-
ployment . . . .”).  
 29. While the June 17 memorandum from DHS on prosecutorial discretion in-
cludes some additional procedures that would include a case to be initiated by the 
ICE officer, private attorney, or ICE agent, it does not appear to include a specific 
method for notifying the noncitizen when they have been denied deferred action.  
See Morton Memo on Prosecutorial Discretion, supra note 4.
 30. See, e.g., Reno v. Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 491 
(1999). 
 31. Notably, the June 17, 2011 Morton Memo on prosecutorial discretion enables 
ICE attorneys to review the charging decisions by ICE, CBP, and USCIS.  See 
Morton Memo on Prosecutorial Discretion, supra note 4, at 3.  By including and 
amplifying the role of the ICE attorney, the memo includes an important and new 
check to the deferred action process before ICE and prosecutorial discretion gen-
erally.  See id. 
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make information about the program available on its website, forms, 
or memoranda. 
II. DEPARTMENT GUIDELINES ON PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION 
A. Operations Instruction and Meissner Memo 
Two seminal policy statements on deferred action that have sur-
vived enormous structural changes of the immigration agency and 
immigration statute include a former “Operations Instruction” on 
deferred action, and a memorandum published by former INS Com-
missioner Doris Meissner.32  The Operations Instruction (O.I.) was 
revealed in the 1970s in connection with litigation filed on behalf of 
John Lennon.  That now-defunct Operations Instruction advises of-
ficers to consider: 
(1) advanced or tender age; (2) many years' presence 
in the United States; (3) physical or mental condition 
requiring care or treatment in the United States; (4) 
family situation in the United States—effect of expul-
sion; (5) criminal, immoral or subversive activities or 
affiliations.  If the district director's recommendation 
is approved by the regional commissioner the alien 
shall be notified that no action will be taken by the 
Service to disturb his immigration status, or that his 
departure from the United States has been deferred 
indefinitely, whichever is appropriate.33   
That Operations Instruction was the subject of significant court-
room traffic beginning in the late 1970s that revolved around wheth-
er deferred action operates as a substantive benefit or an act of pure 
administrative convenience.34  Concluding that the O.I. on deferred 
  
 32. Meissner Memo, supra note 19; (Legacy) Immigration and Naturalization 
Service, Operations Instructions, O.I. § 103.1(a)(1)(ii) (1975). 
 33. (Legacy) Immigration and Naturalization Service, Operations Instructions, 
O.I. § 103.1(a)(1)(ii) (1975). 
 34. See Velasco-Gutierrez v. Crossland, 732 F.2d 792, 798 (10th Cir. 1984); 
Pasquini v. Morris, 700 F.2d 658, 661 (11th Cir. 1983); Nicholas v. Immigration 
& Naturalization Serv., 590 F.2d 802, 807 (9th Cir. 1979); Soon Bok Yoon v. 
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action operated like a substantive benefit, the Ninth Circuit in Nicho-
las v. INS articulated the five criteria listed in the O.I., the directive 
language of the O.I., and the fact that a grant of deferred action pro-
vided the benefit of “an indefinite delay in deportation.”35  From the 
agency’s point of view, the tension of what to call deferred action 
(administrative convenience or substantial benefit) was eliminated 
with a tweaking of the O.I. in 1981 and more explicit language in 
future memoranda including the Meissner Memo.36   
Published in 2000, the Meissner memo identifies a list of exam-
ples of factors that should be considered by immigration officers in 
making prosecutorial decisions like deferred action, including, but 
not limited to: 
 immigration status of the applicant;  
 length of residence in the United States;  
 criminal history and circumstances surrounding 
such history;  
 humanitarian concerns such as family times, ten-
der age at the time of entry into the United States, 
special medical conditions or conditions and cir-
cumstances in the country to which the benefi-
ciary could be potentially removed; likelihood of 
being removed;  
 current or past cooperation with law enforcement;  
  
Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 538 F.2d 1211, 1213 (5th Cir. 1976); Lennon 
v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 527 F.2d 187, 193 (2d Cir. 1975); Wan 
Chung Wen v. Ferro, 543 F. Supp. 1016, 1017–18 (W.D.N.Y. 1982); Zacharakis 
v. Howerton, 517 F. Supp. 1026, 1027–28 (S.D. Fla. 1981); see also Siverts v. 
Craig, 602 F. Supp. 50, 53 (D. Haw. 1985) (construing 1981 instruction). 
 35. Nicholas, 590 F.2d at 806–807.  
 36. The relevant part of the amended instruction reads “Deferred action.  The 
district director may, at his discretion, recommend consideration of deferred ac-
tion, an act of administrative choice to give some cases lower priority and in no 
way an entitlement, in appropriate cases . . . .”  (Legacy) Immigration and Natural-
ization Service, Operations Instructions, O.I. § 103.1(a)(1)(ii) (1981).  Despite the 
disclaimers placed in the amended O.I. and subsequent memoranda, the data be-
low combined with the agency’s continued application of deferred action based on 
specific factors present a strong argument for recognizing deferred action as a 
substantive benefit.   
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 service in the U.S. military; immigration history; 
and  
 likelihood that she could be eligible for a legal 
immigration status in the future among other fac-
tors.37   
B. Morton Memoranda 
In the last two years, the immigration agency has published addi-
tional guidance about its authority to exercise prosecutorial discre-
tion.38  In June 2010, ICE issued a broad memorandum about its 
“Civil Enforcement Priorities” and limited resources, highlighting 
the importance of prosecutorial discretion during the apprehension, 
detention, and removal of noncitizens.39  The memo reaffirms earlier 
memoranda on prosecutorial discretion and further states “Particular 
care should be given when dealing with lawful permanent residents, 
juveniles, and the immediate family members of U.S. citizens.”40  In 
  
 37. Meissner Memo, supra note 19, at 7–8. 
  38.   For a detailed description of memoranda and policy about prosecutorial 
discretion prior to 2010, see Wadhia, supra note 3. 
  39. Morton Memo on Civil Enforcement Priorities, supra note 19, at 1. EOIR 
highlighted the relationship between implementation of the June 2010 Morton 
Memo and an increased detained docket at EOIR.  Immigration Court System: 
Hearing Before the S. Comm. On the Judiciary, 112th Cong. (2011) (statement of 
Juan P. Osuna, Director, Executive Office for Immigration Review), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/eoir/press/2011/EOIRtestimony05182011.pdf (“As DHS 
enforcement programs reach their full potential, EOIR is planning ahead and shift-
ing resources to meet the anticipated corresponding increase in the agency’s de-
tained caseload.”).  Note that Morton’s June 30, 2010 memo on Civil Enforcement 
priorities was reissued by ICE on March 2, 2011, with one additional clause at the 
end to confirm that the memo itself did not create any right or benefit or limit the 
legal authority of ICE to enforce immigration laws.  See Morton Memo on Civil 
Enforcement Priorities, supra note 19, at 4 (“These guidelines and priorities are 
not intended to, do not, and may not be relied upon to create any right or benefit, 
substantive or procedural, enforceable at law by any party in any administrative, 
civil, or criminal matter.”). 
  40.   Morton Memo on Civil Enforcement Priorities, supra note 19, at 4.  For an 
in-depth analysis of the June 30 Morton memo, see Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, 
Reading the Morton Memo: Federal Priorities and Prosecutorial Discretion, 
IMMIGRATION POLICY CENTER-AMERICAN IMMIGRATION COUNCIL, THE 
PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIVERSITY LEGAL STUDIES RESEARCH PAPER NO. 46-
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June 2011, ICE issued another memorandum on prosecutorial discre-
tion that was intended to support the Morton Memo on Civil En-
forcement Priorities and also build upon many of the historic policy 
memoranda by INS and DHS on the subject of prosecutorial discre-
tion.41  The broad Morton Memo on Prosecutorial Discretion con-
tains a tone similar to previous memoranda in that it identifies the 
resource limitations of the agency, furnishes a laundry list of largely 
humanitarian factors that ICE may consider in deciding whether or 
not to assert the full scope of enforcement authority available to ICE, 
and “clarifies” that the directive itself confers no right to the nonciti-
zen or limitation on the agency to apprehend, detain, or remove 
“any” alien unlawfully within the United States.42  The factors post-
ed for consideration by ICE include, but are not limited to: 
 
 the agency's civil immigration enforcement priori-
ties;  
 the person's length of presence in the United 
States, with particular consideration given to 
presence while in lawful status;  
 the circumstances of the person's arrival in the 
United States and the manner of his or her entry, 
particularly if the alien came to the United States 
as a young child;  
  
2010 (2010) [hereinafter Wadhia, Reading the Morton Memo], available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1723165. 
 41. Morton Memo on Prosecutorial Discretion, supra note 4, at 1. ICE issued a 
second memorandum on prosecutorial discretion specific to certain victims, wit-
nesses, and plaintiffs.  See Morton Memo on Certain Victims, Witnesses, and 
Plaintiffs, supra note 19.  This memo highlights the importance of exercising 
prosecutorial discretion towards:  
victims of domestic violence, human trafficking, or other serious 
crimes; witnesses involved in pending criminal investigations or 
prosecutions; plaintiffs in non-frivolous lawsuits regarding civil 
rights or liberties violations; and individuals engaging in a pro-
tected activity related to civil or other rights who may be in a 
non-frivolous dispute with an employer, landlord, or contractor.   
Id. at 2.  That memo also states somewhat conclusively “[I]t is against ICE policy 
to initiate removal proceedings against an individual known to be the immediate 
victim or witness to a crime.”  Id. at 1. 
 42. Morton Memo on Prosecutorial Discretion, supra note 4, at 4, 6. 
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 the person's pursuit of education in the United 
States, with particular consideration given to 
those who have graduated from a U.S. high 
school or have successfully pursued or are pursu-
ing a college or advanced degrees at a legitimate 
institution of higher education in the United 
States;  
 whether the person, or the person's immediate rel-
ative, has served in the U.S. military, reserves, or 
national guard, with particular consideration given 
to those who served in combat;  
 the person's criminal history, including arrests, 
prior convictions, or outstanding arrest warrants;  
 the person's immigration history, including any 
prior removal, outstanding order of removal, prior 
denial of status, or evidence of fraud;  
 whether the person poses a national security or 
public safety concern;  
 the person's ties and contributions to the commu-
nity, including family relationships;  
 the person's ties to the home country and condi-
tion in the country;  
 the person's age, with particular consideration 
given to minors and the elderly;  
 whether the person has a U.S. citizen or perma-
nent resident spouse, child, or parent;  
 whether the person is the primary caretaker of a 
person with a mental or physical disability, minor, 
or seriously ill relative;   
 whether the person or the person's spouse is preg-
nant or nursing;  
 whether the person or the person's spouse suffers 
from severe mental or physical illness;  
 whether the person's nationality renders removal 
unlikely;  
 whether the person is likely to be granted tempo-
rary or permanent status or other relief from re-
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moval, including as a relative of a U.S. citizen or 
permanent resident;  
 whether the person is likely to be granted tempo-
rary or permanent status or other relief from re-
moval, including as an asylum seeker, or a victim 
of domestic violence, human trafficking, or other 
crime; and  
 whether the person is currently cooperating or has 
cooperated with federal, state or local law en-
forcement authorities, such as ICE, the U.S Attor-
neys or Department of Justice, the Department of 
Labor, or National Labor Relations Board, among 
others.43  
 
The Morton Memo on Prosecutorial Discretion also articulates 
that “particular care” should be given to the following classes of in-
dividuals:  
 
 veterans and members of the U.S. armed forces 
 long-time lawful permanent residents 
 minors and elderly individuals  
 individuals present in the United States since 
childhood 
 pregnant and nursing women  
 victims of domestic violence, trafficking, or other 
serious crimes 
 individuals who suffer from serious mental or 
physical disability; and  
 individuals with serious health conditions.44 
 
  
  43.   Id. at 4. 
  44.   Id. at 5. For a detailed analysis about the Morton Memo on Prosecutorial 
Discretion, see Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, The Morton Memo and Prosecutorial 
Discretion: An Overview, IMMIGRATION POLICY CENTER, 6 (July 20, 2011), avail-
able at http://www.immigrationpolicy.org/special-reports/morton-memo-and-
prosecutorial-discretion-overview-0. 
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The Morton Memo on Prosecutorial Discretion is somewhat 
unique from previous memoranda in that it explicates who within 
ICE has authority to exercise prosecutorial discretion and the special 
role of ICE attorneys to “exercise prosecutorial discretion in any 
immigration removal proceeding before EOIR” including any re-
moval proceedings that have been proposed by CBP or USCIS.45  
Rather than relying on the initial charging agency’s decision to issue 
an NTA, the Morton Memo on Prosecutorial Discretion suggests that 
the ICE Chief Counsel or Deputy Director for ICE should handle 
any conflicts that arise between the charging agency and the ICE 
trial attorney seeking to exercise prosecutorial discretion.46   
C. Other ICE Policies 
ICE also released a “toolkit” for U.S. Prosecutors in April 2011, 
which contains a separate section on prosecutorial discretion and the 
related tools of deferred action and administrative stays of removal.47  
In describing the concept of deferred action, the toolkit advises: 
Deferred Action (DA) is not a specific form of relief 
but rather a term used to describe the decision-making 
authority of ICE to allocate resources in the best pos-
sible manner to focus on high priority cases, poten-
tially deferring action on cases with a lower priority.  
There is no statutory definition of DA, but federal 
regulations provide a description: “[D]eferred action 
[is] ‘an act of administrative convenience to the gov-
ernment which gives some cases lower priority. . . .’”  
There are two distinct types of DA requests: (i) those 
seeking DA based on sympathetic facts and a low-
enforcement priority, and (ii) those seeking DA based 
on his/her status as an important witness in an inves-
tigation or prosecution.  Basically, DA means the 
  
 45. Morton Memo on Prosecutorial Discretion, supra note 4, at 3. 
 46. Id.  For a more detailed analysis of the Morton Memo on Prosecutorial Dis-
cretion, see Wadhia, supra note 44, at 5. 
 47. Protecting the Homeland: Toolkit for Prosecutors, U.S. IMMIGRATION AND 
CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, 4–8 (2011), available at 
http://www.ice.gov/doclib/about/offices/osltc/pdf/tool-kit-for-prosecutors.pdf. 
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government has decided that it is not in its interest to 
arrest, charge, prosecute or remove an individual at 
that time for a specific, articulable reason.48  
The enforcement activities of ICE bear a direct relationship to 
the activities undertaken by the immigration court system, housed 
within the Department of Justice’s Executive Office for Immigration 
Review.49  EOIR assumes jurisdiction of immigration cases once a 
Notice to Appear (NTA) is filed with the immigration court.50  A 
wide array of Department employees have the authority to assemble 
a NTA, which in and of itself raises concerns about the quality and 
consistency of NTA issuance.  According to recent data calculated 
by the American Bar Association: 
The number of Notices to Appear (NTA) issued by 
the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to initi-
ate removal proceedings grew by 36% in just two 
years, from 213,887 in FY 2006 to 291,217 in FY 
2008.  These numbers are expected to increase as 
DHS focuses on apprehending and removing all crim-
inal noncitizens, such as through the Secure Commu-
nities initiative.51   
In addition, and in response to an overwhelmed immigration 
court system, ICE published guidance for dismissing select cases 
before EOIR where a benefit such as a marriage-based green card 
could be conferred by USCIS.52  Specifically, the memo advises the 
  
 48. Id. at 4 (citations omitted). 
 49. EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW, http://www.justice.gov/eoir/ 
(last visited July 17, 2011). 
 50. See Jurisdiction and Commencement of Proceedings Rule, 8 C.F.R. 
§ 1003.14 (2011) (“(a) Jurisdiction vests, and proceedings before an Immigration 
Judge commence, when a charging document is filed with the Immigration Court 
by the Service. . . .”). 
 51. Improving Efficiency and Ensuring Justice in the Immigration Court System: 
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. (2011) (statement of 
Karen T. Grisez, American Bar Association), available at 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/uncategorized/2011/2011may18_gri
sezs_t.authcheckdam.pdf. 
 52. Memorandum from John Morton on Guidance Regarding the Handling of 
Removal Proceedings of Aliens with Pending or Approved Applications or Peti-
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ICE Office of Chief Counsel to “dismiss” removal cases before the 
immigration court involving “adjustment of status” (green card) cas-
es in which the applicant appears eligible for a green card.  The pur-
pose of this guidance is to reduce the number of cases pending at the 
EOIR.53  The need for operationalizing a policy dismissing cases in 
which the noncitizen is eligible for an immigration benefit before the 
United States was underscored by EOIR Director Juan Osuna’s re-
cent recitation about the current number of cases pending at EOIR. 
At the end of FY 2010, EOIR’s immigration courts 
had 262,622 proceedings pending, marking an in-
crease of more than 40,000 proceedings pending over 
  
tions, 2–4 (Aug. 20, 2010), available at www.ice.gov/doclib/detention-
reform/pdf/aliens-pending-applications.pdf. 
 53. Id. at 3.  The relevant section of that memo states: 
As a matter of prosecutorial discretion and to promote the effi-
cient use of government resources, I hereby issue new ICE poli-
cy to govern the handling of removal proceedings involving al-
iens with applications or petitions pending with USCIS.  This 
policy extends both to the prosecution of removal proceedings 
by OCCs and to any associated detention decisions by Enforce-
ment and Removal Operations (ERO). 
. . . 
Where there is an underlying application or petition and ICE de-
termines in the exercise of discretion that a non-detained indi-
vidual appears eligible for relief from removal, OCC should 
promptly move to dismiss proceedings without prejudice before 
EOIR. 
. . . 
Only removal cases that meet the following criteria will be con-
sidered for dismissal:  
The alien must be the subject of an application or petition filed 
with USCIS to include a current priority date, if required, for ad-
justment of status; 
The alien appears eligible for relief as a matter of law and in the 
exercise of discretion;  
The alien must present a completed Application 10 Register 
Permanent Residence or Adjust Status (Form 1-485), if required; 
and  
The alien beneficiary must be statutorily eligible for adjustment 
of status (a waiver must be available for any ground of inadmis-
sibility). 
Id. at 2–3. 
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the end of FY 2009.  In the first half of FY 2011, that 
pending caseload grew by an additional 9,400.  This 
caseload is directly tied to annual increases in cases 
filed in the immigration courts by DHS.  In FY 2010, 
the immigration courts received 325,326 proceedings.  
By contrast, in FY 2007, proceedings received were 
279,430.54   
III. THE POLITICS OF IMMIGRATION AND DEFERRED ACTION 
A. Legislative Stalemates and Deferred Action  
The 2009–11 legislative debate on immigration helps demon-
strate the political context under which deferred action has been 
spotlighted.55  Efforts by select members of Congress, attorneys, and 
pro-immigration advocates to advance broad immigration reforms 
were unsuccessful despite the promise proffered by the Obama Ad-
ministration in 2008.56  In December 2010, the Senate failed to move 
  
 54. See Statement of Juan P. Osuna, supra note 39, at 2.  In response to the 
swelling court docket and recent Morton Memos, the American Bar Association 
has further recommended that: 
DHS personnel should be encouraged to reduce the burden on 
the removal adjudication system by exercising discretion to not 
serve a Notice to Appear on noncitizens who are prima facie eli-
gible for relief from removal, to concede eligibility for relief 
from removal after receipt of a clearly meritorious application, 
to stop litigating a case after key facts develop that make remov-
al unlikely, or to waive appeal in certain appropriate types of 
cases. 
Statement of Karen T. Grisez, supra note 51, at 7.  It should also be noted, the new 
Morton Memo on Prosecutorial Discretion and its focus on the role of ICE trial 
attorneys when appearing before EOIR in removal proceedings has the potential to 
reduce the docket at EOIR, especially if the memo becomes a tool for the ICE trial 
attorney to join in motions to terminate or dismiss cases that are not among the 
priorities identified by ICE. 
 55. This article does not attempt to analyze “why legislative reform has failed” 
nor does it suggest that prosecutorial discretion can ever be a substitute for such 
reforms. 
 56. Immigration Policy: Transition Blueprint, OBAMA-BIDEN TRANSITION 
PROJECT, 20–21 (2008), available at http://www.aila.org/content/fileviewer.aspx? 
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forward on the Development, Relief, and Education for Alien Mi-
nors Act (DREAM Act), a bill that would have provided legal status 
to eligible young residents who have been in the United States for an 
extended period of time, finished high school, and plan to enter col-
lege; after several years in “conditional” resident status, the DREAM 
Act would have enabled young people who have completed higher 
education or service in the military to achieve permanent residence 
in the United States.57  To many advocates, the failure of the 
DREAM Act was symbolic of an Administration with little will and, 
more importantly, a Congress unwilling to put the policy of regular-
izing status for arguably the most sympathetic population in the 
United States, namely, young people with great intellectual promise 
whose immigration status was beyond their control, before politics.58  
Weeks later, the 112th Congress opened up with a cadre of congres-
sional members at the National Press Club highlighting the benefits 
of repealing birthright citizenship.59  That Congress was willing to 
renounce children and infants, speaks volumes to the political land-
scape on “the Hill” with respect to the immigration question.60  
Whereas President Obama has made public announcements and 
  
docid=27611&linkid=188816.  For a longer discussion about previous efforts to 
enact legislative reform, see Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, Policy and Politics of 
Immigrants’ Rights, 16 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 387, 410–18 (2007). 
 57. See Development, Relief, and Education for Alien Minors Act of 2010, S. 
3992, 111th Cong. (2010), available at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-
bin/bdquery/z?d111:SN03992:; Development, Relief, and Education for Alien 
Minors Act of 2010, H.R. 6497, 111th Cong. (2010), available at 
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d111:HR06497:. 
 58. See, e.g., Brian Naylor, Democrats Push DREAM Act; Critics Call It Amnes-
ty, NPR.ORG (Dec. 6, 2010), http://www.npr.org/2010/12/06/131796206/ 
democrats-push-dream-act-critics-call-it-amnesty. 
 59. Julia Preston, State Lawmakers Outline Plans to End Birthright Citizenship, 
Drawing Outcry, NY TIMES, Jan. 5, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/ 
06/us/06immig.html. 
 60. See, e.g., Birthright Citizenship Act of 2011, H.R. 140, 112th Cong. (1st 
Sess. 2011), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-
112hr140ih/pdf/BILLS-112hr140ih.pdf; Marc Lacey, Birthright Citizenship 
Looms as Next Immigration Battle, NY TIMES, Jan. 4, 2011, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/05/us/politics/05babies.html; Washington Post 
Staff, DREAM Act delayed in Senate: Prospects of cloture by year's end fading, 
WASHINGTON POST, Dec. 9, 2010, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/ 2010/12/09/AR2010120903504.html. 
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hosted a handful of stakeholder meetings about the importance of 
comprehensive immigration reform, the outcome as of this writing 
has not led to any serious proposal by Congress about reforming 
immigration holistically, a legislative scheme that in past years has 
included a statutory update to the family and employment-based 
immigration system, a legal pathway for noncitizens to enter the 
United States in the future on the basis of work or a family relation-
ship, and a registration program that enables individuals and other 
special populations such as high school students and migrant work-
ers currently in the United States without authorization to come be-
fore the government and apply for a legal visa.61 
Meanwhile, staff members of USCIS circulated an internal draft 
memorandum outlining potential ways in which the agency could 
reprieve individuals and certain classes of persons who are ineligible 
for legal immigration status, but who nonetheless exhibit compelling 
qualities or equities.62  In discussing deferred action, that memoran-
dum acknowledged that it could be used as a tool to protect certain 
individuals or groups from the threat of removal.63 
USCIS can increase the use of deferred action.  De-
ferred action is an exercise of prosecutorial discretion 
  
 61. For a sampling of President Obama’s public discussion about comprehensive 
immigration reform, see David Jackson, Obama talks immigration with officials -- 
but no members of Congress, USA TODAY, Apr. 19, 2011, 
http://content.usatoday.com/communities/theoval/post/2011/04/obama-talks-
immigration-with-officials----but-no-members-of-congress/1; Julie Mason, Presi-
dent Obama Pushes Immigration Overhaul, POLITICO.COM (MAY 10, 2011), 
http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0511/54696.html;.  For an analysis of previ-
ous congressional proposals on comprehensive immigration reform; PRESIDENT 
OBAMA ON COMPREHENSIVE IMMIGRATION REFORM, 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/photos-and-video/video/president-obama-
comprehensive-immigration-reform (last visited July 17, 2011). See Shoba Si-
vaprasad Wadhia, Policy and Politics of Immigrants’ Rights, supra note 56; Shoba 
Sivaprasad Wadhia, Immigration: Mind Over Matter, 5 U. OF MD. L. J. ON RACE, 
RELIGION, GEND. & CLASS 201 (2005), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1346586. 
 62. Memorandum from Denise A. Vanison, et al, to Alejandro Mayorkas, on 
Administrative Alternatives to Comprehensive Immigration Reform (undated) (on 
file with author), available at http://abcnews.go.com/images/Politics/memo-on-
alternatives-to-comprehensive-immigration-reform.pdf. 
 63. Id. at 10–11. 
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not to pursue removal from the U.S. of a particular 
individual for a specific period of time . . . .  Were 
USCIS to increase significantly the use of deferred 
action, the agency would either require a separate ap-
propriation or independent funding stream.  Alterna-
tively, USCIS could design and seek expedited ap-
proval of a dedicated deferred action form and require 
a filing fee.64 
B. Congressional Criticism of Deferred Action  
Following the “leak” of the draft USCIS memo, select members 
of Congress freed themselves from working on a legislative solution 
and instead criticized the Department for its modest exercise of pros-
ecutorial discretion.  Notably, in a congressional hearing dated 
March 9, 2011, Senator Charles Grassley (R-IA) interrogated DHS 
Secretary Janet Napolitano about a memorandum drafted by a staff 
member at USCIS containing, among other things, a discussion 
about the use of prosecutorial discretion and deferred action in par-
ticular.65  The Secretary indicated that the Department had made 
roughly 900 deferred action grants, juxtaposing the agency’s 
395,000 removals during the same time period.66  Pro-immigration 
advocates were stunned by the record low number of actual deferred 
action grants in contrast with the previous Administration.67  For 
example, the American Immigration Lawyers Associationwrote to 
the Secretary:  “We are concerned that in your testimony on March 9 
before the Senate Judiciary Committee regarding prosecutorial dis-
cretion, you highlighted that the number of cases where discretion 
was favorably exercised was very small, suggesting that your de-
partment is discouraging and limiting its exercise.”68  Following the 
  
 64. Id. 
 65. Department of Homeland Security Oversight: Hearing Before the S. Comm. 
on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. (2011) (testimony of Janet Napolitano, Secretary, 
U.S. Department of Homeland Security).  
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Letter from AILA and Immigration Council to Janet Napolitano, DHS Secre-
tary, 1 (Apr. 6, 2011), available at 
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Senate hearing, La Opinion, the largest Hispanic newspaper in the 
United States, reported that DHS granted deferred action to only 542 
individuals.  The pro-immigration group America’s Voice pulled 
together a chart below based on the data from La Opinion and con-
cluded:  “According to our calculations, the Bush Administration 
averaged 771 deferred action grants and 301,418 deportations from 
2005-2008, while the Obama Administration averaged 661 deferred 
action grants and 391,348 deportations its first two years in office . . 
. .”69
The publication of the Morton Memo on Prosecutorial Discretion 
spurred a new wave of congressional criticism against the agency’s 
use of prosecutorial discretion and deferred action in particular.  On 
June 23, 2011, Congressman Lamar Smith announced his plans to 
http://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/sites/default/files/docs/AILA-AIC-
Napolitano-4-6-2011.pdf. 
 69. Dara Lind, La Opinion: Obama Has Granted a Record Low Number of De-
ferred Actions to Immigrants, AMERICA’S VOICE (Apr. 28, 2011),
http://americasvoiceonline.org/blog/entry/la_opinion_obama_has_granted_a_recor
d_low_number_of_deferred_actions. 
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introduce the “HALT (Hinder the Administration’s Legalization 
Temptation) Act” and issued a related “Dear Colleague” letter.70  
The HALT Act was introduced in July 2011 in both the House of 
Representatives and Senate and, among other provisions, would pre-
vent DHS from granting deferred action as a matter of prosecutorial 
discretion and “suspend” the handful of discretionary remedies 
available under the immigration laws for compelling cases.71  The 
politics behind the HALT Act are plentiful and illustrated in part by 
the fact that the bill expires on January 21, 2013, at the end of Presi-
dent Obama’s first term.72  The HALT Act was the centerpiece of a 
hearing in the House Judiciary’s Subcommittee on Immigration Pol-
icy and Enforcement on July 26, 2011.73   
Like with Lamar Smith and congressional members who support 
the HALT Act, the ICE union criticized the Morton Memo on Prose-
cutorial Discretion, calling such policies a “law enforcement night-
mare” and “just one of many new ICE policies in queue aimed at 
stopping the enforcement of U.S. immigration laws in the United 
States . . . .  Unable to pass its immigration agenda through legisla-
tion, the Administration is now implementing it through agency pol-
  
 70. “Dear Colleague” letter from Lamar Smith, House Judiciary Comm. Chair-
man, to members of Congress (June 23, 2011), available at 
http://big.assets.huffingtonpost.com/Smith_DearColleague.pdf. 
 71. Id. at 2–3.  See also Hinder the Administration’s Legalization Temptation 
Act (HALT Act), H.R. 2497, 112th Cong. (1st Sess. 2011), available at 
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-112hr2497ih/pdf/BILLS-112hr2497ih.pdf; 
Hinder the Administration’s Legalization Temptation Act (HALT Act), S. 1380, 
112th Cong. (1st Sess. 2011), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-
112s1380is/pdf/BILLS-112s1380is.pdf.  On a historical note, in 1999, Representa-
tive Lamar Smith went on record supporting prosecutorial discretion by co-
authoring a letter from select members of Congress to the immigration agency.  
For a copy of the letter and commentary about Rep. Smith’s reverse position on 
prosecutorial discretion, see Editorial, The Forgetful Mr. Smith, NY TIMES, July 
12, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/13/opinion/13wed3.html. 
 72. See “Dear Colleague” letter from Lamar Smith, House Judiciary Comm. 
Chairman,  supra note 70, at 3; see also Hearing Information: Hearing on H.R. 
2497, U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, 
http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/hear_07262011_2.html (last visited July 31, 
2011). 
 73. Hearing Information: Hearing on H.R. 2497, supra note 72. 
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icy.”74  The union’s president, Chris Cane, testified at the July 26, 
2011, hearing which attacked the Morton Memo on Prosecutorial 
discretion and ICE’s lack of guidance and resources to implement 
the memo.75  
Adding fuel to the fire, Senator John Cornyn (R-Texas) accused 
DHS of operating a secret policy of dismissing high priority immi-
gration cases as a matter of prosecutorial discretion after his staff 
reviewed a series of internal memoranda and emails retrieved by the 
Houston Chronicle.76  On July 5, 2011, House Judiciary Committee 
Chairman Lamar Smith (R-Texas) and Homeland Security Sub-
committee Chairman Robert Aderholt (R-Ala.) sent a letter to Secre-
tary Janet Napolitano chronicling the release of various draft and 
official agency memoranda on prosecutorial discretion and express-
ing concerns that these memos are being used to “circumvent Con-
gress and use executive branch authority to allow illegal immigrants 
to remain in the United States.”77  On July 13, 2011, and citing to the 
Morton Memo on Prosecutorial Discretion, Orrin Hatch, former 
chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee, joined Sen. Jeff Ses-
  
 74. Press Release, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, ICE Agent’s 
Union Speaks Out on Director’s “Discretionary Memo” Calls on the public to take 
action, 1 (June 23, 2011), available at http://www.iceunion.org/download/286-
287-press-release-pd-memo.pdf. 
 75. Immigration Legislation: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Immigration 
Policy and Enforcement and the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. (2011) 
(statement of Chris Crane, President, National Immigration and Customs En-
forcement Council 118 American Federation of Government Employees), availa-
ble at http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/pdf/Crane07262011.pdf.  Beyond the 
scope of this article but noteworthy are Crane’s remarks about the importance of 
training, and the ostentatious lack of training or guidance field officers received on 
the Morton Memo on Prosecutorial Discretion prior to its publication.  
 76. See Susan Carroll, Report: Feds downplayed ICE case dismissals; Docu-
ments show agency had approval to dismiss some deportation cases, HOUSTON 
CHRONICLE, June 27, 2011, 5:30 AM, 
http://www.chron.com/disp/story.mpl/chronicle/7627737.html; Susan Carroll, 
Cornyn presses Napolitano over immigration case dismissals, HOUSTON 
CHRONICLE, June 28, 2011, 5:30 AM  
http://www.chron.com/disp/story.mpl/chronicle/7631394.html. 
 77. Letter from Lamar Smith, House Judiciary Comm. Chairman, and Robert 
Aderholt, Homeland Security Subcomm. Chairman to Janet Napolitano, DHS 
Secretary, 1 (July 5, 2011), available at 
http://judiciary.house.gov/news/pdfs/Administrative%20Amnesty.pdf. 
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sions (R-Ala.) and four more Republican colleagues in urging U.S. 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) to stop trying to 
“grant administrative amnesty to millions of illegal aliens” and to 
start enforcing immigration laws.78 
C. Congressional Support for Deferred Action 
Deferred action has not been contentious with every Member of 
Congress.  Select Members of Congress have taken positions sup-
porting the executive branch’s exercise of prosecutorial discretion.  
For example on April 13, 2011, 22 U.S. Senators sent a letter to 
President Obama urging him to grant deferred action to qualifying 
DREAM Act students who are not a law enforcement priority to 
DHS.79  The letter states:  
We would support a grant of deferred action to all 
young people who meet the rigorous requirements 
necessary to be eligible . . . under the DREAM       
Act. . . .  We strongly believe that DREAM Act stu-
dents should not be removed from the United States, 
because they have great potential to contribute to our 
country and children should not be punished for their 
parents’ mistakes.80   
In their letter, the Senators are critical of the Department’s lack 
of a process for applying for deferred action and the fact that many 
DREAM Act students are unaware of this form of relief.81  On the 
  
 78. Press Release, Sen. Orrin Hatch, Hatch, Senate Colleagues Press U.S. Immi-
gration and Customs Enforcement to Enforce Immigration Laws (July 13, 2011), 
http://hatch.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/releases?ContentRecord_id=86f43fd7-
bb7c-4d03-8bb8-f83ea8468843. 
 79. Letter from Harry Reid, Senator, et al., to President Barack Obama, 2 (Apr. 
13, 2011), available at http://www.scribd.com/doc/53014785/22-Senators-Ltr-
Obama-Relief-for-DREAMers-4. 
 80. Id.  For an example of a DREAM Act student granted deferred action, see 
Michigan Student's Deportation Put On Hold, Warren Student Wants To Gradu-
ate, Continue Schooling At University Of Michigan, CLICKONDETROIT.COM (last 
updated May 25, 2011, 9:36 AM), 
http://www.clickondetroit.com/news/28010704/detail.html. 
 81. Letter from Harry Reid, Senator, et al., to President Barack Obama, supra 
note 79, at 2. 
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heels of this letter, Senator Charles Schumer, a Democrat from New 
York and Chair of the Judiciary Committee remarked in another let-
ter to DHS: 
According to a March 2, 2011 memorandum of John 
Morton, Director of Immigration and Customs En-
forcement, ICE only has the funding to remove 
400,000 individuals per year.  Given that this entire 
number can be filled by criminal aliens and others 
posing security threats, it makes eminent sense to fo-
cus ICE's enforcement efforts on these criminals and 
security threats, rather than non-criminal populations.  
On a daily basis, my office receives requests for assis-
tance in many compelling immigration cases.  These 
cases often involve non-criminal immigrants such as: 
(1) high-school valedictorians and honor students 
who did not enter the country through their own voli-
tion and yet are being deported solely for the illegal 
conduct of their parents; (2) bi-national same-sex 
married couples who are being discriminated against 
based on their sexual orientation who would other-
wise be able to remain in the United States if they 
were in an opposite-sex marriage; (3) agricultural 
workers who perform back-breaking labor and are 
providing for their families; and (4) immigrant par-
ents with U.S. citizen children, whose deportation 
will only lead to increased costs to the states in foster 
care and government benefits.82 
On June 28, 2011, Senator Al Franken (D-MN) indicated that he 
would be sending his own letter to the Department in support of de-
ferred action for DREAM Act students, remarking, “I'd like to let 
everyone know that today I'll be sending a letter, my own letter, to 
the president in support of deferred action . . . .  I think it is the least 
  
 82. Letter from the Senate Judiciary Subcomm. on Immigration to Janet Napoli-
tano, DHS Secretary (Apr. 14, 2011), available at 
http://arnolaw.blogspot.com/2011/04/letter-from-senate-judiciary.html. 
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that we can do to stop this injustice from getting any worse.”83  And 
on July 21, 2011, seventy-five Democratic members from the House 
of Representatives sent a letter to President Obama critical of Repub-
lican efforts to freeze executive branch authority by introducing leg-
islation like the HALT Act.84  Likewise, Democratic members of the 
House Subcommittee on Immigration Policy and Enforcement ex-
pressed their opposition to the HALT Act at the July 26, 2011, hear-
ing and the importance of preserving the few discretionary remedies 
available under the immigration laws, like deferred action.  Rep. Zoe 
Lofgren (D-CA) expressed her disbelief that Congress would waste 
so much time on a bill like the HALT Act and pointed to the unin-
tended human consequences if the legislation were enacted.85  
Meanwhile, Rep. John Conyers (D-MI) focused on the politics of the 
HALT Act noting that “[The HALT Act] is not an attack on the 
Presidency, but an attack on the President himself.”86  
D. Public Activities and Support for Prosecutorial Discretion  
The political context for, and lack of, transparency of deferred 
action is also illustrated by the public’s response to the various agen-
cy memoranda and legislative reactions to prosecutorial discretion in 
the last two years.  This section illustrates the activities and positions 
on prosecutorial discretion by select bar associations, journalists, and 
immigration advocates since the 2010 publication of The Role of 
Prosecutorial Discretion in Immigration Law.  Relying on its 
  
 83. DREAM Act Education for Alien Minors: Hearing on S. 952 Before the Sub-
comm. on Immigration, Refugees and Border Security of the S. Comm. on the Ju-
diciary, 112th Cong. 27 (2011) (statement of Sen. Al Franken). 
 84. Letter from Democratic members from the House of Representatives to Pres-
ident Barack Obama, 1 (July 21, 2011), 
http://www.gutierrez.house.gov/images/stories/HALT_Act_letter_complete.pdf. 
 85. See The Hinder the Administration's Legalization Temptation Act: Hearing 
on H.R. 2497 before the Subcomm. on Immigration Policy and Enforcement of the 
H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 3–4 (2011). 
 86. Id. at 5.  For a short analysis of the HALT Act and related politics, see Mar-
shall Fitz, HALT the Insanity: New Hyperpartisan Bill Tries to Handcuff the Pres-
ident, CENTER FOR AMERICAN PROGRESS (July 25, 2011), 
http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2011/07/halt_act.html. 
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groundbreaking report on immigration adjudications,87 the American 
Bar Association testified before the Senate Judiciary Committee on 
May 17, 2011, highlighting the importance of prosecutorial discre-
tion:  
Prioritization, including the prudent use of prosecuto-
rial discretion, is an essential function of any adjudi-
cation system.  Unfortunately, it has not been widely 
utilized in the immigration context.  There are nu-
merous circumstances in which a respondent is not 
likely to be removed regardless of the outcome of the 
legal case.  The most obvious cases are those where 
the respondent is terminally ill or is the parent or 
spouse of someone who is critically ill, but there are 
other examples where it is clear from the circum-
stances at the beginning of the process that the inter-
ests in removing the respondent will almost certainly 
be outweighed on humanitarian or other grounds.88 
The American Immigration Lawyers Association and its sister 
group, American Immigration Council, have also published infor-
mation about prosecutorial discretion.  To illustrate, the Immigration 
Council published a practice advisory for immigration attorneys 
about the strategies and forms of prosecutorial discretion, as well as 
an article on the highs and lows of the June 30, 2010, Morton 
Memo.89  Similarly, the American Immigration Lawyers Association 
conducted a nationwide poll of its more than 11,000 members re-
garding their experiences with prosecutorial discretion requests to 
  
 87. See AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION COMMISSION ON IMMIGRATION, 
http://www.americanbar.org/groups/public_services/immigration.html (last visited 
July 18, 2011).  
 88. Statement of Karen T. Grisez, supra note 51, at 7. 
 89. See Prosecutorial Discretion: How to Advocate for Your Client, LEGAL 
ACTION CENTER (June 24, 2011), http://www.legalactioncenter.org/practice-
advisories/prosecutorial-discretion-how-advocate-your-client; Wadhia, Reading 
the Morton Memo, supra note 40, at 4.  See also Just The Facts, IMMIGRATION 
POLICY CENTER, http://www.immigrationpolicy.org/just-facts/executive-action-
resource-page (last visited July 18, 2011). 
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ICE,90 and received more than 200 responses.  AILA sent a follow 
up letter to DHS remarking: 
Many of these cases involve people who, if deported, 
would be separated from U.S. citizen and Lawful 
Permanent Resident immediate family members who 
depend on their noncitizen relatives for care and sup-
port.  Several cases involve people who suffer from 
severe medical conditions; who are victims of domes-
tic violence, trafficking or other serious crimes; or 
who are serving as valuable witnesses in criminal 
prosecutions.  Many are students whose academic 
performance shows great promise for their ability to 
contribute to this nation in the future.91 
Similarly, the former president of AILA, David Leopold, pub-
lished an article in Bloomberg Law Reports describing the concept 
of prosecutorial discretion and authorities of the Executive Branch to 
grant deferred action in compelling cases.92  Likewise, attorney 
Margaret Stock testified about the importance of deferred action at 
the July 26, 2011, hearing on the HALT Act by showcasing the 
types of individuals that would be deported without the discretionary 
relief the HALT Act seeks to “halt.”93  One example provided by 
Professor Stock in her written testimony included:  
An example of a person who will be harmed immedi-
ately by passage of the HALT Act is Fereshteh Sani, 
a woman whose father and mother were executed by 
  
 90. Prosecutorial Discretion Survey, AILA (2011), 
http://www.surveymonkey.com/s/LMMTBSG. 
 91. Letter from AILA and Immigration Council to Janet Napolitano, DHS Secre-
tary, supra note 68, at 2. 2 (Apr. 6, 2011).  
 92. David W. Leopold, What Legal Authority Does President Obama Have to 
Act on Immigration?, BLOOMBERG LAW REPORTS, 2 (May 16, 2011), available at 
http://www.aila.org/content/default.aspx?docid=35404. 
 93. Executive Immigration Enforcement Limitations: Hearing Before the Sub-
comm. on Immigration Policy and Enforcement and the H. Comm. on the Judici-
ary, 112th Cong. (2011) (statement of Margaret D. Stock, Adjunct Professor, Uni-
versity of Alaska Anchorage), available at  U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, 3–4 (2011) 
http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/pdf/Stock07262011.pdf. 
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Iranian government officials in 1988.  Fereshteh has 
been in the United States since 1999, and has gradu-
ated from college and medical school here; she is cur-
rently a resident in Emergency Medicine at Bellevue 
Hospital in New York City.  She is in the United 
States on a grant of deferred action, which is sched-
uled to expire on September 14, 2011.94  
Like the private bar associations, and following the administra-
tive and legislative roadblocks on immigration during the first two 
years of the Obama Administration, public policy think-tanks, advo-
cacy groups, and law firms have published affirmative positions on 
deferred action and prosecutorial discretion more generally.  For 
example, the Migration Policy Institute highlighted the importance 
of prosecutorial discretion in a 2011 report highlighting actions for 
the Executive Branch in the absence of legislative reform.95  Specifi-
cally, the MPI report recommends that the Government develop a 
uniform set of enforcement priorities and, in cases of lesser priority, 
exercise prosecutorial discretion in the form of deferred action with 
work authorization.96  Similarly, the 10,000 membership organiza-
tion NAFSA: Association of International Educators highlighted the 
importance of prosecutorial discretion in a May, 2011, press release 
stating: 
We urge President Obama to exercise his executive 
authority and act now to direct the Department of 
Homeland Security to implement such a deferred-
action policy.  This is a matter of humanitarian neces-
sity, and it would represent the kind of national lead-
ership that is needed to move the one-sided, enforce-
ment-first debate about immigration that has so far 
  
 94. Id. at 9. 
 95. Donald M. Kerwin, Doris Meissner & Margie McHugh, Executive Action on 
Immigration: Six Ways to Make the System Work Better, MIGRATION POLICY 
INSTITUTE, 14–19 (2011), http://www.migrationpolicy.org/pubs/administrative 
fixes.pdf. 
 96. Id.     
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poisoned prospects for what is ultimately needed – 
comprehensive reform – in a more fruitful direction.97 
Law firms, law clinics, and advocacy organization have also as-
sembled practical tools for noncitizens potentially eligible for de-
ferred action.  In May 2011, Duane Morris, Maggio Kattar, and 
Pennsylvania State University’s Dickinson School of Law published 
a practitioner’s toolkit addressing private bills and deferred action, 
underscoring the dearth of information about how to go about apply-
ing for deferred action and the heightened importance of pursuing 
these forms of relief.98  Developed to help immigration judges, law-
yers, public officials, and nonprofit groups navigate what has be-
come a last-resort option for those facing deportation, the toolkit 
includes “Best Practices” from attorneys around the country; a sum-
mary of the laws and procedures governing deferred action and pri-
vate bills; sample letters of support, exhibit lists, and legal briefs; 
and selected resources.99  In June, 2011, Asian Law Caucus, Educa-
tors for Fair Consideration, DreamActivist.org, and National Immi-
grant Youth Alliance published a resource manual titled “Education 
Not Deportation: A Guide for Undocumented Youth in Removal 
Proceedings.”100  This manual is “intended to aid certain undocu-
mented students and their lawyers to fight effectively throughout a 
removal (deportation) proceeding.”101  The production of these 
toolkits underscores the absence of quality information about the 
deferred action program and procedures.   
The growing chorus of immigration attorneys, advocates, and 
media outlets speaking about the importance of prosecutorial discre-
tion in immigration law is striking and in part responds to their frus-
tration about the stalemate in Congress over immigration.  While I 
  
 97. Press Release, NAFSA: Association of International Educators, NAFSA 
Statement on Immigration Reform and Undocumented Students (May 10, 2011), 
http://www.nafsa.org/PressRoom/PressRelease.aspx?id=26639. 
 98. New toolkit sheds light on lesser known immigration remedies, PENN STATE 
LAW (May 17, 2011), http://law.psu.edu/news/immigration_toolkit. 
 99. Id. 
100. Guide for Undocumented Youth in Removal Proceedings, ASIAN LAW 
CAUCUS, http://www.asianlawcaucus.org/alc/publications/guide-for-
undocumented-youth-in-removal-proceedings/ (last visited July 18, 2011). 
101.   Id. at 6. 
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disagree with those who label the recent agency memoranda on 
prosecutorial discretion as a “backdoor amnesty” or alternative for 
legislation like the DREAM Act, I nevertheless believe that some 
potential beneficiaries of immigration legislation are likely to carry 
qualities that resemble the equities listed in the O.I., Meissner 
Memo, and Morton Memoranda.  As such, it should not be surpris-
ing that some would-be DREAM Act beneficiaries for example, are 
also deserving of deferred action.102 
IV. ANALYZING DEFERRED ACTION CASES 
A.  Previous Empirical Studies 
Leon Wildes is an attorney who represented the former Beatle 
John Lennon in his immigration case.103  Believing that Lennon’s 
prosecution by INS was politically motivated, Wildes (on behalf of 
Lennon) corresponded with INS for more than one year to gain in-
formation about INS’ deferred action program.104  Conceding that 
records pertaining to the deferred action were not specifically ex-
empt from the FOIA, and moreover existed as an identifiable “class 
or category” of documents, INS provided Wildes with case histories 
of 1843 deferred action cases granted by INS.105  Upon examining 
the 1843 cases, Wildes calculated that deferred action was granted to 
individuals subject to a spectrum of deportability or excludability 
grounds, and suggested that equitable factors played are far greater 
role in the outcome than the actual charge.106 
  
102.   For a longer explanation about why prosecutorial discretion cannot serve as 
a substitute for legislative reforms, see Wadhia, supra note 3, at 297–98. 
103.  E.g., Wadhia, supra note 3, at 246-47; Wildes, The Litigative Use of the 
FOIA, supra note 2, at 42. 
104.  Wildes, The Litigative Use of the FOIA, supra note 2, at 45; Wildes, The 
Nonpriority Program Part I, supra note 2; Wildes, The Nonpriority Program Part 
II, supra note 2; Wildes, The Cultural Lag, supra note 2, at 280.  See generally 
Wildes, The Operations Instructions, supra note 2 (discussing the importance of 
John Lennon’s immigration case as the first to provide the public with knowledge 
of the Nonpriority Program). 
105.  Wildes, The Litigative Use of the FOIA, supra note 2, at 48–49. 
106.  Id. at 52–53 & n.35. 
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In Wildes’s study, more than 98% of the deferred action cases 
granted by INS involved one of the following discernable factors 
that drove the agency’s decision: individuals who were of tender age 
or elderly age; mentally incompetent; medically infirm; or would be 
separated from their family members if deported.107  Separation from 
family was the greatest category of cases analyzed by Wildes that 
led to a favorable decision by the agency.108  Moreover, a U.S. citi-
zen or lawful permanent resident (LPR) family member was in-
volved in more than 80% of the 1,843 cases granted.109  This data 
indicates that the presence of a family member with long-term ties to 
the United States was important, but not always determinative, to 
whether or not the agency granted deferred action.   
Seeking to update his 1979 article on deferred action, Wildes 
filed FOIA requests to the Central, Western, and Eastern Regional 
offices of USCIS for all records of cases in which deferred action 
was granted.110  Wildes received information from the Central and 
Western regions, which cumulated to 499 deferred action cases.111  
Wildes received some cases that were denied or discontinued.112  
The data indicated that nearly 89% of the deferred action cases fur-
nished to Wildes were granted.113  Like his 1979 study, Wildes 
found that USCIS was granting deferred action based on a strict set 
of criteria as opposed to arbitrarily.114  Specifically, the cases granted 
deferred action fell within seven specific categories: (1) separation 
of family; (2) medically infirm; (3) tender age; (4) mentally incom-
petent; (5) potential negative publicity; (6) victims of domestic vio-
lence; and (7) elderly age.115  In both studies, Wildes found that sep-
aration from a family member was an overriding factor in deferred 
  
107.  Id. at 53 & n.36. 
108.  Id. at 53, 58. 
109.  Id. at 60 & n.45. 
110.  Wildes, A Possible Remedy, supra note 2, at 825. 
111.  Id. at 826–27. 
112.  Id. at 826 & n.44 (“The calculation assumes that all relevant cases, whether 
approved, denied, or removed by the two regions, were released and forwarded to 
[Wildes].”).  
113.  Id. at 826. 
114.  Id. at 830. 
115.  Id.   
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action grants.116  The second greatest operating factor for cases 
granted in the 2003 study was medical infirmity, which according to 
Wildes included “life-threatening” situations such as HIV and can-
cer.117  These figures indicate that both in 1976 and in 2003, the 
agency relied predominantly on humanitarian criteria in granting 
deferred action.118    
B.  FOIA Requests to ICE 
I filed my first FOIA request to ICE on October 6, 2009, request-
ing for all records and policies involving prosecutorial discretion.  A 
reply letter from ICE was sent on November 19, 2009, acknowledg-
ing receipt of the request, assigning a control number to the request, 
and stating that ICE had “queried the appropriate program offices 
within ICE for responsive records.”119  On November 30, 2009, an-
other letter was sent from ICE stating that the request was “overly 
broad” and requesting clarification.120  On December 19, 2009, less 
than thirty days later, a clarifying letter was sent to ICE.121  On Feb-
ruary 3, 2010, the status of the request was “administratively 
closed.”122  According to ICE, my request was closed on December 
30, 2009, because there was “no response to letter requesting addi-
tional information.” 
I sent a new FOIA request to ICE on March 30, 2010, containing 
an expanded request for information on prosecutorial discretion and 
  
116.  Wildes, A Possible Remedy, supra note 2, at 831 & n.64. 
117.  Id. at 831–32. 
118.  Id. at 832. 
119.  Letter from Catrina M. Pavlik-Keenan, Freedom of Info. Act Dir., U.S. Im-
migration & Customs Enforcement, to author (Nov. 19, 2009) (assigning to the 
request reference number: 2010FOIA1069) (on file with author). 
120.  Letter from Catrina M. Pavlik-Kennan, Freedom of Info. Act Dir., U.S. Im-
migration & Customs Enforcement, to author (Nov. 30, 2009) (on file with au-
thor). 
121.  Letter from author to Catrina M. Pavlik-Kennan, Freedom of Info. Act Dir., 
U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement (Dec. 19, 2009) (on file with author). 
122.  Letter from U.S. Customs & Immigration Enforcement to author (Feb. 3, 
2010) (on file with author). 
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deferred action.123  No response from ICE was received.  On July 12, 
2010, a follow up e-mail was sent to ICE for a status update on the 
March 30, 2010, request, but no response was received.124  On No-
vember 9, 2010, I followed up with a contact in ICE to inquire about 
the status of my request and learned that ICE had no record of the 
request.125  On November 24, 2010, ICE e-mailed me with a clarify-
ing question about whether I preferred open or closed cases as well 
as detained and non-detained cases.126  In January, 2011, I received a 
yellow package from ICE holding a single compact disc containing a 
single chart identifying only a handful of active deferred action cases 
between the years of FY 2003 and 2010.127  This chart is pasted be-
low and, if complete, indicates that ICE granted less than 500 de-
ferred action cases between 2003 and 2010.  I contacted ICE by 
phone and e-mail in February, 2011, and at the time learned that ICE 
had mistakenly sent the disc without a letter.128  ICE electronically 
sent a formal decision letter on February 9, 2011.129  The letter itself 
indicated that a full search of the ICE Office for Enforcement and 
Removal yielded the single chart below.130 
  
123.  Letter from author to U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Serv., U.S. Immigra-
tion & Customs Enforcement & U.S. Customs & Border Protection (Mar. 30, 
2010) (on file with author).  
124.  E-mail from Nicole Comstock, Research Assistant of author, to U.S. Immi-
gration & Customs Enforcement (July 12, 2010, 11:20 EST) (on file with author). 
125.  E-mail from Andrew Strait, U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, to 
author (Nov. 9, 2010, 12:51 EST) (on file with author). 
126.  E-mail from Ryan McDonald, Paralegal Specialist, U.S. Immigration & 
Customs Enforcement, to author (Nov. 24, 2010, 11:07 EST) (on file with author). 
127.  U.S. IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, NO. OF ACTIVE CASES 
GRANTED DEFERRED ACTION STATUS SINCE CY 2003, (undated) (on file with 
author). 
128.  E-mail from Ryan McDonald, Paralegal Specialist, Immigration & Customs 
Enforcement, to author (Feb. 2011, 12:27 EST) (“Attached is a copy of the ICE 
response letter that was supposed to be included with the CD.”) (on file with au-
thor). 
129.  Id. 
130.  Id.  Note that the letter itself was dated December 17, 2010. 
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C. Chart Provided by ICE: Number of Active Cases Granted Deferred   
Action Status Since CY 2003 
            
CY Detained Non Detained Total     
2003 0 117 117     
2004 0 68 68     
2005 0 62 62     
2006 0 64 64     
2007 0 71 71     
2008 0 39 39     
2009 2 34 36     
2010 1 15 16     
Total 3 470 473     
            
As of IIDS November 29, 2010 as provided by the Statistical 
Tracking Unit. 
Data only reflects Deferred Action Granted and Case Status Active 
(i.e. open cases).  Data cannot be reported for Deferred Action Granted, 
Case Status inactive (i.e. closed cases).  
 
Concerned in part that ICE did not make a complete search, I 
filed an appeal with ICE on March 29, 2011, hoping to receive more 
data.131  As to the adequacy of its search, the appeal letter highlight-
ed the data Wildes was able to retrieve in the late 1970s and early 
2000s and also indicated: 
Responsive records [to my FOIA request] exist that 
were not included in ICE’s response.  Specifically, 
records on deferred action are required to be main-
tained under the Detention and Removal Operations 
and Procedure Manual § 20.8(c).  The Manual pro-
  
131.  Letter from author to Assoc. Gen. Counsel, Dep’t of Homeland Sec. (Mar. 
29, 2011) (appealing adverse decision in FOIA matter 2011FOIA1845) (on file 
with author). 
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vides that all deferred action considerations be sum-
marized using a Form G-312 and placed in the alien’s 
A-file.  Decisions regarding grants and denials of de-
ferred action must also be in writing and signed by an 
agency official making the determination.  Production 
of these records would be responsive to the original 
FOIA request, even if redaction were required to pro-
tect an individual’s privacy interests . . . .132 
On May 18, 2011, I contacted ICE by telephone and learned that 
ICE had not received the FOIA appeal.  As such, the appeal was en-
tered into ICE’s system on May 18, 2011, nearly two months after 
the original appeal was filed.133  On May 24, 2011, I communicated 
for up to an hour with an ICE FOIA officer in charge of appeals to 
clarify the procedural history of my FOIA request and confirmed 
that the date of my original appeal letter was filed within sixty days 
of ICE’s original decision letter, so that my appeal would be pre-
served.134  Hearing nothing for two months, I called the ICE FOIA 
office on July 27, 2011 to inquire about the status of my appeal.  I 
was told that I would need to speak with the same ICE FOIA officer 
and thereafter provided a callback number with the expectation that I 
would receive a return phone call.135  In a letter dated September 27, 
2011 ICE denied my appeal regarding the adequacy of ICE’s 
search.136  According to the letter, ICE conducted an additional 
  
132.  Id. 
133.  Letter from Susan Mathias, Chief, Gov’t Info. Law Div., U.S. Immigration & 
Customs Enforcement, Office of the Principal Legal Advisor, to author (May 18, 
2011) (“On behalf of the Chief for the Government Information Law Division, we 
acknowledge your appeal request of 2011FOIA1845 and are assigning it number 
OPLA11-181 for tracking purposes.”) (on file with author). 
134.  Phone Conversation with Mark Graff, Freedom of Info. Act Officer, U.S. 
Immigration & Customs Enforcement (May 24, 2011) (discussing 
2011FOIA1845). 
135.  Phone Call to U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, Freedom of Info. 
Act Office (July 27, 2011) (attempting to discuss 2011FOIA1845 and OPLA11-
181). 
136.  Letter from Catrina M. Pavlik-Kennan, Freedom of Info. Act Dir., U.S. Im-
migration & Customs Enforcement, to author (Sep. 27, 2011) (regarding matter 
number OPLA-181, 2011FOIAFOIA14736) (on file with author). 
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search on remand of the Office of the Principal Legal Advisor 
(OPLA) and found that no records were responsive.137 
D.  FOIA Requests to USCIS 
My initial FOIA request to USCIS headquarters was made on 
October 6, 2009.138  A letter was sent from USCIS on October 9, 
2009, which acknowledged receipt of my request and assigned it a 
control number.139  On October 28, 2009, a second letter was sent 
from USCIS, requesting additional information about the records 
sought.140  More specifically, USCIS required the inquiry be made 
regarding particular individuals with their consent.  On February 9, 
2010, the FOIA request was closed.141   
I made a second and more detailed FOIA request on March 30, 
2010.  USCIS sent a response on April 1, 2010, assigning the request 
a control number.142  As of August 31, 2010, my FOIA request was 
listed on the USCIS website as 65 out of 219 requests pending in 
Track 2.  After nearly one year without a response, I discussed my 
request with the Office of Citizenship and Immigration Services’ 
Ombudsman on February 25, 2011; the office, which had initiated a 
study of deferred action processing, reviewed and inquired with 
USCIS about the status of the FOIA request.143  On March 11, 2011, 
I received an e-mail from a USCIS FOIA officer stating “[we have] 
received most of the records responsive to your request and are con-
tacting an additional program office to determine if additional rec-
  
137.  Id. 
138.  Letter from author to U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Serv. (Oct. 6, 2009) 
(on file with author).   
139.  Letter from T. Diane Cejka, Dir., U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Serv., to 
author (Oct. 9, 2009) (assigning FOIA request control number: NRC2009057166) 
(on file with author).  
140.  Letter from T. Diane Cejka, Dir., U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Serv., to 
author (Oct. 27, 2009) (concerning control number NRC2009057166) (on file with 
author). 
141.  Id. 
142.  Letter from T. Diane Cejka, Dir., U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Serv., to 
author (Apr. 1, 2010) (on file with author).  
143.  E-mail from Gary Merson, Office of the U.S. Citizenship & Immigration 
Serv. Ombudsman, to author (Feb. 25, 2011, 18:41 EST) (on file with author). 
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ords exist on this subject.”144  Three months later, in a letter dated 
June 17, 2011, USCIS responded to my FOIA request with three 
compact discs, which together contained a cover letter, a 270-page 
PDF document containing data, and several spreadsheets listing sta-
tistical data.145  A subsequent conversation with the FOIA officer 
responsible for implementing the FOIA request indicated that de-
ferred action records from FY 2003 through FY 2010 were requested 
from every USCIS regional service center and field office.146  Be-
cause USCIS does not formally track information about deferred 
action, the data I received was variable depending on the office and 
location.  It is neither possible to conclude that the records I received 
were complete, nor is it possible to analyze the entirety of what I 
received, because there is great disparity between how the data on 
deferred action is collected and recorded by each office, if at all.  
The legible data I received on deferred action came in one of three 
variations: (1) spreadsheet or chart; (2) Form G-312s Deferred Ac-
tion Case Summary; and/or (3) written request or memorandum by 
the applicant or attorney seeking deferred action.147  To manage the 
data and create a meaningful qualitative analysis, I did not incorpo-
rate data that was unclear or cases where deferred action appeared to 
serve as a pre-adjudication form of relief – i.e., those who filed ap-
plications for relief as a victim of trafficking, crime, or abuse (a.k.a., 
prospective U or T visa holders).148   
  
144.  E-mail from Tembra Greenwood, Nat’l Records Ctr., Freedom of Info. Act 
Div., to author (Mar. 11, 2011, 13:48 EST) (referring to NRC2010021400) (on file 
with the author).  The email also estimated the author’s FOIA request would be 
completed in approximately three months.  Id.  
145.  Letter from Jill A. Eggleston, Dir., Freedom of Info. Act Operations, U.S. 
Customs & Immigration Serv., to author (June 17, 2011) (on file with author); see 
infra note 161.  
146.  Phone Conversation with Tembra Greenwood, Nat’l Records Ctr., Freedom 
of Info. Act Div. (June 28, 2011). 
147.  Eggleston, supra note 145. 
148.  For an overview of how deferred action serves as important form of relief 
for abuse victims who are eligible and awaiting trafficking related visas, see Letter 
from organizations to Reps. Lamar Smith, John Conyers, Elton Gallegly, & Zoe 
Lofgren (July 25, 2011) (on file with author). 
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More than 100 cases involved Haitian citizens who entered the 
United States after the 2010 earthquake.149  Much of the data on cas-
es involving Haitians applying for deferred action after the earth-
quake lacked information about the factual information and/or out-
come.  About fifty of these cases included some information, mostly 
in the form of copies of deferred action request letters submitted, and 
involved individuals who: entered the United States as B-2 visitor; 
were transported to the United States; had at least one family mem-
ber already living in the United States; had their home destroyed 
during the earthquake; and/or entered the United States with minor 
children.150  In some cases, the applicant was forced to separate from 
a spouse or child in Haiti.151  Below is a sampling of the case sum-
maries provided in some of the USCIS logs: 
 
 Thirteen-year-old girl came to the United States 
with her seventeen-year-old sister; house de-
stroyed by earthquake; living with United States 
Citizen (USC) aunt and legal guardian in the 
United States; attending school in the United 
States.152  
 Entered United States on B-2 visa with two 
daughters, one a USC; owned warehouse in Haiti 
that was destroyed by the earthquake; many cus-
tomers killed in earthquake; living with brother in 
United States.153 
 Entered United States with twelve-year-old USC 
son as evacuees after earthquake in Haiti; home 
and business destroyed by quake; son was injured 
in earthquake.154 
  
149.  Eggleston, supra note 145. 
150.  Id. 
151.  Id. 
152.  Letter from [name removed] to Dep’t of Homeland Sec. (July 7, 2010) (on 
file with author). 
153.  Affidavit in Support of Deferred Action Status for [name removed] (June 
22, 2010) (on file with author).  
154.  Letter from [name removed] to A. Castro, Acting Field Office Dir., Dep’t of 
Homeland Sec. (June 30, 2010) (on file with author). 
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 Entered with twelve-year-old daughter; left Haiti 
to escape from man who had sexually abused his 
daughter; the criminal escaped from jail when it 
was damaged in earthquake and told subject he 
was going to abuse daughter again.155 
 Infant USC daughter; family home destroyed in 
earthquake; wife and one child entered the United 
States as evacuees; children have health problems 
as a result of the quake; wife persecuted by Hai-
tian gang members.156  
 Transported to United States with three minor 
children as evacuees following earthquake; one 
child is a USC; home severely damaged; husband 
remains in Haiti working and trying to rebuild 
home.157 
 Transported to United States with three minor 
children as evacuees following earthquake; infant 
child is a USC; family home and business de-
stroyed in quake; subject is diabetic and requires 
insulin shots twice daily.158 
 
In July 2011, the DHS Ombudsman recognized the influx in 
post-earthquake cases from Haiti: “Over the past year, stakeholders 
expressed concerns to the Ombudsman’s Office regarding the de-
layed processing of numerous deferred action requests submitted by 
Haitian nationals following the earthquake in January 2010.”159   
  
155.  Letter from [name removed] to Dep’t of Homeland Sec. (July 10, 2010) (on 
file with author). 
156.  Affidavit in Support of Deferred Action Status for [name removed] (June 
21, 2010) (on file with author). 
157.  Affidavit in Support of Deferred Action Status for [name removed] (June 
25, 2010) (on file with author). 
158.  Letter from [name removed] to A. Castro, Acting Field Office Dir., Dep't of 
Homeland Sec. (June 30, 2010).    
159.  January Contreras, Deferred Action: Recommendations to Improve Trans-
parency and Consistency in the USCIS Process, OFFICE OF THE U.S. CITIZENSHIP 
& IMMIGRATION SERV. OMBUDSMAN, 6 (2011), 
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/cisomb-combined-dar.pdf. 
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The remaining qualitative data within the 270-page PDF docu-
ment included 118 identifiable deferred action cases.  It was difficult 
to label a case as tender or elder age because much of the data lacked 
identifiers.  However, when a field included the word “minor,” “in-
fant,” or a specific age (e.g., eighty-nine-year-old), the case was cal-
culated as involving tender or elder age for purposes of this analysis.  
It should also be mentioned that some of the cases approved, pend-
ing, or unknown contained little to no factual information and, as a 
consequence, were not identified as bearing any of the “positive” 
factors listed above.160  The outcomes for many of these cases were 
unknown because the field was blank or there simply was not a field 
in the log maintained by a particular office.  Many of the cases also 
had outcomes that were marked as “pending.”  Of the 118 cases, 
fifty-nine (59/118 or fifty percent) were pending or unknown; forty-
eight (48/118 or 40.7%) were granted; and eleven (11/118 or 9.3%) 
were denied.161   
Among the 107 cases approved, pending, or unknown, fifty 
(50/107 or 46.7%) involved a serious medical condition, nineteen 
(19/107 or 17.8%) involved cases in which the applicant had USC 
family members, twenty-two (22/107 or 21.5%) involved persons 
who had resided in the United States for more than five years, and 
thirty-two (32/107 or 29.9%) cases involved persons with a tender or 
elder age.162  Many of these cases (29/107 or 27.1%) involved more 
than one “positive” factor.163  For example, many of the cases 
(10/107 or 9.3%) involved both a serious medical condition and 
USC family members.164  Likewise, many of the cases (21/107 or 
19.6%) involved both tender or elder age and a serious medical con-
dition.165   
Among the forty-eight granted cases, twenty-four (24/48 or 50%) 
involved a serious medical condition; ten (10/48 or 20.8%) involved 
  
160.  See supra Part IV.A.   
161.  Freedom of Info. Act Request Responses & Logs (June 17, 2011) (providing 
dozens of documents including letters to the agency for deferred action, agency 
responses, and regional offices’ case logs) (on file with author).    
162.  Id. 
163.  Id.; see supra Part IV.A.   
164.  Freedom of Info. Act Request Responses & Logs, supra note 161.  
165.  Id. 
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cases in which the applicant had USC family members; four (4/48 or 
8.3%) involved persons who had resided in the United States for 
more than five years; and thirteen (13/48 or 27.1%) cases involved 
persons with a tender or elder age.166  Many of these cases (12/48 or 
25%) involved more than one “positive” factor.167  For example, four 
(4/48 or 8.3%) of the cases involved both a serious medical condi-
tion and USC family members.  Likewise, ten (10/48 or 20.8%) of 
the cases involved both tender or elder age and a serious medical 
condition.168 
Below is a sampling of approved cases involving a serious medi-
cal condition, tender or elder age, and/or the presence of United 
States Citizen family members: 
 Eighty-nine-year-old man suffering from Parkin-
son’s disease, dementia, Alzheimer’s disease, 
glaucoma, hypertension, and hypotension 
 Twenty-two-year-old with Downs Syndrome un-
able to care for self; daughter of an LPR 
 Entered U.S. as an EWI; --------- was in an auto-
mobile accident that rendered him in a quadriple-
gic in a vegetative state that requires continuous 
care and supervision; Mother has Temporary Pro-
tected Status, living in FL. 
 Cerebral palsy victim, Korean orphan with USC 
sponsors  
 Father of eight-year-old child receiving extensive 
neurological treatment  
 Father of eleven-year-old USC daughter with se-
vere heart problems  
 Mother of eleven-year-old USC daughter with se-
vere heart problems  
 Mother of U.S. national child with progressive 
muscular dystrophy  
  
166.  Id. 
167.  Id.; see supra Part IV.A. 
168.  Freedom of Info. Act Request Responses & Logs, supra note 161. 
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 Forty-seven-year-old schizophrenic B-2 overstay; 
son of LPR parents; USC siblings 169 
E.  Survey Monkey  
As a supplement to my FOIA requests, I circulated an informal 
survey to immigration attorneys and advocates using Survey Mon-
key.170  Specifically, my survey was sent by e-mail to the following 
listservs: National Immigration Project, Detention Watch Network, 
Immigration Professors, and other immigration advocates on May 
22, 2011, May 31, 2011, and June 17, 2011.171  Most of the ques-
tions included in the survey were “multiple choice” and limited to a 
series of possible answers.  The survey included the following ques-
tions:  
 
1. Have you ever applied for deferred action or prosecutorial dis-
cretion to USCIS or ICE? 
2. Which agency did you apply to? 
3. What type of action did you request?  
4. In what geographic region did your request take place?  
5. What was the result of your request? 
6. What was the sex of your client?  
7. What factors did your client have in their favor?  
  
169.  Id. 
170.  DEFERRED ACTION & PROS. DISCRETION, 
https://www.surveymonkey.com/s/5DYY68K (last visited July 18, 2011). 
171. The body of the e-mail indicated: 
I am continuing to research the agency's use of prosecutorial 
discretion and deferred action in particular since FY 2003.  This 
research builds upon writing projects that are available here: 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/cf_dev/AbsByAuth.cfm?per_id=103
5598.  At the moment, I have pending FOIA requests with the 
DHS sub-agencies and have otherwise been informally collect-
ing information from advocates about their experiences.  If you 
have applied for deferred action with DHS on or after FY 2003, 
PLEASE CONSIDER TAKING THIS 5 MINUTE SURVEY 
(one survey for each case): 
http://www.surveymonkey.com/s/5DYY68K. 
E-mail from author to Immigration listservs (May 22, 2011; May 31, 2011; June 
17, 2011) (on file with author). 
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 Tender age 
 Elderly 
 Medical condition 
 Psychological condition 
 DREAM Act eligible 
 Widow of USC 
 Military service 
 Involvement in community 
 Has children who are USCs 
 Has other family members who are USCs 
 Has little or no family in native country 
 Has resided in the United States for over ten years 
 Has resided in the Unites States since childhood 
 Strong showing of community support 
 Media coverage of the case 
8. What negative factors negative factors did your client have 
working against them? 
 Criminal history   
 Medical condition   
 Psychological condition   
 History of drug abuse   
 Has ties to a gang    
 Has only resided in the United States for a short time 
 Has little or no family in the United States   
 Could be easily removed to native country (or other 
country)  
 Has ties to a foreign organization at odds with the 
U.S. government.172    
9.  Other Comments  
 
The survey yielded seventy-two responses, fifty-eight of which 
were deferred action cases.173  Despite the small sample size, the 
surveys are revealing about the primary factors that drive deferred 
  
172.  Id. 
173.  Survey Monkey Results, Deferred Action & Pros. Discretion (on file with 
author). 
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action requests.  Among the fifty-eight deferred action cases, nine 
were denied, thirty-five were granted, seven were pending, one was 
unknown, and six lacked a response from the agency.174  Notably, 
twenty-four of the thirty-five granted cases involved more than one 
positive factor.175  Below are a few case examples where a deferred 
action grant involved more than one positive factor:   
 
 Case # 1 -  Psychological condition  
Involvement in community 
Has children who are USCs 
Has other family members who are USCs 
Has little or no family in native country 
 Case # 2 - Medical Condition 
Has children who are USCs 
Has other family members who are USCs 
Has resided in the United States for over ten 
years 
Strong showing of community support 
Media coverage of the case 
 Case # 3 - Medical Condition 
Psychological condition 
Has children who are USCs  
Has resided in the United States for over ten 
years 
 Case #4 - Medical Condition 
Psychological condition 
Has children who are USCs 
Has other family members who are USCs 
 Case #5 - Tender Age 
Has children who are USCs 
Has little or no family in native country 
Has resided in the United States for over ten 
years 
Strong showing of community support.176 
  
174. Id. 
175. Id.; see supra Part IV.A. 
176. Survey Monkey Results, supra note 173. 
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Notably, the positive factors indicated for the nine cases denied 
were largely similar to the cases granted.177  Moreover, only two of 
the nine cases involved criminal history, insofar as such a history 
might have caused a negative decision.178  In fact, six of the nine 
cases denied included more than one of the positive factors reflected 
in the granted cases.179  This raises a concern that cases involving 
similarly relevant facts resulted in a different outcome, which inter-
sects with the forthcoming discussion about the importance of trans-
parency.  The foregoing analysis of deferred action cases obtained 
by USCIS and through Survey Monkey indicate that five equitable 
factors influence deferred action grants: (1) serious medical condi-
tion; (2) tender or elder age; (3) long term residence in the United 
States; (4) presence of USC children in the United States; and/or (5) 
other USC family members in the United States.180 
While the grant rate for deferred action cases might cause alarm 
for those who challenge the deferred action program as an abuse of 
executive branch authority, it should be clear that regardless of out-
come, the number of deferred action cases considered by ICE and 
USCIS are quite low.  These numbers suggest that the real concern 
lies in the fact that many non-citizens who meet the common criteria 
utilized by the agency in assessing deferred action lack access or 
knowledge about deferred action, the process for applying, and basic 
eligibility requirements.  Even doubling the number of legible de-
ferred action grants produced by USCIS and ICE between 2003 and 
2010 (118 plus 946) yields less than 1,100 cases, or less than 130 
cases annually!  One can appreciate this exceptionally low number 
when comparing it to the unauthorized immigrant population (10.8 




179. Id.; supra Part IV.A. 
180. Survey Monkey Results, supra note 173; see supra Part IV.A. 
181.  Michael Hoefer et al., U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Estimates of the Unau-
thorized Immigrant Population Residing in the United States: January 2010, 1 
(2011), 
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/publications/ois_ill_pe_2010.pdf. 
182.  U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS: 
2010 OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS 2 (2011), 
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number of persons placed in removal proceedings in 2010 (approx. 
300,000183). 
The next section challenges the agency’s lack of transparency 
about the deferred action program and offers specific recommenda-
tions for rulemaking and greater transparency.  The goals behind 
these recommendations are not geared primarily towards escalating 
the grant rate to unmanageable levels, but rather to ensuring that 
immigrants bearing equities similar to the ones already utilized by 
the agency in assessing deferred action requests are given equal con-
sideration.   
V.  THE DEFERRED ACTION PROGRAM LACKS TRANSPARENCY 
From the earliest days, when prosecutorial discretion was re-
vealed in 1975, up to the present, the immigration agency has lacked 
transparency about both the various forms of prosecutorial discretion 
and deferred action in particular.184  Whereas the agency has contin-
ued to include its authority to exercise prosecutorial discretion in 
various memoranda and manuals, it has been less willing to offer 
statistics on the individuals granted discretionary relief under prose-
cutorial discretion, or the method by which one should go about ap-
plying for such relief.185  The data above also shows that attorneys 
who are fortunate enough to figure out the deferred action process 
and make a formal request are not always guaranteed a response by 
the Department.   
The agency’s lack of transparency about deferred action is also 




183.  Statement of Juan P. Osuna, supra note 39, at 2.  Note that while the actual 
testimony suggests that 325,326 proceedings were receiving by EOIR in FY 2010, 
I have reduced the number to accommodate those proceedings which are unrelated 
to formal removal proceedings such as bond proceedings and motions proceed-
ings.   
184.  See Wildes, The Litigative Use of the FOIA, supra note 2, at 42-43. 
185. The most revealing information about deferred action is included in the 
memoranda and is limited to informing the public and authorization officials that 
deferred action is a form of prosecutorial discretion.  See e.g. Meissner Memo, 
supra note 19. 
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ferred action cases from ICE, CBP, and USCIS.186  Seeking to up-
date Wildes’s studies, I filed multiple FOIA requests to the DHS 
sub-agencies (ICE, CBP, and USCIS) beginning in October 2009, 
inquiring first about all records and policies pertaining to prosecuto-
rial discretion decisions, and later narrowing the request to deferred 
action cases.187  The intermittent letters by the DHS sub-agencies 
seeking clarification and/or closing the request altogether sheds light 
on the difficulty in obtaining basic information about prosecutorial 
discretion generally and deferred action in particular.188   
Notably, USCIS conducted a complete search to produce a 270-
page PDF document in addition to statistical charts about deferred 
action.189  However, the data itself was variable and incomplete be-
cause the agency does not have a clear tracking mechanism for de-
ferred action cases.  Moreover, not only did the data I receive come 
more than one year after my initial request, I had the assistance of 
the DHS Ombudsman, who agreed to help move my FOIA request; 
like the deferred action process itself, my experience illustrates how 
an accidental phone call with a government official can influence 
outcomes more readily than merit and the following of vague proce-
dures.190   
  
186.  See supra Part IV.B. 
187.  Letter to Sub-agencies, supra note 121; Letter from author to U.S. Immigra-
tion & Customs Enforcement (Oct. 6, 2009) (on file with author). 
188.  See supra Part IV.B for my procedural history in obtaining information from 
USCIS and ICE.  Note that my FOIA request with CBP was ultimately closed 
without any data.  My initial request was made to CBP on October 6, 2009.  On 
October 26, 2009, an email reply was sent from Ada Symister of CBP’s Office of 
International Trade, requesting clarification.  A reply to Ms. Symister was sent on 
November 4, 2009.  On November 9, 2009 an additional e-mail was sent from 
Elissa Kay of CBP’s Office of International Trade seeking further clarification on 
the information sought in the FOIA request.  A response was sent to Ms. Kay on 
November 11, 2009.  There was no additional response from CBP.  On March 30, 
2010 I made a second, more detailed FOIA request to CBP.  On April 29, 2010 
CBP responded to the request stating that the information sought is under the pur-
view of USCIS and that the request should be forwarded there. 
189. Freedom of Info. Act Request Responses & Logs, supra note 161.  
190. According to the DHS Ombudsman, USCIS Headquarters has recently begun 
tracking deferred action requests in local offices.  See Contreras, supra note 159, 
at 5. 
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In the case of ICE, the result of a single chart detailing active 
cases in which deferred action was granted was thin on detail about 
the facts involved in each case, the process by which deferred action 
was considered, the evidence presented to meet eligibility for de-
ferred action, and the conditions under which each case was granted.  
Even if I were to concede that the data provided by ICE constitutes 
the universe of active deferred action cases granted between 2003 
and 2010, this raises questions about ICE’s recordkeeping regarding 
inactive cases, the number of applications filed and received by ICE, 
the number of cases denied by ICE, the number of cases initiated as 
a deferred action requested and treated as something else (i.e., stay 
of removal), and so on.  Tracking this data is important both for the 
agency and the public.191   
In the case of CBP, I can only speculate that CBP lacks a specific 
policy about how it executes prosecutorial discretion generally and 
deferred action particularly.192  My FOIA experience also suggests 
that CBP lacks data about prosecutorial discretion grants or denials.  
Together, these limitations give CBP the lowest transparency marks 
within DHS.193  The next section explores the normative benefits of 
  
191. Notably, the Secretary of DHS testified on June 28 about her willingness to 
share data about deferred action cases with the Senate Judiciary Committee.  In 
response to a question posed by Senator Charles Grassley (R-IA) she noted:  
Senator, we've had an awful lot of correspondence with the 
committee on various issues.  But I think the point of the ques-
tion is would we agree to some oversight of how the deferred ac-
tion process is being administered?  And the answer is we want 
to be very transparent about how we are exercising the authori-
ties the statutes give us.  
DREAM Act Education for Alien Minors: Hearing on S. 952 Before the Subcomm. 
on Immigration, Refugees & Border Security of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 
112th Cong. (2011) (statement of Janet Napolitano, Sec’y of Dep’t of Homeland 
Sec.), available at http://judiciary.senate.gov/hearings/hearing.cfm?id= 
3d9031b47812de2592c3 baeba604d881. 
192. See supra note 148. 
193. My research is consistent with recent findings by the DHS Ombudsman with 
regards to transparency and the deferred action program within USCIS:   
  Stakeholders lack clear, consistent information regarding 
requirements for submitting a deferred action request and 
what to expect following submission of the request.  There 
is no formal national procedure for handling deferred ac-
tion requests. When experiencing a change in the type or 
 
2012 DEFERRED ACTION AND IMMIGRATION LAW 51 
transparency generally and codifying a regulation about deferred 
action in particular. 
A.  Why Transparency Matters 
Transparency about deferred action matters and is premised first 
on the acceptance that an officer or agency’s decision about deferred 
action is an adjudicatory function that demands the same kind of 
analysis that would be given to other immigration benefits that fall 
within the formal adjudicatory framework.  There is no shortage of 
literature scrutinizing an administrative process against a set of nor-
mative values.194  Administrative law scholar Roger Cramton has 
  
number of submissions, local USCIS offices often lack the 
necessary standardized process to handle such requests in a 
timely and consistent manner.  As a result, many offices 
permit deferred action requests to remain pending for ex-
tended periods.  Stakeholders lack information regarding 
the number and nature of deferred action requests submit-
ted each year; and they are not provided with any infor-
mation on the number of cases approved and denied, or the 
reasons underlying USCIS’ decisions.   
Contreras, supra note 161, at 1. 
194.  See, e.g., Lenni B. Benson, Breaking Bureaucratic Borders: A Necessary 
Step Toward Immigration Law Reform, 54 ADMIN. L. REV. 203, 263-64 (2002) 
[hereinafter Benson, Breaking Bureaucratic Borders]; Lenni B. Benson, Making 
Paper Dolls: How Restrictions on Judicial Review and the Administrative Process 
Increase Immigration Cases in the Federal Courts, 51 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 37, 40 
(2006-2007); Roger C. Cramton, Administrative Procedure Reform: The Effects of 
S. 1663 on the Conduct of Federal Rate Proceedings, 16 ADMIN. L. REV. 108, 112 
(1963) [hereinafter Cramton, Administrative Procedure Reform]; Roger C. 
Cramton, A Comment on Trial-Type Hearings in Nuclear Power Plant Siting, 58 
VA. L. REV. 585, 592-93 (1972); Colin S. Diver, The Optimal Precision of Admin-
istrative Rules, 93 YALE L.J. 65, 80 (1983) (arguing for a “precision calculus” 
framework for interpreting adjudicative rules, which leads to more transparency 
and accessibility); Family, supra note 19, at 598 (examining the problem of divert-
ing individuals away from immigration administrative adjudication); Stephen H. 
Legomsky, Forum Choices for the Review of Agency Adjudication: A Study of the 
Immigration Process, 71 IOWA L. REV. 1297, 1313-14 (1986); David A. Martin, 
Reforming Asylum Adjudication: On Navigating the Coast of Bohemia, 138 U. PA. 
L. REV. 1247, 1322 (1990); Abraham D. Sofaer, The Change-of-Status Adjudica-
tion: A Case Study of the Informal Agency Process, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 349, 419-21 
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identified “accuracy,” “efficiency,” and “acceptability” as goals for 
evaluating administrative designs.  Immigration law scholar Steven 
Legomsky has also explored “consistency” in asylum adjudications 
along with the criteria identified by Cramton.195  Administrative and 
immigration law scholar Lenni Benson has examined transparency 
as a separate process value.196  For purposes of this article, I analyze 
the values of equal justice, accuracy, consistency, efficiency, and 
acceptability in the deferred action context.  I chose these criteria 
because I believe that the lack of transparency in deferred action un-
dermines these values and underscores why transparency is so im-
portant.  I concede that many of the values analyzed below are over-
lapping in that one bears relationship to another.   
B.  Equal Justice197 
Transparency can promote a fair process and more equitable out-
comes.  One of the most important benefits of transparency is per-
haps the least obvious: the reduction to the number of requests for 
deferred action that are never made because the individual who may 
qualify is unaware of the process.  To my knowledge, no public 
memoranda from DHS have authorized employees to automatically 
consider cases for deferred action before they enter the system, if at 
all.  The Morton Memo on Prosecutorial Discretion takes a step in 
the right direction by indicating that it is “preferable for ICE officers, 
agents, and attorneys to consider prosecutorial discretion in cases 
without waiting for an alien or alien’s advocate or counsel to request 
a favorable exercise of discretion.”198   
There is also a fairness component to the practical uncertainty 
faced by non-citizens.  It is possible that a potential beneficiary of 
deferred action is aware of the process but is unable to decide 
  
(1972) (discussing the inconsistencies broad discretionary power imposes on ad-
ministrative decisions in an immigration context). 
195. Cramton, Administrative Procedure Reform, supra note 194, at 111–12; 
Legomsky, supra note 194, at 1313. 
196. Benson, Breaking Bureaucratic Borders, supra note 194, at 262–63. 
197.  While Cramton intentionally analyzes accuracy, efficiency, and acceptability 
as an alternative to “fairness” or “due process,” I think it is appropriate to mention 
how the current deferred action program undermines these latter values.      
198.  Morton Memo on Prosecutorial Discretion, supra note 4, at 5. 
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whether he should hire an attorney and apply for it.  Moreover, an 
applicant for deferred action who never hears back from the agency 
is unable to plan his affairs because he is unaware about the outcome 
of his case.  Even where the individual has been granted deferred 
action and given a legitimate basis for work authorization, a U.S. 
employer might be unsure about whether to hire the individual be-
cause of the secrecy or in-limbo nature of deferred action.  All of 
these scenarios have a fairness component that should be considered 
when thinking about the protections and greater certainty of other 
discretionary remedies. 
Finally, and less clear, is the subject of due process, which at the 
very least requires that the interests at stake bear some relationship 
to the procedures.199  In deferred action cases, the interest at stake for 
the non-citizen is significant.  If deferred action is denied or never 
considered, the consequences could include arrest, detention, depor-
tation, or a combination of the three.  The deferred action program 
also lacks notice.  As it stands, many people who apply for deferred 
action have hired a lawyer who is familiar with the process.200  
Whereas these interests lie at the top of the “hierarchy” of actions 
that deprive the individual of liberty, the scenario is complicated by 
the fact that most individuals applying for or eligible to apply for 
deferred action do not have a formally recognizable immigration 
status.201  On the other hand, many such individuals have resided in 
the United States for a meaningful number of years.  The Supreme 
Court has more than once concluded that “[o]nce an alien enters the 
country, the legal circumstance changes, for the Due Process Clause 
applies to all persons within the United States, including aliens, 
whether their presence here is lawful, unlawful, temporary, or per-
  
199.  Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334 (1976).  There, the Supreme Court 
distinguished the need for a preliminary hearing in administering disability bene-
fits from welfare benefits on the basis that a welfare recipient warrants a hearing 
because he could be deprived of the “very means by which to live while he waits.”  
Id. at 340. 
200.  On the other hand, the government might view that greater notice will in-
crease the incentives to utilize deferred action as a delay tactic.  See Paul R. 
Verkuil, A Study of Immigration Procedures, 31 UCLA L. REV. 1141, 1170 
(1984). 
201.  Id. at 1150. 
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manent.”202  Furthermore, the Court compared deportation to “ban-
ishment or exile.”203   
C.  Efficiency 
Efficiency refers to the time and expense invested in a particular 
process.  Professor Cramton explains efficiency “emphasizes the 
time, effort, and expense of elaborate procedures.  The work of the 
world must go on, and endless nitpicking, while it may produce a 
more nearly ideal solution, imposes huge costs and impairs other 
important values.”204  On the one hand, one might think that the cur-
rent deferred action design is superbly efficient because it lacks the 
costs associated with an application form or process, lacks review by 
an administrative or judicial appellate body, lacks recordkeeping or 
reporting by the Department, and so on.  On the other hand, the lack 
of transparency about the deferred action program has resulted in 
congressional inquiries about the Department’s recordkeeping, re-
search by the DHS Ombudsman on how to improve deferred action 
processes, and lengthy FOIAs between the author and the Depart-
ment.  Similarly, the Department’s review of voluminous submis-
sions by attorneys fortunate enough to know about deferred action 
and the ensuing correspondence that takes place between Depart-
ment employees and attorneys because of the lack of guidance or 
process conceivably results in great costs to the government.  In 
short, the lack of transparency about deferred action has resulted in 
enormous monetary expenses and personal time for the Department.   
D.  Accuracy 
Accuracy means that once an adjudicator interprets relevant fac-
tors, the law that is applied to the factors is correct and the conclu-
sion is consistent with the sources of law.  To Professor Benson, 
  
202.  Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 679 (2001). 
203.  Fong Haw Tan v. Phelan, 333 U.S. 6, 10 (1948) (“We resolve the doubts in 
favor of that construction because deportation is a drastic measure and at times the 
equivalent of banishment or exile. . . . [W]e will not assume that Congress meant 
to trench on [the individual’s] freedom beyond that which is required by the nar-
rowest of several possible meanings of the words used.”). 
204. Cramton, Administrative Procedure Reform, supra note 194, at 112. 
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“[a]ccuracy ensures the law is being carried out, and not undermined 
through error or fraud.”205  Practically, it is difficult to measure the 
accuracy of the current deferred action program because the gov-
ernment does not maintain basic information about the process and 
its decisions.  Moreover, the deferred action program undervalues 
the accuracy objective, because it prevents potentially eligible indi-
viduals from applying for deferred action and immunizes officers 
from liability when a deferred action is denied or disregarded alto-
gether.  If a person is denied deferred action but has facts similar to a 
family member who was granted deferred action in a neighboring 
region, it can be identified as inaccurate.  Similarly, if the same per-
son never applies for deferred action because she does not have a 
lawyer and is otherwise unaware of the program, accuracy is also 
disregarded.  When a person has the opportunity to consult with pub-
lished criteria after being denied deferred action, he is able to under-
stand the reasons for this denial and, if appropriate, enable the agen-
cy to catch errors.206   
E.  Consistency 
To Professor Benson, “[c]onsistency, not only of outcome, but 
also of treatment along the way, is required to maintain fairness 
among and between participants, and thus, is necessary to foster re-
spect for and trust in the system.”207  Americans also value con-
sistency because it treats similarly situated people equally.  In sharp 
contrast, decisions about deferred action are uneven and in some 
cases unknown to attorneys and advocates who file applications.208  
Transparency about the deferred action process promotes consisten-
cy by directing potential applicants to a similar procedure at the front 
  
205.  Benson, Breaking Bureaucratic Borders, supra note 194, at 263. 
206. E-mail from Stephen Legomsky to author (July 16, 2011, 19:41 EST) (on file 
with author). 
207. Benson, Breaking Bureaucratic Borders, supra note 194, at 263. 
208. See, e.g., Contreras, supra note 159, at 5 (“USCIS does not have a nation-
wide process for acknowledging the receipt of deferred action requests, but many 
USCIS offices have implemented a local method for logging submissions and 
acknowledging their receipt.  Other offices do not issue a written acknowledge-
ment of receipt for deferred action requests.”); Wadhia, supra note 36; Survey 
Monkey, supra note 170. 
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end, and ensuring more consistent outcomes at the back end.209  The 
importance of transparency and consistency in deferred action cases 
was also highlighted by DHS’ own Ombudsman in 2007 when he 
remarked: 
[M]inimal measures, including tracking requests for 
deferred action and regular review by USCIS head-
quarters of the requests and the determinations made, 
would help to ensure that there is no geographic dis-
parity in approvals or denials of deferred action re-
quests and that like cases are decided in like manner.  
. . . .   
If implemented, this recommendation would make 
USCIS more efficient by tracking requests for de-
ferred action and helping to ensure consistency in ad-
judications.210 
Consistency is also enhanced when officers are held accountable 
for their actions.  My own belief is that a more transparent process 
for deferred action can have a disciplinary effect on the adjudicator 
and, as a consequence, advance the quality and consistency of deci-
sions on deferred action.  A similar argument has been set forth by 
Professor Legomsky in his writings about the benefits of agency re-
view when he remarks: 
I believe that the mere prospect of review can have a 
sobering effect on administrative officials.  Most of 
us do not like to be embarrassed, especially in our 
work.  When we know that someone might be scruti-
  
209. Legomsky contends that the arguments supporting an agency’s head to re-
view adjudicative decisions for the purpose of promoting consistency fall short, 
since there are other alternatives that are no less consistent.  See Stephen H. Le-
gomsky, Learning to Live with Unequal Justice: Asylum and the Limits to Con-
sistency, 60 STANFORD L. REV. 413, 458 (2007) [hereinafter Legomsky, Learning 
to Live with Unequal Justice]; see also Legomsky, supra note 194. 
210.  Recommendation from Prakash Kharti, Ombudsman, U.S. Customs & Im-
migration Serv., to Dr. Emilio T. Gonzalez, Dir., U.S. Customs & Immigrtion 
Serv., 3–4 (Apr. 6, 2007), http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/CISOmbudsman 
_RR_32_O_Deferred_Action_04-06-07.pdf. 
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nizing our work and testing our reasons, we have an 
extra incentive to approach our decisions careful-
ly. . . .211   
F.  Acceptability 
Acceptability is not so much focused on whether a particular 
process is in fact fair or acceptable, but rather on whether the proce-
dure is perceived to be fair by members of the public and parties to 
the process.212  Here, my specific recommendation for promulgating 
a rule on deferred action subsumes the “so what” of transparency in 
that rulemaking itself ensures that members of the public are provid-
ed with an opportunity to provide input before a rule is made final.  
More predictable rules and procedures about deferred action also 
promote acceptability because non-citizens and attorneys can make 
reliable plans based on an articulated set of criteria proffered by the 
agency and, over time, a body of case law to indicate how these cri-
teria are applied to individual cases.213   
From the agency’s perspective, transparency about deferred ac-
tion and publication of a regulation may be more trouble than it is 
worth.  “Transparent rules tend to spotlight a value choice.  Oppo-
nents of that choice will attack the agency's action, forcing the agen-
cy to expend its own resources for defense.  Rules having low trans-
parency thus become more attractive, since they conceal value 
choices.”214  The agency might argue that transparency by the De-
partment about prosecutorial discretion and deferred action in partic-
ular could result in a storm of objections by restrictionists and other 
members of the public who equate deferred action to an “amnesty” 
that received no support by Congress.215  In response to any concern 
that a published rule on deferred action is akin to a “backdoor legali-
zation” program, I would opine that a legislative scheme is distin-
  
211.  See, e.g., Legomsky, Learning to Live with Unequal Justice, supra note 206, 
458; Stephen H. Legomsky, Refugees, Administrative Tribunals, and Real Inde-
pendence: Dangers Ahead for Australia, 76 WASH. U. L.Q. 243, 245 (1998). 
212.  See, e.g., Legomsky, supra note 194, at 1313. 
213.  Legomsky, Learning to Live with Unequal Justice, supra note 209, at 426–
28. 
214.  Diver, supra note 194, at 106. 
215.  See, e.g., Wadhia, supra note 36, at 6 & n.22. 
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guishable and more generous in both its application and its benefits.  
For example, the published rule proposed in this article would be 
limited to non-citizens who possess specific qualities and criteria and 
enable the individual to be legally present in the country and apply 
for work authorization.216  In contrast, a legalization program in-
cludes the benefits of temporary residence, work authorization, per-
mission to travel, and a path to green card status and eventual citi-
zenship.217 
The concern that a published rule on deferred action may attract 
future illegal migration is a legitimate one, but this concern can be 
addressed by catering the rule to people who meet specific qualify-
ing criteria and, if appropriate, setting an annual numerical cap.  
Since the agency already employs specific criteria for considering 
deferred action cases, spelling out the criteria in a published rule 
would not necessarily create a new or objectionable policy for the 
Department, but would advance the goals of equal justice, accuracy, 
consistency, efficiency, and acceptability.  Achieving these values 
requires transparency about how deferred action works as well as a 
newly codified regulation subject to the “notice and comment” re-
quirement of the Administrative Procedures Act (APA).218   
Nevertheless, the immigration agency has previously held reser-
vations about promulgating rules under the APA.  The best illustra-
tion of this was in 1979, when the former INS proposed a rule that 
would have explained the various criteria utilized by officers in de-
termining the discretionary component of “adjustment of status” and 
other immigration remedies involving a discretionary component.219  
  
216.  See infra Part VI.  
217. See, e.g., Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act of 2011, S. 1258, 112th 
Cong. (2011); Security Through Regularized Immigration and a Vibrant Economy 
Act of 2007, H.R. 1645, 110th Cong. (2007).  
218.  See generally 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2011).   
219.  See Factors To Be Considered in the Exercise of Administrative Discretion, 
44 Fed. Reg. 36,187, 36,191 (June 21, 1979) (proposing 8 C.F.R. 245.8); see also 
Diver, supra note 194, at 94; Prosecutorial Discretion, supra note 3, at 284-86 
(“Several provisions of these proposed regulations would have required a favora-
ble exercise of discretion in the absence of adverse factors.  For example, with 
regard to the exercise of discretion under the former 212(c) waiver, the rule identi-
fied the following factors for consideration in the exercise of discretion: ‘alien is 
likely to continue type of activity which gave rise to the grounds of excludability; 
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In most cases, to qualify for adjustment of status, the non-citizen 
must generally have a qualifying relationship with a U.S. employer 
or family member, be admissible to the United States, and have a 
visa immediately available to him or her.220  In addition to meeting 
these statutory criteria, the applicant must qualify for adjustment as a 
matter of discretion.  The discretionary component has not been de-
fined in the statute or the regulations, but at one time was articulated 
in the former INS O.I. as requiring “substantial equities.”221  The 
published rules would have given clarity to the discretion exercised 
in adjustment of status and other cases but was instead repealed in 
1981 because the INS feared that:  
 
[l]isting some factors, even with the caveat that such 
list is not all inclusive, poses a danger that use of 
guidelines may become so rigid as to amount to an 
abuse of discretion . . . .  The INS also argued that the 
rules would “eliminate discretionary powers by con-
verting discretionary powers into a body of law.”222 
 
INS’ fear of litigation is not merely theoretical, but underscored by a 
relating memorandum to then INS Commissioner Lionel J. Castillo 
who remarked:  
[T]he proposals embodied in this draft would subject 
the Service to a constant barrage of spurious appeal 
[sic] by Immigration attorneys on the basis of seman-
tics proposed to be injected into the regulations.  
They subvert Government to the vagaries of attorney 
dilatory tactics and would appear to tie our hands 
  
alien has a history of criminal, immoral, narcotic, or subversive activity; act giving 
rise to grounds of excludability was relatively recent; no unusual hardship would 
accrue to alien or family members if the waiver is denied.’”) (citations omitted). 
220.  INA § 245, 8 U.S.C. § 1255 (2006). 
221.  IMMIGRATION & NATURALIZATION SERV., OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS, O.I. 
§ 245.5d(5), available at http://www.uscis.gov/ilink/docView/SLB/HTML/SLB/0-
0-0-1/0-0-0-53690/0-0-0-60138/0-0-0-60293.html; see also Diver, supra note 194, 
at 93. 
222.  Wadhia, supra note 3, at 284–85 & n.238. 
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completely in the cobwebs of endless liturgical [sic] 
dialogue.223   
The agency’s desire for flexibility and fear of litigation are not 
new, and have historically served as a basis for less transparency.224  
But the argument from an agency that regulatory language providing 
factors to assess discretionary adjudication would limit its flexibility 
is unpersuasive.  First, the Department has the ability to craft a rule 
that both lists criteria and adopts a discretionary component.  In fact, 
there are many humanitarian-like remedies that operate in this way.  
For example, cancellation of removal is a remedy codified in the 
statute in 1996 that is available to eligible non-LPRs and LPRs who 
meet specific statutory requirements, such as continuous physical 
presence and residence in the United States for a specified time peri-
od, or hardship to a qualifying family member who is either a green 
card holder or USC, among other requirements.225  Similarly, the 
O.I., Meissner Memo, and Morton Memo on Prosecutorial Discre-
tion all include a listing of factors that should be considered by im-
migration officers, agents, or attorneys, but qualifies that list of rele-
vant factors as illustrative.  More important, the factors used by the 
agency to make decisions about deferred action are identifiable and 
operate as a “benefit” for those non-citizens fortunate enough to 
have a knowledgeable attorney who can apply for it.   
VI.  CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A.  Recognize Deferred Action as a Rule 
Deferred action should be published as a rule in the Federal Reg-
ister.226  The regulation should be subject to a 120-day public notice 
  
223.  Diver, supra note 194, at 95 (citing to Memorandum from [name and posi-
tion deleted], INS, to Lionel Castillo, Commissioner, INS (September 12, 1978), at 
1.). 
224.  See, e.g., Benson, Breaking Bureaucratic Borders, supra note 194, at 263–
64. 
225.  INA § 240A, 8 U.S.C. § 1229b (2006). 
226.  See Wadhia, Prosecutorial Discretion, supra note 3, at 286; See also 
AILA’s comments on the Department of Homeland Security’s implementation of 
Executive Order 13563, “Improving Regulation and Regulatory Review.”  Special 
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and comment period.  The regulatory language as proposed must 
recognize both the humanitarian and economical bases for deferred 
action.  The advantages of rulemaking promotes the values that are 
so interconnected with principles of administrative law, including 
but not limited to transparency, consistency, acceptability, and ac-
countability.  As described by Professor Legomsky: 
[R]ulemaking has tremendous advantages over adju-
dication as a vehicle for policy formation.  These ad-
vantages include broader public input, notice to Con-
gress, avoidance of adjudicative hearings to resolve 
issues of legislative fact, avoidance of litigating the 
same issues repeatedly, more enforceable rules, clear-
er advance notice of allowable and prohibited con-
duct, fairer applicability of the rules to similarly situ-
ated individuals at different points in time, and the 
opportunity for affected individuals to make policy 
submissions before the rule is adopted.227 
In addition to advancing various process values, rulemaking 
would assist with narrowing the various factors used by adjudicators 
to determine whether deferred action should be granted.  An analysis 
  
thanks to the AILA Interagency Liaison Committee. AILA Doc. No. 11041463 
(“Guidance on deferred action was contained in the now withdrawn INS Operating 
Instructions.  Though the relief is still available, there are currently no regulations 
that would facilitate a more meaningful and consistent application of prosecutorial 
discretion in context of deferred action.  We ask that such regulations be promul-
gated.”).  
227.  Legomsky, Learning to Live with Unequal Justice, supra note 209, at 459; 
see also id. at 423 & n.67 (“Inconsistent procedures and inconsistent employment 
criteria for adjudicators were among the problems that inspired the Administrative 
Procedure Act”).  For an insightful description, see Jeffrey S. Lubbers, APA-
Adjudication: Is the Quest for Uniformity Faltering?, 10 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 65, 
65-68 (1996).  These problems were also the focus of a superb consultants’ report 
prepared for the Administrative Conference of the United States.  Paul R. Verkuil 
et al., Report For Recommendation 92-7: The Federal Administrative Judiciary, in 
2 ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, RECOMMENDATIONS 
AND REPORTS 777 (1992).  See also Recommendations and Statements of the Ad-
ministrative Conference, 57 Fed. Reg. 61,759 (Dec. 29, 1992) (codified at 1 C.F.R. 
pts. 305, 310) (recommending many of the reforms urged by the consultants’ re-
port). 
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of the data on deferred action cases indicate that decisions are based 
on distinguishable criteria and that a single regulation would only 
bolster the application of this criteria in like cases, and stave the in-
evitable abuse of discretion that stems from a system where cases are 
decided by different regional officers and without accountability.  
The benefit of using rules to guide discretionary decisions is not a 
new argument and has been affirmed by scholars in various other 
immigration contexts.228 
Rulemaking is also cost-effective.  I believe the costs associated 
with rulemaking would be recovered by enabling immigration adju-
dicators to follow a clear rule.  Clearer rules on deferred action could 
also remove the costs associated with documenting every rationale 
and factor in a particular A-file, gaining approval from a supervisor 
before granting deferred action, or ICE attorneys having to review 
every NTA for sufficiency under the prosecutorial discretion guide-
lines.  Interestingly enough, the internal checks and balances created 
by the Morton Memo on Prosecutorial Discretion, however im-
portant, are a costly endeavor that could be streamlined by crafting a 
rule limited to deferred action cases.  I also believe that implementa-
tion of a regulation would not particularly increase litigious costs 
but, to the contrary, infuse a level of internal quality control and in-
centive for immigration adjudicators to apply the rule faithfully.229  
The proposed rule should include information about the scope of 
deferred action, namely that it is a temporary benefit available to 
eligible non-citizens who meet specific criteria and who warrant de-
ferred action as a matter of discretion.  The agency should create a 
form for deferred action requests, and attach a nominal fee for pro-
cessing the form.  An applicant who is unable to pay a filing fee 
should be eligible to fill out a fee-waiver form.  The application 
should be filed to the Vermont Service Center or another regional 
Service Center.  By maintaining all applications at a specific service 
center, it will be easier for DHS to keep statistics and also adjudicate 
related requests for work authorization.  The rule should be discre-
  
228.  See, e.g., Sofaer, supra note 194, at 421; Verkuil, supra note 200, at 1205–
06. 
229. Diver, supra note 194, at 95; Legomsky, Learning to Live with Unequal Jus-
tice, supra note 209, at 463. 
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tionary and place the burden on the non-citizen to present substantial 
equities that may include: continuous residence in the United States 
for at least ten years; presence of a USC or LPR child, spouse, or 
parent in the United States; serious mental health condition or physi-
cal disability; and/or tender or elderly age. 
While my proposal provides concrete guidelines, it offers flexi-
bility for the Department to consider equally compelling factors not 
listed.  That said, my goal is not to “codify” previous memoranda 
like the Morton Memo on Prosecutorial Discretion, but instead to 
create a discreet remedy in the form of deferred action that is based 
on an identifiable set of factors that (as illustrated by the data) the 
agency has relied upon for more than thirty years.  The Department 
will and should continue to follow the current memoranda on prose-
cutorial discretion when making prosecutorial decisions.  Deferred 
action is merely one slice of the scores of decisions that currently 
serve as an exercise of prosecutorial discretion.   
Those who are denied deferred action should receive a written 
decision with reasons for the denial.  Written decisions promote ac-
curacy, consistency, and acceptability by allowing the applicant to 
be heard.  While written decisions would likely add costs onto the 
agency, these costs could be offset by the fees that accompany the 
new deferred action form and the current costs associated with the 
internal checks and reviews that accompany deferred action pro-
cessing. 
Those who are successful in obtaining a deferred action grant 
should be granted temporary residence for a renewable three-year 
period, work authorization, and permission to travel for good cause.  
A grant of deferred action should not lead to permanent residency, 
but neither should it prohibit a grantee from applying for a more 
permanent legal benefit if she is otherwise eligible.  The period dur-
ing which an individual is in deferred action status should be recog-
nized as a lawful status as is currently the case.230  If the newly pro-
  
230. See Memorandum from Donald Neufeld, Acting Associate Director, Domes-
tic Operations Directorate, Lori Scialabba, Associate Director Refugee, Asylum 
and International Operations Directorate, Consolidation of Guidance Concerning 
Unlawful Presence for Purposes of Sections 212(a)(9)(B)(i) and 212(a)(9)(C)(i)(I) 
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posed regulation on deferred action needs alteration, the Department 
should make adjustments to the regulation “relying on exceptions, 
time extensions, variances, and waivers.”231   
B.  Publicize Information About Deferred Action  
The Department of Homeland Security should train immigration 
employees about the new rule.  Moreover, DHS should create a sys-
tem whereby every case that is brought to the Department’s attention 
is automatically considered for deferred action.  Alternatively, indi-
viduals who are facing removal before EOIR or DHS should be noti-
fied about their right to apply for deferred action before USCIS.  
Information about deferred action should be posted on the relevant 
DHS websites.  This information should include a step-by-step pro-
cess about how to apply for deferred action, basic eligibility re-
quirements, and related benefits.  If a policy is implemented whereby 
DHS automatically considered cases for deferred action, then such 
policy should be posted on the various DHS websites and also ac-
companied by a “Fact Sheet” in user-friendly English.232  Even if the 
procedures themselves are not codified as regulations, they should be 
published in the Federal Register.   
Finally, DHS must publish the facts of individual cases as well 
as decisions about deferred action and keep statistics about the cases 
in which deferred action is considered, denied, and/or granted.  Such 
statistics must be made part of the annual statistics published by 
  
of the Act, 42 (May 6, 2009), available at http://www.uscis.gov/USCIS/Laws/ 
Memoranda/Static_Files_Memoranda/2009/ revision_redesign_AFM.PDF 
231. Raising the Agency’s Grades – Protecting the Economy, Assuring Regulatory 
Quality and Improving Assessments of Regulatory Need, Subcomm. on Courts, 
Commercial and Administrative Law of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th 
Cong. (2011) (citing Robert L. Glicksman & Sidney A. Shapiro, Improving Regu-
lation Through Incremental Adjustment, 52 U. KAN. L. REV. 1179 (2004) (state-
ment of Robert L. Glicksman)), http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/ 
pdf/Glicksman03292011.pdf. 
232.  As noted before, the Morton Memo on Prosecutorial Discretion takes a step 
forward by asking ICE employees to initiate decision on prosecutorial discretion 
without waiting for an affirmative request by an attorney.  Note however that the 
language does not create a mandate or “automatic” process nor does it imply that 
in all cases deferred action (which is but a sliver in the universe of ways in which 
prosecutorial discretion can be exercised) will be considered as the remedy.   
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DHS and also posted on the various websites.  DHS must publish the 
training officers receive on deferred action.  Cumulatively, publish-
ing information about the deferred action process, related decisions, 
statistics, and training programs will advance transparency and ac-
ceptability, while also providing the public with tools for measuring 
efficiency, accuracy, and consistency in deferred action cases.233 
VII.  APPENDIX: TABLE OF ABBREVIATIONS  
Administrative Procedures Act – APA 
American Immigration Council – Immigration Council 
American Immigration Lawyers Association – AILA 
Board of Immigration Appeals – BIA or Board  
Civil Rights and Civil Liberties – CRCL 
Customs and Border Protection – CBP 
Deferred Action – DA 
Department of Homeland Security – DHS or Department 
Department of Justice – DOJ or Justice  
Doris Meissner, Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion – Meissner 
Memo  
Executive Office for Immigration Review – EOIR 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement – ICE 
Immigration and Nationality Act – INA or the Act 
Immigration and Naturalization Service – INS 
John Morton, Civil Immigration Enforcement: Priorities for the 
Apprehension, Detention, and Removal of Aliens – Morton Memo 
on Civil Enforcement Priorities  
John Morton, Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion Consistent 
with the Civil Immigration Enforcement Priorities of the Agency for 
the Apprehension, Detention, and Removal of Aliens – Morton 
Memo on Prosecutorial Discretion  
Notice to Appear – NTA  
Office of the Principal Legal Adviser – OPLA  
Operations Instruction – O.I. 
Prosecutorial Discretion – PD  
  
233.  See, e.g., Benson, Breaking Bureaucratic Borders, supra note 194, at 263–
64. 
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United States Citizen – USC 
United States Citizenship and Immigration Services – USCIS 
VII.  POSTSCRIPT  
This article was completed in July 2011.  Subsequently, on Au-
gust 18, 2011, the White House “announced” a policy whereby an 
interagency working group consisting of officials from DOJ and 
DHS would review 300,000 cases pending removal and as a matter 
of prosecutorial discretion administratively close cases that are 
deemed “low priority.”234  Without spelling out a legal vehicle or 
process, the announcement also suggested that individuals whose 
cases were successfully closed would be eligible for work authoriza-
tion.235  Thereafter, ICE issued a series of documents in November 
2011 to implement the August 18th announcement.236 Together, the-
se documents identified the Morton Memo on Prosecutorial Discre-
tion as the “cornerstone” for what officers should follow in making 
  
234.  Cecilia Munoz, Immigration Update: Maximizing Public Safety and Better 
Focusing Resources, THE WHITE HOUSE BLOG (Aug. 18, 2011, 2:00 PM), 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2011/08/18/immigration-update-maximizing-
public-safety-and-better-focusing-resources; see also Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia,  
Sivaprasad Wadhia on the White House’s Review of Removal Cases, 
IMMIGRATIONPROF BLOG (Sept. 4, 2011), http://lawprofessors.typepad.com 
/immigration /2011/09/shoba-sivaprasad-wadhia-on-the-white-houses-review-of-
removal-cases.html.   
235. Wadhia, supra note 234. 
236.  See Memorandum from Peter Vincent, Principle Legal Advisor, U.S. Immi-
gration and Customs Enforcement, on Case-by-Case Review of Incoming and 
Certain Pending Cases (Nov. 17, 2011), available at http://www.ice.gov/doclib 
/foia/dro_policy_memos/case-by-case-review-incoming-certain-pending-cases-
memorandum.pdf.; U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SECURITY, U.S. IMMIGRATION AND 
CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, GUIDANCE TO ICE ATTORNEYS REVIEWING THE CBP, 
USCIS, AND ICE CASES BEFORE THE EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION 
REVIEW (2011), available at http://www.ice.gov/doclib/foia/dro_policy_memos 
/guidance-to-ice-attorneys-reviewing-cbp-uscis-ice-cases-before-eoir.pdf; U.S. 
DEP’T OF HOMELAND SECURITY, U.S. IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS 
ENFORCEMENT, NEXT STEPS IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PROSECUTORIAL 
DISCRETION MEMORANDUM AND THE AUGUST 18TH ANNOUNCEMENT ON 
IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT PRIORITIES (2011), available at http://www.ice.gov/ 
doclib/about/offices/ero/pdf/pros-discretion-next-steps.pdf. 
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prosecutorial discretion decisions; furnished an additional set of sub-
stantive criteria officers should use to making short term decisions 
about prosecutorial discretion; explained that every ICE officer au-
thorized to exercise such discretion would be trained by January 13, 
2012; launched a short-term process for reviewing select cases enter-
ing the immigration court or pending removal for prosecutorial dis-
cretion in the form of administrative closure; and initiated a special 
review of cases pending removal at the Denver and Baltimore immi-
gration courts.  A detailed analysis of these initiatives is beyond the 
scope of this article.  While there remain a number of outstanding 
and unresolved questions about these protocols237, the author 
acknowledges that the steps the Administration has taken improves 





237.  For example, many of these protocols sunset in January 2012; appear to be 
limited to non-detained cases; fail to address a specific procedure for individuals 
who lack counsel; appear to limit the immediately available forms of prosecutorial 
discretion to remedies that provide no independent basis for work authorization; 
seem to widen the list of “negative” factors ICE officers should consider in the 
short term as a basis for denying prosecutorial discretion; and provide no guaran-
tee or process for reviewing cases that result in a denial or creating a public record 
that includes a listing of cases considered, denied or granted prosecutorial discre-
tion. 
238.  For an analysis of the November 2011 documents and a related letter by the 
American Bar Association, see ALEXSA ALONZO & MARY KENNEY, DHS REVIEW 
OF LOW PRIORITY CASES FOR PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION (2011), available at  
http://www.legalactioncenter.org/sites/default/files/DHS_Review_of_Low_Priorit
y_Cases_9-1-11.pdf; Letter from Thomas M. Susman, Director of ABA Govern-
mental Affairs Office, to John Morton, Director of Immigration and Customs En-
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I. INTRODUCTION 
In the 1950s and 1960s, the southern states struggled to respond 
to the civil rights decisions being issued by the U.S. Supreme Court 
as well as the new civil rights laws being passed by Congress.  The 
judicial battleground for this perfect storm of evasion and massive 
resistance was found in the “old” Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, 
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which encompassed the states of Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Louisi-
ana, Mississippi, and Texas.1  In the “old” Fifth Circuit, a minority 
of liberal appeals court judges—sympathetic to the civil rights 
movement—used all legal and administrative power at their disposal 
to make sure that the federal district and appeals courts were com-
plying with the U.S. Supreme Court’s mandate in Brown v. Board of 
Education.2  In their ground-breaking book A Court Divided: The 
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals and the Politics of Judicial Reform,3 
political scientists Deborah J. Barrow and Thomas G. Walker care-
fully examined the political behavior of these aforementioned liberal 
appeals court judges and found evidence that Elbert Parr Tuttle, the 
Fifth Circuit’s chief judge from 1960 to 1967, was manipulating, or 
“gerrymandering,” the assignment of appeals court judges to both 
three-judge district court panels,4 and three-judge appellate court 
panels to guarantee that the panels had at least two liberal judges 
who would enforce the Supreme Court’s desegregation rulings.5  
The finding that a federal court of appeals judge may have used 
his administrative powers to create judicial panels sympathetic to 
civil rights cases is hardly surprising to Barrow and Walker; the 
basic assumption of their entire study is that “federal judges in the 
United States are by nature and necessity politicians” or “black-
robed homo sapiens” who are “subject to the same forces that influ-
ence the behavior of other individuals.”6  Add Barrow and Walker:  
“A judge must always be cognizant of the obligations and responsi-
bilities of the judicial role, but putting on the black robe cannot be 
  
1.  DEBORAH J. BARROW & THOMAS G. WALKER, A COURT DIVIDED: THE FIFTH 
CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS AND THE POLITICS OF JUDICIAL REFORM, 40–41, 56–
60 (1988). 
 2. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 3. See generally BARROW & WALKER, supra note 1. 
 4. Federal law authorized three-judge district court panels to hear specific types 
of cases, including civil rights and reapportionment cases.  The panel is composed 
of the original district court judge assigned to the case and at least one federal 
appeals court judge.  See generally Thomas G. Walker, Behavioral Tendencies in 
the Three-Judge District Court, 17 AM. J. POL. SCI. 407 (1973).  
 5. BARROW & WALKER, supra note 1, at 40–41, 56–60.  
 6. Id. at ix (citing S. Sidney Ulmer, Dissent Behavior and the Social Back-
ground of Supreme Court Justices, 32 J. POL. 580, 580 (1970)).  
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expected to neutralize an individual’s political nature.”7  Of course, 
the argument that judges achieved preferred policy outcomes by the 
selective interpretation of controlling legal principles is hardly a new 
insight.8  Barrow and Walker, however, examine the more interest-
ing question of whether an appeals court judge can take advantage of 
administrative rules—such as how judges are selected to sit on ap-
peals court panels—to pack panels with like-minded jurists, bring 
lower courts into compliance with the chief judge’s policy prefer-
ences, and achieve specific policy goals.9  
In highlighting the role that panel packing played in the “old” 
Fifth Circuit, Barrow and Walker contribute to a rich socio-legal 
literature that explores the mechanisms used for effective oversight 
and control in a judicial hierarchy.10  Nearly all judicial systems pro-
vide for some means of oversight, and research into the interplay of 
such systems and the legal actors situated within them is of interest 
to scholars of constitutional design, judicial administration, and judi-
cial decision making.11  In particular, the relative effectiveness of 
various mechanisms of hierarchical control has long been a central 
  
 7. Id.  
8. See generally JEFFREY SEGAL & HOWARD SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT 
AND THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL (1993).  
9.  BARROW & WALKER, supra note 1, at 40–41, 56–60. 
10.  Id. 
11.  Id. 
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focus for students of socio-legal phenomena,12 as well as for scholars 
of social and political institutions more generally.13 
In common law systems, judicial institutions often face signifi-
cant challenges relating to oversight.14  Hierarchy is arguably the 
signature institutional trait of the U.S. federal courts, and social sci-
entists have long recognized the importance of that structure for the 
operation of those courts.15  Higher court oversight of the decisions 
of lower courts has been found to be important in a host of different 
contexts.16  Most of these studies have focused on the U.S. courts of 
appeals, investigating the influence of such factors as Supreme Court 
doctrinal trends on court of appeals decision making,17 as well as on 
more direct forms of monitoring such as en banc rehearings.18  Other 
studies have looked beyond the courts of appeals, either to the dis-
  
 12. See generally LAWRENCE BAUM, JUDGES AND THEIR AUDIENCES: A 
PERSPECTIVE ON JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR (2006); LAWRENCE BAUM, THE PUZZLE OF 
JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR (1997); VIRGINIA HETTINGER, STEFANIE LINDQUIST & 
WENDY MARTINEK, JUDGING ON A COLLEGIAL COURT: INflUENCES ON APPELLATE 
DECISION MAKING (2006); DAVID E. KLEIN, MAKING LAW IN THE UNITED STATES 
COURTS OF APPEALS (2002); Evan H. Caminker, Precedent and Prediction: The 
Forward-Looking Aspects of Inferior Court Decisionmaking, 73 TEX. L. REV. 1 
(1994); Frank B. Cross, Decisionmaking in the U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals, 91 
CALIF. L. REV. 1459 (2003); David E. Klein & Robert J. Hume, Fear of Reversal 
as an Explanation of Lower Court Compliance, 37 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 579 
(2003); Andrew P. Morriss, Michael Heise & Gregory C. Sisk, Signaling and 
Precedent in Federal District Court Opinions, 13 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 63 (2005).  
 13. See generally HERBERT A. SIMON, ADMINISTRATIVE BEHAVIOR: A STUDY OF 
DECISION-MAKING PROCESSES IN ADMINISTRATIVE ORGANIZATIONS (3d ed. 
1976). 
14.  Id. 
15.  Id. 
16.  Id. 
 17. See generally Klein & Hume, supra note 12; Donald R. Songer, Consensual 
and Nonconsensual Decisions of the United States Court of Appeals, 26 AM. J. 
POL. SCI. 225 (1982); Donald R. Songer, The Impact of the Supreme Court on 
Trends in Economic Policy Making in the United States Courts of Appeals, 49 J. 
POL. 830 (1987); Donald R. Songer & Reginald S. Sheehan, Supreme Court Im-
pact on Compliance and Outcomes, 43 W. POL. Q. 297 (1990). 
 18. See generally Tracey George, The Dynamics and Determinants of the Deci-
sion to Grant En Banc Review, 74 WASH. L. REV. 213 (1999); Tracey George & 
Michael E. Solimine, Supreme Court Monitoring of the United States Court of 
Appeals En Banc, 9 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 171 (2001). 
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trict courts19 or to other actors, including state supreme courts,20 liti-
gants,21 and even the agenda-setting of the U.S. Supreme Court it-
self.22 
Here, we take advantage of a unique characteristic of the proce-
dures of the U.S. courts of appeals—the discretion held by chief 
judges to designate district court judges to three-judge appellate pan-
els23—to examine empirically the importance of oversight and judi-
cial hierarchy on judges' behavior in those courts.  Specifically, we 
examine the extent to which decisions about the policy preferences 
of designated judges vary systematically with the ideological tenor 
of the chief judge himself, the court as a whole, and the U.S. Su-
preme Court.  More simply put, we ask: are district court judges se-
lected to sit on appeals court panels simply to help ease the workload 
of the federal courts of appeals, or are the chief judges of the courts 
of appeals free to take a page from Chief Judge Tuttle’s playbook 
and use the designation process to select district court judges that 
share the chief judges’ political preferences?  In Part II of this arti-
cle, we outline in detail the court of appeals designation process.  
Part III sets forth a series of expectations regarding chief judges’ 
decisions about the delegation decision.  We then examine those ex-
pectations empirically, using data on a random sample of court of 
appeals cases decided between 1925 and 1988.  Part IV outlines our 
data and methods, while Part V discusses our findings and Part VI 
  
 19. See generally Lawrence Baum, Responses of Federal District Judges to 
Courts of Appeals Policies: An Exploration, 33 W. POL. Q. 217 (1980); Susan B. 
Haire, Donald R. Songer & Stephanie A. Lindquist, Appellate Court Supervision 
in the Federal Judiciary: A Hierarchical Perspective, 37 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 143 
(2003). 
 20. See generally Bradley C. Canon, Reactions of State Supreme Courts to a U.S. 
Supreme Court Civil Liberties Decision. 8 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 109 (1973); Scott 
A. Comparato & Scott D. McClurg, State Supreme Court Compliance with the 
United States Supreme Court (2002) (paper presented at the annual meeting of the 
Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, IL). 
 21. See generally Donald R. Songer, Charles M. Cameron & Jeffrey A. Segal, 
An Empirical Test of the Rational-Actor Theory of Litigation, 57 J. POL. 1119 
(1995). 
 22. See generally Charles M. Cameron, Jeffrey A. Segal & Donald Songer, Stra-
tegic Auditing in a Political Hierarchy: An Informational Model of the Supreme 
Court’s Certiorari Decisions, 94 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 101 (2000). 
  23.  S. Res. 253, 106th Cong. (1999) (enacted). 
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briefly examines future research questions regarding judicial desig-
nation.  
II. DISTRICT COURT JUDGE DESIGNATION IN THE FEDERAL COURTS 
OF APPEALS 
The familiar structure of the modern federal judiciary has its 
roots in the Evarts Act.24  Passed by Congress in 1891, the Evarts 
Act dramatically restructured the federal judiciary by creating the 
federal courts of appeals.  The Act also affected the duties performed 
by federal court judges, including authorizing district court judges to 
sit by designation on three-judge appellate panels.  The statutory 
authority for judicial designation is codified at 28 U.S.C. § 292, 
which states that a chief circuit court judge may designate district 
court judges within the circuit (and from outside the circuit, if au-
thorized by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court) to hear appeals 
on three-judge appellate panels.25  In other words, district court 
judges are permitted to sit by designation on three-judge appellate 
panels, hear appeals taken from federal district courts, vote on the 
merits of the appeal, and draft the panel opinion as if they were court 
of appeals judges.26 
The process by which district court judges are selected to sit by 
designation on court of appeals panels is illustrated in Figure 1.  It is 
especially important to note that each federal circuit follows strict 
procedures designed to guarantee that appellate judges are randomly 
selected to each three-judge panel, and that cases are randomly as-
signed to those panels.27  This is very different from the practices of 
the “old” Fifth Circuit studied by Barrow and Walker, in which a 
  
 24. Evarts Act, ch. 517, 26 Stat. 826 (1891) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. 
§ 292 (2006)).  
 25. 28 U.S.C. § 292 (2006).   
 26. Beyond the scope of this paper is the question of how the practice of select-
ing district court judges to sit by designation might run afoul of the United States 
Constitution.  For an excellent discussion on this point, see Richard B. Saphire & 
Michael E. Solimine, Diluting Justice on Appeal?: An Examination of the Use of 
District Court Judges Sitting by Designation on the United States Court of Ap-
peals, 28 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 351, 360 (1995).  
 27. See, e.g., 11TH CIR. INTERNAL OPERATING P. 34-2(b). 
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chief judge knew the exact case that a designated judge would be 
hearing.  There are no rules, however, which stipulate that the selec-
tion of a designated judge to complete an appellate panel is similarly 
conducted in a random fashion;28 instead, chief judges are given only 
loosely-bounded authority to designate judges as they see fit.29  As a 
practical matter, chief judges retain complete discretion to create a 
pool of designated judges from which to select and, more important-
ly, to hand-pick specific district court judges and assign them to pre-
existing appellate panels of two court of appeals judges.30  While the 
completed panels are then randomly assigned to blocks of cases—
thus preventing the deliberate assignment of specific panels to cer-
tain cases—chief judges nonetheless clearly have at least the poten-
tial to shape the composition of the circuit's three-judge panels31. 
The lack of institutional rules regarding designation provides 
scholars with a unique opportunity to study the impact of circuit-
level environmental factors on the actions of chief judges.  First, in 
making their designation decisions, chief judges are presented with a 
random stimulus: a court of appeals panel already consisting of two 
randomly-selected judges32.  Second, and more important, the fact 
that the subsequent assignment of cases to panels occurs randomly 
means that case-level factors do not (indeed, cannot) play a role in 
the designation decision33.  The designation process thus provides a 
valuable natural quasi-experiment for examining questions of judi-
cial behavior as well as greatly simplifying our analysis of the desig-
nation decision.34 
  
 28. See Saphire & Solimine, supra note 26, at 361.  
29.  S. Res. 253, 106th Cong. (1999) (enacted). 
30.  Id. 
31.  Id. 
32.  Id. 
33.  Id. 
 34. As a secondary matter, we would note that this discretion over district court 
judge designation is also potentially important for studies of the federal courts of 
appeals.  In fact, despite their nearly universal presence in the courts of appeals, no 
clear consensus has emerged regarding the treatment of district court judges sitting 
by designation in studies of those courts.  Compare Burton M. Atkins & Justin J. 
Green, Consensus on the United States Court of Appeals: Illusion or Reality?, 20 
AM. J. POL. SCI. 735, 744 (1976) (excluding designated judges in determining that 
panel structure of the U.S. Courts of Appeals permits conflict to be hidden within 
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It is interesting to note that, with the exception of Barrow and 
Walker, scholars have not focused on the strategic possibilities af-
forded chief judges by the designation of district court judges to ap-
pellate panels in the U.S. context.35  Scholars have, however, studied 
other institutional rules that provide chief judges with the discretion 
  
unanimous decisions); Burton M. Atkins & William Zavoina, Judicial Leadership 
on the Court of Appeals: A Probability Analysis of Panel Assignment in Race Re-
lations Cases on the Fifth Circuit, 18 AM. J. POL. SCI. 701, 701–11 (1974); Virgin-
ia Hettinger, Stefanie Lindquist & Wendy Martinek, Comparing Strategic and 
Attitudinal Accounts of Dissenting Behavior on the United States Courts of Ap-
peals, 48 AM. J. POL. SCI. 123, 131 (2004) [hereinafter Hettinger, Comparing Stra-
tegic and Attitudinal Accounts] (limiting analysis to decisions rendered by three-
judge panels composed of active or senior court of appeals judges); John P. 
McIver, Scaling Judicial Decisions: The Panel Decisionmaking Process of the 
U.S. Courts of Appeals, 20 AM. J. POL. SCI. 749, 753 (1976) (excluding district 
court judges sitting by designation in order to isolate the nine judges and their 
working relationships with each of their fellow circuit judges); Donald R. Songer 
& Susan Haire, Integrating Alternative Approaches to the Study of Judicial Vot-
ing: Obscenity Cases in the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 36 AM. J. POL. SCI. 963, 963–
82 (1992) with Martha Anne Humphries & Donald R. Songer, Law and Politics in 
Judicial Oversight of Federal Administrative Agencies, 61 J. POL. 212 (1999) (de-
liberately including designated judges in analysis).  Contra, Virginia Hettinger, 
Stefanie Lindquist & Wendy Martinek, The Role and Impact of Chief Judges on 
the United States Courts of Appeals, 24 JUST. SYS. J. 91, 105 (2003) [hereinafter 
Hettinger, The Role and Impact of Chief Judges]; Donald R. Songer, Danna Smith 
& Reginald S. Sheehan, Nonpublication in the Eleventh Circuit: An Empirical 
Analysis, 16 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 963, 980 (1989); Isaac Unah, Specialized Courts 
of Appeals’ Review of Bureaucratic Action and the Politics of Protectionism, 50 
POL. RES. Q. 851-878 (1997) (examining the potential effects of designation on 
judicial behavior, while other studies are unclear on precisely how they treat the 
presence or absence of designated judges).  See, e.g., Virginia Hettinger, Stefanie 
Lindquist & Wendy Martinek, Acclimation Effects and Separate Opinion Writing 
in the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 84 SOC. SCI. Q. 792 (2003) [hereinafter Hettinger, 
Acclimation Effects and Separate Opinion Writing]; Songer, supra note 17; Don-
ald R. Songer & Sue Davis, The Impact of Party and Region on Voting Decisions 
in the United States Courts of Appeals, 1955–1986, 43 W. POL. Q. 317 (1990).  If 
there are systematic differences in the characteristics and behavior of designated 
judges vis-à-vis their appellate colleagues, then this broad inconsistency in treat-
ment is potentially troubling. 
35. See, e.g., Michael E. Solimine, The Three-Judge District Court in Voting 
Rights Litigation, 30 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 79, 111–12 (1996). 
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to appoint judges to achieve certain goals.36  Moreover, one recent 
study found compelling evidence of ideologically-driven behavior in 
the making of panel assignments in both the Canadian and South 
African Supreme Courts.37  These two courts are similar to the cir-
cuit courts of appeals because chief judges have significant discre-
tion over panel assignments; to the extent that the same dynamics 
hold across the various systems, we have at least some reason to be-
lieve that judges in these systems might use designation in a policy-
driven fashion.38 
III. IDEOLOGY, OVERSIGHT, AND THE POLITICS OF DESIGNATION 
As noted above, the lack of formal rules governing the selection 
of district court judges to sit by designation provides at least the op-
portunity for chief judges to use the designation process to pursue 
their own goals.  We begin with the contention that judges in the 
courts of appeals are motivated by substantive political preferences.  
In addition to the widely-supported importance of such considera-
tions on judges’s decisions on the merits,39 scholars have amassed 
substantial evidence that policy-related factors also exert influence in 
other facets of court of appeals decision making, including panel 
assignments,40 opinion assignments,41 authorship of dissenting opin-
ions,42 and publication decisions.43  Accordingly, we begin with the 
  
 36. Id. 
 37. See Lori Hausegger & Stacia Haynie, Judicial Decisionmaking and the Use 
of Panels in the Canadian Supreme Court and the South African Appellate Divi-
sion, 37 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 635, 653 (2003). 
38.  Id. 
 39. See  J. WOODFORD HOWARD, COURTS OF APPEALS IN THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL 
SYSTEM:  A STUDY OF THE SECOND, FIFTH AND DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUITS 
184–85 (1981); McIver, supra note 34, at 753, 755; Songer & Davis, supra note 
34, at 319–20; Songer & Haire, supra note 34, at 970, 978. 
 40. See Atkins & Zavoina, supra note 34, at 708.  
 41. See Burton M. Atkins, Opinion Assignments on the United States Courts of 
Appeals: The Question of Specialization, 27 W. POL. Q. 409, 427 (1974). 
 42. See Hettinger, Acclimation Effects and Separate Opinion Writing, supra note 
34, at 807; Hettinger, Comparing Strategic and Attitudinal Accounts, supra note 
34, at 130, 134. 
 43. See Songer, Smith & Sheehan, supra note 34, at 14. 
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expectation that chief judges will use the designation process to 
bring the law into accord with their own personal policy preferences 
by designating ideologically like-minded judges to panels.  At the 
same time, we suggest that chief judges will be constrained, both in 
their incentives to do so (by the ideological makeup of the existing 
panel) and in their ability to do so (by the possibility of oversight by 
the circuit sitting en banc or the U.S. Supreme Court).  We outline 
the contours of these expectations below. 
A. “Split” Panels 
At the broadest level, chief judges faced with the decision of 
whom to designate to an existing two-judge panel are presented with 
two circumstances: those two judges are either ideologically similar 
(what we term a unified panel) or they are ideologically different (or 
split).  Consider first the case of a split panel, consisting of one ideo-
logically conservative and one ideologically liberal circuit court 
judge.  Such a situation presents a chief judge with the greatest op-
portunity to affect the decisions of the panel, since he or she is effec-
tively appointing the swing vote.  In the absence of other constraints, 
our policy-based perspective would suggest that he or she would 
appoint a judge with an ideology similar to his or her own.  At the 
same time, however, a number of other factors suggest that his or her 
ability to do so effectively may be limited. 
The most important such factor is oversight: both the circuit as a 
whole (sitting en banc) and the U.S. Supreme Court may reverse 
what they perceive as incorrect panel decisions of the courts of ap-
peals.  The possibility of such a reversal is exacerbated to the extent 
that the panel's minority judge might act as a watchdog,44 bringing 
the actions of the panel to the attention of the circuit and/or the Su-
preme Court through dissenting opinions and/or requests for rehear-
ing en banc.  Note, however, that if the ideology of the chief judge is 
consistent with that of the panel's overseers, such considerations 
cease to be a concern.  Thus, for example, a conservative chief judge 
  
 44. See Frank B. Cross & Emerson H. Tiller, Judicial Partisanship and Obedi-
ence to Legal Doctrine: Whistleblowing on the Federal Courts of Appeals, 107 
YALE L.J. 2155, 2175–76 (1998); Steven R. Van Winkle, Dissent as a Signal: 
Evidence from the U.S. Courts of Appeals (1997) (Unpublished manuscript).   
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may designate an equally conservative district court judge to a split 
panel if the circuit and/or the Supreme Court are also conservative.  
If, however, there is a liberal majority at the circuit or Supreme 
Court level, the chief judge’s ability to select such a like-minded 
designee is reduced since the chances are relatively good that a con-
servative decision rendered by the panel would be revisited.  The 
reverse is true for liberals: the ability of a liberal chief judge to select 
a liberal designee will be constrained by the presence of conservative 
oversight at the circuit or Supreme Court level.  Put differently, we 
predict that the probability that a liberal chief judge will designate a 
liberal district court judge increases as the fraction of liberal judges 
on the circuit and/or the U.S. Supreme Court increases and that the 
reverse is true for conservative chief judges (that is, that they will be 
more likely to designate a conservative district court judge as the 
fraction of conservative judges on the circuit and/or the Supreme 
Court increases). 
More generally, our expectation for split panels is that the influ-
ence of the ideology of the chief judge on the identity of the design-
ee will depend on the ideological tenor of the court exercising over-
sight.  This in turn implies an interactive empirical model, of the 
form: 
 
Pr(Like-Minded Designee)   =    f [β0 + β1 (Conservative 
Chief Judge) + β2 (Conservative Circuit/Supreme Court) + β3 
(Conservative Chief Judge (1) × Conservative Cir-
cuit/Supreme Court) + u] 
 
Equation (1) specifies that the probability that a chief judge des-
ignates a like-minded district court judge is a function f(•) of three 
things: how conservative (or liberal) that chief judge is; how con-
servative or liberal the circuit as a whole (and/or the Supreme Court) 
is; and the interaction of the two.  The multiplicative interaction of 
the two components allows for the effect of each variable on the 
probability of a like-minded designee to depend on the value of the 
other.45 
  
 45. See generally Thomas Brambor, William Clark & Matt Golder, Understand-
ing Interaction Models: Improving Empirical Analyses, 14 POL. ANAL. 63 (2006) 
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The discussion above suggests that, for split panels, we would 
expect that on a liberal circuit (or in the presence of a liberal Su-
preme Court), a conservative chief judge would be less likely to des-
ignate a like-minded judge than would a liberal.  Statistically, this 
expectation is borne out if the estimated value of β1 is less than zero.  
Similarly, for liberal chief judges (that is, when Conservative Chief 
Judge = 0), the probability of designating a like-minded judge 
should decrease as the fraction of conservatives on the circuit as a 
whole or on the Supreme Court increases; this implies that β2, the 
coefficient on the term for Conservative Circuit/Supreme Court, 
should also be less than zero.  Finally, we expect these effects to re-
verse for conservative chief judges and/or conservative oversight: on 
a conservative circuit or in the presence of a conservative Supreme 
Court, a conservative chief judge will be more likely to designate a 
like-minded district court judge; for a conservative chief judge, the 
probability of picking a like-minded designate increases as the frac-
tion of conservatives on the circuit or the Supreme Court increases.  
These last expectations imply that the sign of the coefficient on the 
interaction term β3 is positive and that the relative size of that coeffi-
cient is greater than either β1 or β2.  These expectations are summa-
rized in column two of Table 1, located in the appendix. 
B. Unified Panels 
Panels consisting of two ideologically-similar circuit court judg-
es present a different designation scenario for chief judges.  The sig-
nature characteristic of such unified panels is that, as a practical mat-
ter, the chief judge's decision about who to designate will not affect 
that panel's decisions to the same degree as in split panels, since he 
or she is no longer selecting the pivotal voter.  Accordingly, in des-
  
(outlining the use of multiplicative interaction terms for testing conditional expec-
tations in statistical models); Bear Braumoeller, Hypothesis Testing and Multipli-
cative Interaction Terms, 58 INT’L. ORG. 807 (2004) (explaining that when a sta-
tistical equation incorporates a multiplicative term in an attempt to model interac-
tion effects, the statistical significance of the lower-order coefficients is largely 
useless for the typical purposes of hypothesis testing).  For a recent illustration of 
this approach, see generally Christopher Zorn, William D. Henderson & Jason J. 
Czarnezki, Working Class Judges, 88 B.U. L. Rev. 829 (illustrating the interpreta-
tion of regression models with multiplicative interactions). 
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ignating judges to such a panel, chief judges might seek to achieve 
one of two possible (and, in some cases, inconsistent) goals: select-
ing watchdog judges and administrative efficiency. 
The first of these two goals is directly implied by our assumption 
about chief judges’ interest in influencing policy.  As we mentioned 
above, watchdogs are partisans who, by dissent or other means, will 
signal to the circuit when the panel makes decisions at odds with the 
rest of the circuit, the Supreme Court, and/or the chief judge him-
self.46  These signals, in turn, increase the likelihood of either en 
banc review47 or certiorari by the U.S. Supreme Court.48 
It is useful to note some important elements of this watchdog 
theory.  First, the ability of a designee to act as a watchdog depends 
on a very specific set of conditions being present; in particular, the 
ideological orientation of the overseeing courts must differ from that 
of the two judges on the unified panel to which she or he is designat-
ing.  In the absence of that difference, the expectation would be that 
the reviewing court would ratify the decision of the panel, and so the 
choice of a designated judge would be expected to have little effect 
on the final outcome of a case.  Second, from the perspective of the 
chief judge, the value of a watchdog also depends on whether or not 
the chief judge is in ideological agreement with the overseeing court; 
a liberal chief judge, for example, would hardly be expected to des-
ignate a conservative watchdog to call the actions of a liberal panel 
to the attention of a more conservative circuit.  Taken together, these 
two points make clear that the use of watchdog judges cuts both 
ways:  just as we would expect a liberal chief judge on a liberal cir-
cuit to designate a liberal watchdog to a conservative panel, we 
would also expect that a conservative chief judge in the same situa-
tion would endeavor to ensure that his or her designee was conserva-
tive (in order to prevent watchdog-like behavior and so minimize the 
chance of en banc or Supreme Court review). 
The fact that a chief judge’s incentives to designate a watchdog 
depend on his or her ideological congruence with both the existing 
  
 46. See Cross & Tiller, supra note 44, at 2175–76; Van Winkle, supra note 44.   
 47. See George, supra note 18, at 247.  
 48. See Gregory A. Caldeira, John R. Wright & Christopher Zorn, Sophisticated 
Voting and Gate-Keeping in the Supreme Court, 15 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 549, 570 
(1999). 
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panel and the overseeing court implies that the marginal influence of 
both the ideology of the chief judge and that of the circuit or Su-
preme Court on the probability of a like-minded designee will also 
depend on the ideology of the two existing panelists.  In this respect, 
a model for unified panels differs from that for split panels, in that it 
requires a three-way interaction among the composition of the panel, 
the ideology of the chief judge, and the ideology of the overseeing 
court.  In terms of the model in equation (1), the expectations stem-
ming from the watchdog theory would be that, for a panel consisting 
of two liberal court of appeals judges, we would expect to find no 
direct effect of Conservative Chief Judge (that is, the value of β1 
would be zero), while the direct effect of Conservative Cir-
cuit/Supreme Court (β2) would be less than zero, and the interactive 
term (β3) would be greater than zero.  The first of these expectations 
is due to the fact that, when both the panel and the overseeing court 
are liberal, the ideology of the chief judge should have little or no 
impact on the likelihood of a like-minded designee.  The second is 
because, given both a liberal panel and a liberal chief judge, the like-
lihood of a like-minded (liberal) designee increases as the overseeing 
court grows more conservative.  Finally, the third is due to the fact 
that, when the overseeing court is conservative, both conservative 
and liberal chief judges should strongly prefer to pick like-minded 
designees—the former to act as watchdogs and the latter to ensure 
that such behavior did not occur.  In a similar fashion, the expecta-
tions for unified conservative panels are somewhat reversed; there, 
we would expect that the direct influence of the Conservative Chief 
Judge variable (β1) on the probability of designating a like-minded 
judge would be negative, while that of Conservative Cir-
cuit/Supreme Court (β2) would be negative and that for the interac-
tion term (β3) would be positive.49  All of these expectations are pre-
sented in columns three and four of Table 1.50 
A second possibility for unified panels is that the chief judge, 
recognizing that the choice of designee will have little or no effect 
  
 49. See generally Brambor, Clark & Golder, supra note 45. 
 50. The Appendix contains a table of expectations for each of the 2  2  2 = 
eight possible ideological combinations of panel (liberal or conservative), chief 
judge (liberal or conservative), and overseeing court (liberal or conservative), 
along with the corresponding contrasts in Equation (1). 
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on the panel's decisions, will attempt to maximize the decision mak-
ing efficiency of the panel.  This administrative efficiency motiva-
tion suggests that, at the margin, we would expect a chief judge to 
select a designated judge who would increase the probability of what 
we term ideological harmony on the panel.  Such ideological harmo-
ny contributes to the efficiency of panel decision making by making 
it more likely that panel decisions will be issued quickly without oral 
argument,51 speeding the review of amicus briefs,52 minimizing 
lengthy delays stemming from contentious debates among the judg-
es, and reducing the extent of writing and circulation of multiple 
drafts of concurring or dissenting opinions.  In addition, an ideologi-
cally homogenous panel is less likely to grant a party's petition for a 
panel rehearing.53  Empirically, this view suggests that, irrespective 
of their own ideology, chief judges will designate judges with ideo-
logies consistent with the existing panel members.  With reference to 
the model in (1), the administrative view leads us to expect that the 
effect of Conservative Chief Judge (β1) will be negative for ideolog-
ically liberal panels and positive for ideologically conservative ones, 
while the effects of Conservative Circuit/Supreme Court will be zero 
across all panels; these expectations are outlined in columns five and 
six of Table 1.54  Importantly, the expectations derived from the ad-
ministrative efficiency view present a stark contrast to those based in 
policy considerations. 
  
 51. On appeal, the panel may decline to grant a motion for oral argument if all 
three judges unanimously agree that argument is unnecessary.  FED. R. APP. P. 
34(a)(2).  
 52. FED. R. APP. P. 29.  This rule only permits the filing of amicus briefs by leave 
of court or the consent of all parties (with some exceptions).  Id. 
 53. FED. R. APP. P. 40. 
 54. A third possibility is that chief judges act at all times as if the panel was split; 
such behavior might occur, for example, if judges do not vote precisely along 
ideological lines.  If this is the case, then a chief judge’s behavior in the face of 
unified panels ought to be more-or-less consistent with that when the panel is split, 
and we would expect precisely the same relationship between designation, a chief 
judge’s ideology and that of the circuit or Supreme Court as discussed above. 
84          UNIVERSITY OF NEW HAMPSHIRE LAW REVIEW Vol. 10 No.1  
C.  Workload and Designation 
As we mentioned in Part II, the conventional wisdom states that 
the courts of appeals have turned with greater frequency to federal 
district court judges for assistance with their rising workloads.  In 
their recent survey of circuit clerks and chief judges, Saphire and 
Solimine found that workload concerns were among the most fre-
quently cited reasons for the use of designated judges.55  Yet studies 
examining district court judges sitting by designation have uncov-
ered widely varying levels of district court designation, ranging from 
a high of 47%56 to lows between 12% and 24%.57  Drawing upon 
Songer’s United States Court of Appeals Data Base, Phase I, we 
find that district court judges participated in 3,389 (or 22.46%) of the 
15,086 non-en banc decisions in Songer’s data for the 1925–1988 
period.58  Figure 2 presents the annual proportion of three-judge de-
cisions in Songer’s data in which a designated district court judge 
participated from 1925 to 1988.  The data points in Figure 2 are 
broadly consistent with earlier findings regarding the incidence of 
designations: aggregate annual percentages average 21.0% over the 
entire period, and range from a low of 5.5% in 1953 to highs of 
42.3% in 1930 and 37.1% in 1981.59  In accord with the earlier stud-
ies of Green and Atkins, and Wasby, we note an increase in the inci-
  
 55. See Saphire & Solimine, supra note 26, at 362. 
 56. See Justin J. Green & Burton M. Atkins, Designated Judges: How Well Do 
They Perform?, 6 JUDICATURE 358, 363 (1978). 
 57. See Daniel R. Pinello, Linking Party to Judicial Ideology in American 
Courts: A Meta-analysis, 20 JUST. SYS. J. 219, 236 tbl.3 (1999); Stephen L. Was-
by, Of Judges, Hobgoblins, and Small Minds: Dimensions of Disagreement in the 
Ninth Circuit (September 2–5, 1982) (paper presented at the Annual Meeting of 
the American Political Science Association, Denver, CO). 
 58. DONALD R. SONGER, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS DATA BASE, PHASE I (last 
updated Oct. 21, 2008), available at http://www.cas.sc.edu/poli/juri/appct.htm. 
These data are a probability sample of decisions of the United States courts of 
appeals published in the Federal Reporter from 1925 to 1988.  We rely on 
Songer’s coding of the identity of judges sitting on each panel to identify district 
court judges sitting by designation.  Specifically, we code decisions as containing 
a designated district court judge if one or more of the judge codes in Songer’s data 
are identified as such. 
59.  Id. 
2012 HIDDEN POLITICS OF JUDICIAL DESIGNATION 85 
dence of designations during the late 1960s and 1970s.60 The highest 
rates occurred in the late 1920s and early 1930s, and again in the late 
1970s and early 1980s, while the lowest levels are found in the 
1940s and 1950s.61  Moreover, designation rates clearly track closely 
with aggregate workload levels over time; the Pearson’s r correlation 
between the two variables is 0.57, an effect that is statistically differ-
entiable from zero with a high degree of confidence (p <.001).62 
The apparent importance of workload in the incidence of desig-
nation suggests that workload-related factors may play a role in the 
practice of designating district court judges to the courts of appeals.  
In particular, workload concerns may suppress the ability of chief 
judges to select like-minded panelists from the district courts.  To 
address this possibility, we include a control variable for the cir-
cuit/year-specific workload in our models of the designation decision 
below, with the expectation that its effects will be negative. 
IV. DATA, OPERATIONALIZATION, AND METHODS 
We assess the determinants of the designation process using 
Songer’s (1997) data on the U.S. courts of appeals between 1925 and 
1988.  We restrict our analysis to the 3,320 cases in which a district 
court judge sat by designation, and on which data are available for 
all variables.  For all district court judges appearing in Songer’s data, 
we coded their political party affiliation, as well as that of their ap-
pointing president.63  Our response variable is whether (coded one) 
or not (coded zero) the political party of the designated judge is the 
same as that of the chief judge of the circuit responsible for the des-
  
60.  See Atkins & Green, supra note 34; Wasby, supra note 57.  
61.  Songer, supra note 58. 
62.H.T. REYNOLDS, JANET BUTTOLPH JOHNSON, & JASON D. MYCOFF, POLITICAL 
SCIENCE RESEARCH METHODS,140-142 (2007).  
 63. Several sources were used to gather data on district court judges, including 
Directory of American Judges, The American Bench, the Almanac of the Federal 
Judiciary, and Directory of Minority Judges in the United States.  If the judge did 
not self-identify as a Democrat or a Republican, we used the appointing presi-
dent’s party as a surrogate. 
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ignation decision.64  To address matters relating to caseload, we in-
clude a variable measuring the nominal workload of active judges on 
the circuit in any given year.  From Songer’s (1997) Appendix 5, we 
obtained the total number of published decisions in each circuit in 
each year.  We then divided this number by the number of active 
judges sitting on each circuit in each year, as derived from Zuk et 
al.,65 to obtain a measure of the effective caseload per active judge.  
This variable ranges from a low of just under seven cases per judge 
to a high of 141.5 cases, with a mean of 44.9 cases per judge per 
year.  While imperfect—for example, it fails to account for the in-
creasing use of senior judges over time66—it is nonetheless an accu-
rate proxy for each court's true workload. 
We assess our hypotheses regarding the influence of ideological 
factors on the designation process through three key independent 
variables.  First, we note the party identification of the circuit's chief 
judge, coded one for Republicans and zero for Democrats.  Second, 
we operationalize oversight by higher courts in two ways.  As a 
measure of circuit-level ideology, for each case we include a varia-
ble measuring the proportion of the circuit who are Republicans in 
that year.  Similarly, we measure Supreme Court ideology as the 
fraction of Supreme Court justices who are Republicans.  Following 
  
 64. Recognizing that party identification is an imperfect surrogate for a judge’s 
ideology, we opt for it nonetheless.  Party identification is generally a good indica-
tor of political ideology, and has been shown in other studies to be a good predic-
tor of the behavior of judges on the courts of appeals.  E.g., HOWARD, supra note 
39, at 184–85; Donald Songer, Factors Affecting Variation in Rates of Dissent in 
the U.S. Courts of Appeals, in JUDICIAL CONFLICT AND CONSENSUS: BEHAVIORAL 
STUDIES OF AMERICAN APPELLATE COURTS # (Sheldon Goldman & Charles Lamb 
eds., 1986); Sheldon Goldman, Voting Behavior on the United States Courts of 
Appeals Revisited, 69 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 491, 504–05 (1975); Songer and Davis, 
supra note 34, at 319–20.  Also, to account for potential differences between 
Southern and non-Southern Democrats, we conducted separate analyses for South-
ern (defined as the 4th, 5th, and 11th) and Northern circuits.  While smaller Ns led 
to slightly larger standard error estimates in these analyses, the substantive direc-
tion of the results did not change. 
 65. GARY ZUK, DEBORAH J. BARROW & GERARD S. GRYSKI, MULTI-USER 
DATABASE ON THE ATTRIBUTES OF UNITED STATES APPEALS COURT JUDGES, 
1801–1994 (1997). 
 66. See Albert Yoon, As You Like It: Senior Federal Judges and the Political 
Economy of Judicial Tenure, 2 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 495, 517–20 (2005). 
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equation (1), we include as well an interaction between the chief 
judge and overseeing court variables.  Finally, for each case in our 
data, we record the party identification of the two circuit court judg-
es comprising the panel prior to designation, and we undertake sepa-
rate analyses for split (one Democrat and one Republican) and uni-
fied (two Democrats or two Republicans) panels.67 
As we note above, the fact that cases are randomly assigned to 
panels after the designation decision has been made permits us to 
omit case-specific factors from the model, since any such character-
istics are by construction unrelated to the designation decision.  At 
the same time, because of the panel-like structure of our data, there 
is a significant possibility of interdependence across cases.  In par-
ticular, cases arising in the same circuit in a given year may be relat-
ed due to similarities in case types, regional effects, or other factors.  
To address this issue, we estimate a series of probit models incorpo-
rating random effects for each circuit-year.68 
These models—which are appropriate when the outcome varia-
ble is a dichotomous outcome, as it is here—include a separate inter-
cept (or baseline) term for each circuit in each year of the data.  A 
key requirement of such models is that the independent variables be 
unrelated to those unit-specific effects; failure to meet this require-
ment can lead to parameter estimates and standard errors that are 
badly biased.  Here again, the structure of the designation process 
outlined in Figure 1, in the appendix, ensures that this requirement is 
  
 67. We are also aware that the seniority of the district court judge may affect 
designation patterns.  For example, chief judges often designate newly-appointed 
district court judges as part of their socialization process, while judges with senior 
status might be called up more often due to their reduced workloads at the district 
court level.  While such considerations are potentially important, we leave inquiry 
into the possible effects of seniority to future work, for a number of reasons.  First, 
because our data represent only a sample of all court of appeals cases, it is impos-
sible for us to ascertain if the first instance of designation for a particular judge is, 
in fact, his or her first time on the higher court.  This difficulty is compounded by 
our lack of knowledge of the effective pool from which district court judges are 
chosen; without this information, we have no way of assessing chief judges’s deci-
sions regarding the selection of senior versus active district court judges.  Finally, 
with respect to senior status, the precise date on which district court judges take 
such status is often hard to determine, making such distinctions very difficult to 
make in practice. 
 68. See, e.g., CHENG HSIAO, ANALYSIS OF PANEL DATA (2d ed. 2003). 
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met: because court of appeals judges are randomly selected for pan-
els, we can be certain that the panels’ pre-designation compositions 
are unrelated to those effects. 
V. ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
Results of our analyses are presented in Table 2 in the appendix.  
We note at the outset that workload has no appreciable influence on 
the propensity of chief judges to designate their ideological allies to 
court of appeals panels.  In light of existing work, this is unsurpris-
ing; Cohen, for example, highlights the ability of the courts of ap-
peals to respond to increasing workloads without substantially af-
fecting their decision making process.69   More generally, one might 
expect that, to the extent that workload is a factor in designation, its 
influence should appear only on the incidence of such designation 
itself, but not necessarily on the identity of the designee.70 
Broadly speaking, our findings with respect to the influence of 
ideology and oversight are consistent with a pattern of chief judge 
behavior motivated by policy considerations; moreover, these results 
are remarkably consistent across a range of different specifications 
and conditions.  Columns two through five of Table 2 report results 
that operationalize oversight at the circuit level.  The clear pattern 
  
 69. JONATHAN MATTHEW COHEN, INSIDE APPELLATE COURTS: THE IMPACT OF 
COURT ORGANIZATION ON JUDICIAL DECISION MAKING IN THE UNITED STATES 
COURTS OF APPEALS (2002).  
 70. To further address this issue, and to support our contention that there is no 
relationship between designation and case-related factors, we also estimated a two-
stage probit model with selection, where the first stage indicated whether the panel 
contained a designated judge and the second was the party of that designee.  See 
WILLIAM H. GREENE, ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS § 21.6.4, at 713–14 (5th ed. 2003).  
In those analyses, we included an indicator for the year of the decision, a count of 
amicus curiae briefs in the selection stage, and fixed effects for each circuit.  Such 
a model allows us to assess whether case-related factors such as the importance of 
the case (using the number of amici present in a given case serves as a proxy for 
the case’s importance) are related to the incidence of designation and hence 
whether the results in Table 2 are biased by selection effects.  In all cases, we 
found no relationship between case-related factors and designation decisions, and 
the estimates of the selection effects parameter were small and insignificant.  The-
se results are available from the authors upon request. 
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that emerges corresponds precisely to that expected from the policy 
influence perspective: the significant, negative estimate for β1 indi-
cates that, irrespective of the composition of the panel (unified or 
split, Democratic or Republican), the presence of a Democratic ma-
jority at the circuit level makes Republican chief judges less likely 
(and Democratic chief judges more likely) to select a member of 
their own party to sit by designation.  At the same time, the large, 
positive estimate for the coefficient on the interaction term (β3) indi-
cates that the reverse is true on Republican-dominated circuits: there, 
Republican chief judges are more likely (and Democrats less likely) 
to tap their ideological allies for service on the courts of appeals.  
Equally important is what we do not find; in particular, our re-
sults offer little or no support for the administrative perspective and 
only marginal support for the watchdog perspective.  The consistent-
ly large and significant estimates for β3, particularly in the models of 
unified panels, are telling evidence against the administrative theory.  
Similarly, evidence for the watchdog hypotheses is partial at best.  
For the models of unified panels, we can distinguish between the 
watchdog and policy influence hypotheses only via the differential 
effects across Republican and Democratic panels; while we find no 
significant direct effects among the Democratic-majority panels 
(column five), we also find no significant interaction effect. 
These same findings persist—and, in fact, are even stronger—
when we operationalize oversight in terms of Supreme Court ideolo-
gy.  Those results are presented in columns six through nine of Table 
2.  To illustrate the size of these effects, Figure 3 plots the predicted 
probabilities (along with their associated 95 percent confidence in-
tervals) of designating a like-minded judge, for both Democratic and 
Republican chief judges, as a function of the Republican proportion 
of the U.S. Supreme Court.71  The results are striking: for Republi-
can chief judges, increasing the degree of sympathetic oversight 
from 0.09 to 0.73 (that is, from one Republican justice to seven, ef-
fectively the full range of values in the data) yields a corresponding 
increase of 0.76 in the probability of a Republican designee (from 
  
 71. Results in Figure 2 are based on the analysis in column seven of Table 2, 
holding the unit-level effects constant at their mean value of zero: similar results 
are obtained if we base our predictions on the other Supreme Court results pre-
sented in Table 2. 
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0.09 to 0.85).  The same increase in the Republican composition of 
the Supreme Court causes a decline in the probability of a Democrat-
ic judge designating a fellow Democrat, from 0.54 to 0.40.   In both 
instances, the magnitude of these changes exceed their confidence 
intervals, leading us to conclude that, particularly for Republican 
chief judges, the presence of judicial oversight exerts a strong effect 
on those individuals’ designation decisions. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The phenomenon of district court judge designation on the U.S. 
courts of appeals is a unique example of a practice in which chief 
judges have almost unconstrained discretion over a potentially cru-
cial aspect of the decision-making process.  Scholars are increasingly 
aware of the significance of this power72 as well as the importance of 
the chief judges in the operation of the circuit courts of appeals more 
generally.73  Our analysis of the means by which those judges are 
selected provides clear and consistent evidence that chief judges, in 
making designation decisions, tend to choose individuals with simi-
lar ideologies.  In this respect, our results mirror those of Hausegger 
and Haynie,74 who suggest that the practice of judicial designation 
provides at least the potential for policy-motivated behavior across a 
range of different institutional contexts.  Our results make equally 
clear, however, that the extent to which judges are willing and able 
to do so depends on their institutional context—in particular, the 
potential for oversight provided by the circuit en banc and/or the 
U.S. Supreme Court. 
But while our results regarding designation are both robust and 
substantial, it is important to note that the selection of judges with a 
particular ideological bent is only the first step in influencing the 
direction of the law.  Whether or not these judges behave in a man-
ner consistent with the designating chief judge’s intentions remains 
an empirical question, though a number of previous studies suggest 
  
 72. See, e.g., Robert J. Brown Jr. & Allison Herren Lee, Neutral Assignment of 
Judges at the Court of Appeals, 78 TEX. L. REV 1037, 1066 (2000). 
 73. See Hettinger, The Role and Impact of Chief Judges, supra note 34, at 93. 
 74. Hausegger & Haynie, supra note 37, at 651, 653. 
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that, owing to internal pressures on three-judge panels, a given 
judge’s influence over case outcomes is likely to be small.75  Until 
the extent of such influence is more precisely determined, the practi-
cal value of policy changes to limit the influence of the designation 
process remains uncertain. 
More broadly, our findings thus support two general proposi-
tions: that chief judges’ decisions about designation are motivated by 
policy factors, and these same judges behave strategically by taking 
into consideration the likely actions of other actors in making deci-
sions relating to the operation of the courts.  A long line of empirical 
research on the courts of appeals support the notion that such judges 
are driven by policy goals; in the second case, our work squares with 
other recent studies of court of appeals decision making,76 as well as 
those that expand the notion of strategic behavior beyond case-level 
votes to include such other institutional phenomena as the selection 
of decision-making instruments.77  At the same time, our work con-
trasts with a number of recent studies that have called into question 
the conditional nature of court of appeals behavior,78 suggesting the 
importance of additional inquiries into the contours of constraints in 
the federal judicial hierarchy. 
  
 75. See, e.g., Atkins & Green, supra note 34, at 740. 
 76. See, e.g., Cross & Tiller, supra note 44, at 2175; Van Winkle, supra note 44. 
 77. See, e.g., Joseph Smith & Emerson H. Tiller, The Strategy of Judging: Evi-
dence from Administrative Law, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 61, 81 (2002). 
 78. See, e.g., Hettinger, Comparing Strategic and Attitudinal Accounts, supra 
note 34, at 134; Klein & Hume, supra note 12. 
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VII. APPENDIX 
EXPECTATIONS FOR DESIGNATION DECISIONS ON UNIFIED PANELS 
UNDER THE WATCHDOG MODEL 
 
Unified Liberal Panel 
  Circuit/Supreme Court Oversight 
  Liberal  Conservative 
Chief 
Judge 
Liberal Either ↔ (β2) < 
0 
Liberal 
 ↕ (β1) = 0  ↕ (β1 +  β3) > 
0 
Conservative Either ↔ (β2 +  




Unified Conservative Panel 
  Circuit/Supreme Court Oversight 
  Liberal  Conservative 
Chief 
Judge 
Liberal Liberal ↔ (β2) 
> 0 
Either 
 ↕ (β1) > 0  ↕ (β1 +  β3) = 
0 
Conservative Conservative ↔ (β2 +  
β3) < 0 
Either 
 
Note: Cells denote the ideology of the expected designee under 
the watchdog perspective.  Arrows between cells denote the corre-
sponding contrasts in Equation (1).  Note that the expectations imply 
β3 > 0 for liberal panels and β3 < 0 for conservative ones.  This prop-
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TABLE 1: EXPECTED INFLUENCE OF CHIEF JUDGE AND 
CIRCUIT/SUPREME COURT IDEOLOGY ON THE PROBABILITY OF 






















Chief Judge < 0 = 0 = 0 < 0 > 0 
Conservative  
Circuit /  
Supreme Court 
< 0 > 0 < 0 = 0 = 0 
Conservative 
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Note: Response variable is whether (=1) or not (=0) the desig-
nated district court judge was Republican.  Numbers in parentheses 
are coefficient estimates; standard errors are in parentheses.  One 
asterisk indicates p < .05, two indicate p < .01 (one-tailed).  This 
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FIGURE 1: U.S. COURT OF APPEALS DESIGNATION PROCESS
FIGURE 2: PERCENTAGE OF COURT OF APPEALS CASES WITH DISTRICT 
COURT JUDGES SITTING BY DESIGNATION AND COURT OF APPEALS 
WORKLOAD, 1925–1988 
Note: Dashed line plots the mean number of cases decided per 
active judge in each year; smooth line is the annual percentage of 
cases in which a district court judge sat by designation in the U.S. 
courts of appeals.  Estimates are based on Songer’s (1997) data.  
This proposition is discussed more fully above in Section III. C.  
Chief Judge Des-
ignates One Dis-
trict Court Judge 
to that Panel 
Random As-
signment of 
Two Court of 
Appeals Judg-
es to a Panel 
Random 
Assignment 
of Cases to 
that Panel 
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FIGURE 3: PREDICTED PROBABILITIES OF A SAME-PARTY DESIGNEE,
BY CHIEF JUDGE AND SUPREME COURT PARTISANSHIP
Note: Lines indicate predicted probabilities, holding Workload
and the random effects constant at their means; bars denote 95% 
confidence intervals.  Solid line is for panels overseen by a Republi-
can chief judge; dashed line is for a Democratic chief judge.  Results 
are for a unified panel (column seven in Table 2).  This proposition 
is discussed more fully above in Section V. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The prosecution must prove every element of the crime beyond a 
reasonable doubt for a valid conviction.  The Constitution nowhere 
explicitly contains this requirement, but the Supreme Court in In re 
Winship1 stated that due process commands it.2  Justice Brennan, 
writing for the Court, noted that the Court had often assumed that the 
standard existed,3 that it played a central role in American criminal 
justice by lessening the chances of mistaken convictions,4 and that it 
was essential for instilling community respect in criminal enforce-
ment.5  The reasonable doubt standard is fundamental because it 
makes guilty verdicts more difficult.  As Winship said, the require-
ment “protects the accused against conviction . . . .”6   
Justice Harlan’s eloquent concurring opinion in Winship elabo-
rated by noting that “a standard of proof represents an attempt to 
instruct the factfinder concerning the degree of confidence our socie-
ty thinks he should have in the correctness of factual conclusions for 
  
 1. 397 U.S. 358 (1970). 
 2. See id. at 364 (“[W]e explicitly hold that the Due Process Clause protects the 
accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every 
fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged.”); see also Victor 
v. Nebraska, 511 U.S. 1, 5 (1994) (“The government must prove beyond a reason-
able doubt every element of a charged offense.”). 
 3. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. at 362 (“Expressions in many opinions of this 
Court indicate that it has long been assumed that proof of a criminal charge be-
yond a reasonable doubt is constitutionally required.”). 
 4. See id. at 363 (“The reasonable-doubt standard plays a vital role in the Amer-
ican scheme of criminal procedure.  It is a prime instrument for reducing the risk 
of convictions resting on factual error.”). 
 5. See id. at 364 (“[U]se of the reasonable-doubt standard is indispensable to 
command the respect and confidence of the community in applications of the 
criminal law.”). 
 6. Id. at 364. 




a particular type of adjudication.”7  Incorrect factual conclusions can 
lead either to the acquittal of a guilty person or the conviction of an 
innocent one.  “Because the standard of proof affects the compara-
tive frequency of these two types of erroneous outcomes, the choice 
of the standard to be applied in a particular kind of litigation should, 
in a rational world, reflect an assessment of the comparative social 
disutility of each.”8  Society views the harm of convicting the inno-
cent as much greater than that of acquitting the guilty.  Thus, Harlan 
concluded, “I view the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt in a criminal cased as bottomed on a fundamental value de-
termination of our society that it is far worse to convict an innocent 
man than to let a guilty man go free.”9 
The reasonable doubt standard was constitutionalized because of 
the societal function it now serves.  Winship did not find it constitu-
tionally required because the original meaning of a constitutional 
provision required it.  Indeed, the Court indicated that the standard 
had not fully crystalized until after the Constitution was adopted.10  
Even so, the reasonable doubt standard provides a fertile field for 
examining the methodology of finding the original meaning of con-
stitutional criminal procedure rights.  First, its status seems secure.  
  
 7. Id. at 370 (Harlan, J. concurring). 
 8. Id. at 371. 
 9. In re Winship, 397 U.S. at 372. 
 10. See id. at 361 (“The requirement that guilt of a criminal charge be established 
by proof beyond a reasonable doubt dates at least from our early years as a Na-
tion.”); see also Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404, 411 (1972), where Justice 
White, writing for the plurality stated, “As the Court noted in the Winship case, 
the rule requiring proof of crime beyond a reasonable doubt did not crystallize in 
this country until after the Constitution was adopted.”  White continued that schol-
ars had concluded that  
the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt first crystallized in 
the case of Rex v. Finny, a high treason case tried in Dublin in 1798 . . . . 
Confusion about the rule persisted in the United States in the early 19th 
century . . . ; it was only in the latter half of the century . . . that American 
courts began applying it in its modern form in criminal cases. 
Id. at 412 n. 6; see also Victor v. Nebraska, 511 U.S. 1, 8 (1994) (noting that 
the 1850 formulation of the standard by Massachusetts Chief Justice Shaw in 
Commonwealth v. Webster, 59 Mass. 295, 320 (1850), “is representative of 
the time when American courts began applying [the beyond a reasonable 
doubt standard] in its modern form in criminal cases.”) (quotations omitted). 




No debate questions the constitutional requirement that an accused 
can only be convicted if the crime is proven beyond a reasonable 
doubt.  Its original meaning can be explored uncolored by the parti-
sanship often engendered when present seekers of original meaning 
hope to define a new contour to a constitutional guarantee. 
Furthermore, serious scholars have studied the reasonable doubt 
standard’s early development and its original meaning, purposes, and 
intent.  An examination of those scholarly sources, methods, and 
conclusions provides a number of valuable insights that should affect 
the search for finding the original meaning of other American crimi-
nal procedure guarantees.  These are first that the seeker of original 
meaning of evolved criminal procedure rights has to go beyond tra-
ditional legal sources and explore the broader epistemological devel-
opments in religion, philosophy, and science that affected the devel-
opment of the right.  Second, conclusions about original meaning 
drawn primarily from English and other European sources can be 
misleading without a consideration of American developments.  
What might seem like a sound conclusion when English sources are 
examined may look suspect when viewed in the light of American 
developments.  Finally, the reasonable doubt scholarship reveals that 
definitive conclusions about the original meaning of American con-
stitutional rights will often be impossible to find both because the 
necessary American record is absent and because evolved rights 
never really had a definitive original meaning.   
The starting point here is with the scholars who have concluded 
that the original purpose of the reasonable doubt standard was not, as 
the Court now has it, to protect the accused, but instead emerged to 
make convictions easier. 
II. REASONABLE DOUBT AS A REPLACEMENT FOR ANY DOUBT 
Anthony Morano’s path-breaking article in 1975 maintained that 
the reasonable doubt requirement emerged not as a protection for the 
accused, but to make it easier for prosecutors to get convictions.11  
He concluded that juries were not instructed about a burden of per-
  
 11. Anthony A. Morano, A Reexamination of the Development of the Reasonable 
Doubt Rule, 55 B.U. L. REV. 507, 508 (1975). 




suasion until the seventeenth century, with courts then usually stat-
ing that jurors should convict only if they were satisfied in their con-
sciences that the accused was guilty.  Although Morano did not point 
to any authoritative explication of the term, he speculated that the 
satisfied conscience test  
 
probably required jurors to vote for acquittal if they en-
tertained any doubt.  It implied that, unless they were 
morally certain of the correctness of a guilty verdict, 
they would violate their oath if they failed to acquit.  It 
is probable that moral certainty was defined during this 
period as requiring proof beyond any doubt.12 
 
The eighteenth century produced no uniform instruction about 
the burden of persuasion, but most frequently, Morano maintained, 
judges stated that jurors should acquit “if they had any doubt of the 
accused’s guilt.”13  This was not a new standard but only “crystal-
lized the standard of persuasion that had been applied in English 
criminal trials for centuries.”14  And this burden, he stressed, “did 
not require that a doubt be ‘reasonable’ or ‘rational’ to be a sufficient 
basis for an acquittal.”15 
English philosophers of the late seventeenth century, however, 
realized that absolute certainty was not attainable in various human 
endeavors but that “moral certainty” could be reached about these 
matters.  This “required only that one have no reasonable doubts 
about one’s beliefs.”16  Furthermore, because the law began both to 
limit the evidence that prosecutors could present and to allow crimi-
nal defendants to present more evidence, it became harder for the 
prosecutor “to overcome a juror’s irrational or fanciful doubts. . . . 
One way to minimize this [defense] advantage . . . was to reduce the 
degree of certainty necessary to justify a guilty verdict.”17  As a re-
sult of these intellectual and legal developments, the reasonable 
  
 12. Id. at 512. 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. at 513. 
 15. Id. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Morano, supra note 11, at 514–15. 




doubt standard replaced the any doubt rule.  Morano maintained 
“that the reasonable doubt rule was actually a prosecutorial innova-
tion that had the effect of decreasing the burden of proof in criminal 
cases.  Prior to the rule’s adoption, juries were expected to acquit if 
they had any doubts—reasonable or unreasonable—of the accused’s 
guilt.”18 
Morano also challenged the conventional history on the stand-
ard’s earliest appearance. That history then had the rule’s first articu-
lation in a series of treason trials in Dublin in 1798.19  Morano, how-
ever, not only found reasonable doubt charged a generation earlier, 
but across the Atlantic “in the famous Boston Massacre Trials of 
1770–Rex v. Preston and Rex v. Wemms.  There is reason to believe 
that Wemms was the first case to specifically and purposefully dis-
tinguish between the any doubt and the reasonable doubt standards 
of persuasion.”20 
Since Morano wrote, scholars have found that English courts as 
early as the 1780s instructed juries about reasonable doubt,21 but the 
Boston Massacre trials remain the first known legal use of the stand-
ard.  Whether the Massachusetts court was truly the first to articulate 
it, however, cannot be known.  Sources for what happened in eight-
eenth century English courts are limited,22 and we know even less 
about what occurred in American proceedings.  In eighteenth century 
America, cases were not regularly reported.  Trial transcripts were 
  
 18. Id. at 508; see also id. at 515 (“[I]t is clear that the rule helped to reduce the 
potential for irrational acquittals and to that extent operated to the prosecution’s 
advantage.”).  But see id. (“It is not clear whether judges and prosecutors were 
actually aware of the prosecutorial benefits of the reasonable doubt rule as con-
trasted with the any doubt test.”). 
 19. Morano writes that an article by Judge May is the source for the conventional 
view.  May, Some Rules of Evidence: Reasonable Doubt in Civil and Criminal 
Cases, 10 AM. L. REV. 642 (1876).  This assertion was influential, for, as Morano 
notes, “[b]oth Dean Wigmore and Dean McCormick accepted Judge May’s thesis.  
The United States Supreme Court referred to Judge May’s theory in Apodaca v. 
Oregon.” Morano supra note 11, at 515 (citing Apodaco, 406 U.S. at 412 n. 6; 9 J. 
Wigmore, Evidence § 2497 (3d ed. 1940); C. McCormick, Law of Evidence § 341 
(2d ed. 1972)). 
 20. Morano, supra note 11, at 516.  
 21. See WHITMAN, infra note 27 and accompanying text at note 39.  
 22. See Gallanis, infra note 49 and accompanying text at note 54. 




seldom made.23  Furthermore, the avenues of appellate review of 
criminal convictions in early America were constrained24 and, thus, 
few early judicial considerations of the burden of persuasion can be 
found.25 
The available historical record, however, does find that the first 
use of the reasonable doubt standard was in the 1770 Boston trial.  
This has great importance in considering the origins of the rule.  It 
means that we cannot presuppose that America simply inherited the 
standard from English law.26  We have to consider the possibility 
  
 23. See Morano, supra note 11, at 520 (“One obstacle is the general lack of ex-
tant trial transcripts from 1750 to 1830.  Another problem is that the trial court 
proceedings in many criminal cases were never recorded.”). 
 24. Id. at 526 (“The avenues for appellate review of convictions were severely 
restricted in early America because the English appellate procedures, which the 
colonies inherited upon independence, were themselves very limited.  For exam-
ple, the writ of error, although generally employed in early America, provided a 
means for reviewing neither the sufficiency of the evidence nor the correctness of 
the trial judge’s instructions.  The bill of exceptions, which was the proper proce-
dure for obtaining review of such matters [sic] was not recognized in English crim-
inal law or in the federal courts of the United States.  It was not available in Amer-
ica until it was established by state statutes.  In some states, appeals from convic-
tions were virtually nonexistent.”)  
 25. See id. at 520 (“[O]ne must often search for jury instructions in criminal 
apellate reports.  These reports often do not reproduce the instructions or even 
allude to them. . . . Moreover, very few appellate courts directly considered 
whether the reasonable doubt standard had to be charged in all criminal cases.”). 
 26. The development of the reasonable doubt standard in America may have 
influenced its emergence elsewhere.  English interest in the Boston Massacre trials 
was high.  HILLER B. ZOBEL, THE BOSTON MASSACRE 300 (1970) (“In England, 
the Massacre and its aftermath had attracted wide attention.  Even before word of 
the soldiers’ acquittals had reached home, a demand had built up for information 
about Preston’s trial.  One bookseller said that if he had a report of the testimony, 
he ‘could soon sell a thousand copies of it.’”).  Certainly, the trial’s participants 
thought that the proceedings would get a wide audience.  For example, in the 
Wemms case, defense attorney Josiah Quincy in his opening statement urged the 
jury to be dispassionate and said, “We must steel ourselves against passions, 
which contaminate the fountain of justice.  We ought to recollect, that our present 
decisions will be scann’d, perhaps thro’ all Europe.”  3 LEGAL PAPERS OF JOHN 
ADAMS 166 (L. Kinvin Wroth & Hiller B. Zobel, ed. 1965) [hereinafter ADAMS 
PAPERS].  A report of the proceedings was published in 1771, and it quickly be-
came available in both the colonies and England.  See Morano, supra note 11, at 
518–19; ADAMS PAPERS, at 38 n. 70.  This widespread availability, coupled with 
the fact that the reasonable doubt standard emerged at almost the same time in far 
 




that it developed in America before it did in England; indeed, the 
available historical record indicates precisely that.  Consequently, we 
cannot assume that if we understand the origins of the English stand-
ard, we truly understand the original meanings and purposes of the 
American one.  It is, of course, possible that similar currents in both 
places produced the standard in each.  If so, understanding the de-
velopment of the English standard aids in understanding the Ameri-
can development, but certainly, assertions about the birth of the Eng-
lish reasonable doubt standard should also be examined under an 
American light to test their likely validity for understanding the 
American origins of the rule.  As such, an examination reveals that 
some claims about reasonable doubt’s development look dubious 
when American conditions and developments are considered.   
III. REASONABLE DOUBT TO EASE JURORS’ SPIRITUAL ANXIETIES 
(AND TO MAKE CONVICTIONS EASIER) 
James Q. Whitman, in his 2008 study, The Origins of Reasona-
ble Doubt: The Theological Roots of the Criminal Trial, also con-
cludes that the standard appeared to make convictions easier, not 
harder, by supplanting the rule that jurors could acquit if they had 
any doubt.  Whitman finds the burden of persuasion’s emergence 
rooted firmly in religion.27   
Whitman stresses that not merely the fate of the accused was at 
stake in early trials, but also the souls of those who judged.  This 
was so because “convicting an innocent defendant was regarded, in 
  
flung places, led Morano to suggest that the Massachusetts proceedings were an 
important impetus for the rule’s general development.  He states,  
By the mid-1790s, reasonable doubt charges appeared in English, Canadi-
an and American cases.  It is at least as likely as not that, because of their 
notoriety, the Boston Massacre Trials influenced these other courts in 
their employment of the reasonable doubt standard and thus significantly 
contributed to the rule’s development as the accepted burden of persua-
sion in criminal cases.   
Morano, supra note 11, at 519.  But see id. at 518 (“[T]he impact of the Boston 
Massacre Trials on subsequent cases is not altogether clear.”). 
 27. See JAMES Q. WHITMAN, THE ORIGINS OF REASONABLE DOUBT: 
THEOLOGICAL ROOTS OF THE CRIMINAL TRIAL 2 (2008) (“This is a book about the 
forgotten theological roots of the criminal trial.”). 




the older Christian tradition, as a potential mortal sin.”28  This con-
cern was especially high for “‘blood punishments’—that is, execu-
tion and mutilation, the standard criminal punishments of pre-
nineteenth-century law.”29  Consequently, those fearing God’s retri-
bution were reluctant to enter legal condemnations, and this fear 
drove the evolution of the reasonable doubt standard.  Whitman as-
serts that “there is no way to explain ‘reasonable doubt’ unless we 
focus resolutely on the spiritual anxieties of judging . . . .”30  To un-
derstand how that standard came about, “knowledge of the broader 
world of Latin Christendom” is necessary.31 
That Christian doctrine provided a sanctuary for judges.  The 
soul of the judge who authorized a blood punishment was safe as 
long as he strictly followed the legalities and did not use his personal 
knowledge to condemn, for then, theologists had concluded, it was 
not he but the rule of law that was responsible for the judgment.32  
Jurors, however, did not have this theological loophole.  A wrong 
decision condemning another to a blood punishment endangered the 
jurors’ soul. 
According to Whitman, the jurors were especially spiritually en-
dangered because “well into the early nineteenth century, jurors were 
still expected to make use of their private knowledge of the case, at 
least occasionally. . . . This deserves to be underlined, since histori-
  
 28. Id. at 3. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. at 151 (emphasis in original). 
 31. Id. at 126.  Whitman notes that others have also recognized that the actors in 
common law trials were afraid of making the legal judgments and refers to histori-
ans citing fears of vengeance, criminal liability, and making mistakes that could 
damage a career.  Whitman concedes, “There is undoubtedly some truth in all of 
these explanations of the dangers of judging.  In particular, there is no doubt that 
fear of vengeance was strong in the Middle Ages, though it had faded by the 
eighteenth century.”  Id. at 151.  Whitman, however, maintains that these explana-
tions largely miss the mark because they “explain premodern fears by anything 
except the fear of damnation.” WHITMAN, supra note 27, at 151; see also id. at 186 
(noting that the likelihood of retaliation had ebbed by the late eighteenth century, 
but “the fear of moral responsibility had not.  The risk to the soul still shadowed 
the trial.”). 
 32. Id. at 93–94; see also id. at 151 (“[T]he role of the judge was to be kept sepa-
rate from the role of the witness.  Judges were not to use their private 
knowledge.”). 




ans have not got the history quite right.”33  Those historians maintain 
that jurors stopped using their personal knowledge of an accused and 
the crime to reach a judgment by the sixteenth century, after the ju-
rors began to hear witness testimony.  But, Whitman maintains, this 
conclusion “is clearly false.”34  Blackstone and other eighteenth cen-
tury writers still asserted that jurors could decide issues based on 
private knowledge as long as they testified in open court.  Whitman 
concludes that while it may have been rare in the eighteenth century 
for jurors to render verdicts on personal knowledge, especially in 
large cities such as London, it still happened.  That rarity, however, 
was the not the real issue for the spiritually anxious.   
 
[F]rom the point of view of moral theology . . . , it did 
not matter all that much whether jurors only potentially 
had such knowledge.  What moral theology required 
was a kind of spiritual exercise: a determined effort to 
keep the body of the judge separate from the body of 
the witness.  The very structure of the office of the juror 
made this spiritual exercise impossible.35 
 
Moreover, the spiritual concerns of jurors were magnified be-
cause an eighteenth century trial, according to Whitman, was not a 
“whodunit” or a what-happened determination, but a proceeding to 
declare formally what was already known.  “[A] trial was not to 
solve factual riddles, but to confirm truths.”36  Guilt was generally 
clear,37 and the law’s goal was not to have triers of fact but jurors 
“willing to cooperate in the process of inflicting punishment.  To put 
it a little differently, the primary role of the ‘witness,’ in Christian 
  
 33. Id. at 151–52. 
 34. Id. at 152. 
 35. Id. at 152–53. 
 36. WHITMAN, supra note 27, at 195. 
 37. See id. at 203 (noting that a trial “did not involve any great mystery about the 
particular facts: it was assumed that the guilt of the accused would be more or less 
clear, much or most of the time, to the ‘neighbours’ who were called upon to judge 
them.”). 




moral theology, was not to provide factual clues but to take moral 
responsibility.”38 
Jurors could avoid the spiritual anxiety of wrongly imposing 
blood punishments, of course, by simply refusing to convict.  Even 
so, and even though such punishments decreased in England in the 
1700s,39 “the fear of divine vengeance remained strong.”40  This 
fault line—guilty defendant, but jurors concerned for their souls in 
authorizing blood punishments—forced out the reasonable doubt 
rule. Whitman concludes, “It was the resulting tensions that pro-
duced the reasonable doubt formula at the end of the eighteenth cen-
tury: ‘Reasonable doubt’ emerged as formula intended to ease the 
fears of those jurors who might otherwise refuse to pronounce the 
defendant guilty.”41  
The moral literature of the eighteenth century, according to 
Whitman, lit the path out of the spiritual thicket by distinguishing 
  
 38. Id. at 203. 
 39. Blood punishments diminished in eighteenth century England because trans-
portation to the American colonies substituted for many harsher punishments and 
because jurors “avoided inflicting blood punishments through the ‘pious perjury,’ 
systematically undervaluing stolen goods in order to allow the accused to escape 
the most severe penalties of the law.”  Id. at 187.  Whitman says that if all blood 
punishments had been eliminated, “there would have been much less need for the 
reasonable doubt instruction. . . . Nevertheless, these changes in punishment prac-
tices were not enough to eliminate all moral concerns.”  Id.  Of course, the fact 
that juries indulged in pious perjury undercuts Whitman’s arguments about the 
strength of the spiritual anxieties jurors faced.  “Such acts of mercy . . . suggest 
that oaths were not always taken literally and that jurors in such instances did not 
anticipate divine retribution.”  BARBARA J. SHAPIRO, A CULTURE OF FACT: 
ENGLAND, 1550–1720 21 (2000). 
 40. WHITMAN, supra note 27, at 204.  
 41. Id. at 186.  Whitman also maintains that the same dynamic produced the jury 
unanimity rule.  He stresses, again, that the purpose of trials was not fundamental-
ly to determine facts but to obtain moral judgments that could imperil jurors’ 
souls.  He continued:  
There is no reason to suppose that an uncertain fact is more securely es-
tablished because twelve out of twelve laypeople agree on it, rather than 
nine out of twelve, or ten out of twelve.  The unanimity rule serves a dif-
ferent purpose: it allows the twelve to share the heavy moral responsibil-
ity for judgment, and therefore to diffuse it among themselves.  The una-
nimity rule is a moral comfort rule . . . .   
Id. at 204. 




between “doubts” and “scruples.”  “Christians were to stay upon the 
safer path, which meant that they were to listen to their doubts. . . . 
Doubts were legitimate and had to be obeyed; scruples were foolish 
and had to be ignored.”42  The distinction was grounded in reason.  
“In particular, the moralists held, the good Protestant was always to 
use his ‘reason,’ wherever possible, in order to remove his  
doubts. . . . Doubts were, as they always had been, subject to a test of 
reason . . . .”43  Scruples, on the other hand, “were dangerously irra-
tional impulses.”44  Following such scruples “might easily lead the 
Christian into a terrible error, the error of sins of omissions.”45  
When applied to criminal trials, this distinction meant that a juror 
should acquit if he had doubts based in reason, not because of any 
irrational reluctance.46 
Whitman accepts that the standard’s initial appearance is un-
known, but maintains that even so, examination of early instances is 
fruitful.47  He briefly discusses its first known articulation in the 
Boston Massacre trial.  Those proceedings will be explored more 
fully later in this article, but Whitman concludes that they support 
his thesis: “The Boston Massacre trial arguments, like everything 
else we have seen from the period, were framed in the language of 
the safer path theology.”48 
Whitman, however, focuses more on the next discovered reason-
able doubt cases, which come from London’s Old Bailey in the 
1780s.49  He sees these trials mirroring older ones in that they were 
  
 42. Id. at 190. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. at 179. 
 45. WHITMAN, supra note 27, at 180. 
 46. See id. at 192 (“All of this should make it completely unsurprising to discov-
er that the reasonable doubt standard grew out of the old safer way moral theology 
of doubt, and the old fears that public justice would be endangered by the private 
conscience; and so it did.”). 
 47. See id. at 193 (“To hunt for the first case use of the rule would be misguided; 
. . . the reasonable doubt rule was quite simply in the air in the later eighteenth 
century.  Nevertheless, it is revealing to look closely at the earliest cases in which 
the formula does turn up.”). 
 48. Id. at 194. 
 49. See Thomas P. Gallanis, Reasonable Doubt and the History of the Criminal 
Trial, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 941, 941 n. 1 (2009) (“The Old Bailey was the principal 
 




not proceedings to find facts, but to make moral judgments.50  It was 
a time when “the reluctance of jurors to convict could infuriate crit-
ics of English criminal justice. . . . [For some commentators,] Eng-
lish criminal jury trial seemed a wayward institution in the latter 
decades of the eighteenth century—a setting in which unduly ‘merci-
ful’ jurors ignored obvious truths.”51   
The Old Bailey judges responded in the 1780s by instructing ju-
rors to acquit if they had a reasonable doubt.  For Whitman it is 
clear that “[t]he underlying concern [of the instruction] was not with 
protecting the defendant at all.  It was with protecting the jurors.”52     
Whitman goes on to consider more specific reasons “why the 
standard established itself in the Old Bailey when it did, in the mid-
1780s.”53  Whitman suggests that the reasonable doubt standard then 
emerged because American independence made transportation of 
  
criminal court for cases of serious crime arising in the city of London and the ad-
jacent county of Middlesex.”). 
 50. Whitman states that eighteenth century 
[j]urists still sometimes spoke of the trial in the way their medieval fore-
bears had done—as an event involving a solemn moral decision to con-
demn a clearly guilty defendant. . . . [A] trial was not to solve factual rid-
dles but to confirm truths.  We find the same assumptions in the reports of 
Old Bailey.  
WHITMAN, supra note 27, at 195.  Whitman says that pre-1800 courts did not 
have plea-bargaining.  With nearly every case going to trial, guilty defendants 
were “paraded before the court for ceremonious condemnation.” Id. at 19.  
Today a trial is, in essence, the final chapter of a detective story with the jury 
charged with finding the facts, but in the past it was different.   
Instead, they often thought of the trial as a solemn event in which the 
court and the community formally took responsibility for inflicting pun-
ishment on a defendant who was fairly clearly guilty. . . . Certainly there 
were occasionally factual puzzles that the jurors had to solve.  But fre-
quently the toughest question in such a trial was whether the defendant’s 
neighbors would be willing to take the momentous step of giving their 
formal, unanimous, ‘confirmation.’  
Id.; see also id. at 209 (“Because the old moral theology assumed that the 
facts would typically be pretty straightforward, and that the accused was usu-
ally guilty, its moral focus was not on the problems of fact-finding.  Instead, 
its focus was on the morality of punishment itself.”). 
 51. Id. at 197. 
 52. Id. at 194. 
 53. Id. at 199. 




convicted criminals to the American colonies, which had reduced 
blood punishments, impossible.54  After 1783, when American inde-
pendence was formally recognized, jurors had to be especially con-
cerned that a conviction would lead to an execution. 
The first cases using the reasonable doubt formula in 
the Old Bailey crop up during that same period [when 
transportation punishment was unavailable]—indeed, 
they crop up in the year [1783] in which it became clear 
for the first time that transportation to American was an 
impossibility, while it remained uncertain what was 
otherwise to be the fate of those convicted.  Perhaps—
though I offer the suggestion somewhat diffidently—
this raised the punishment stakes sufficiently that jurors 
needed more coaxing to convict than had been the case 
in previous decade.  Seventeen eighty-three was the 
year when no one could be quite certain where the fu-
ture of punishment lay.55 
While Whitman does mention the Boston Massacre trials, his 
study concentrates on English and continental developments, and 
even if he has correctly identified the original purposes for the emer-
gence of the English reasonable doubt standard, it should not be as-
sumed that his conclusions truly inform us about the original Ameri-
can meaning of the standard.  As we have seen, the available histori-
  
 54. Gallanis, supra note 49, at 962 (“After American transportation ended in 
1775, England responded initially by ordering hard labor in hulks on the river 
Thames and in houses of correction, and later by beginning an ambitious pro-
gram of prison construction and initiating transportation to Australia.  These 
noncapital punishments were likely more severe than the prior regime of 
transportation to the established colonies in America, but the punishments did 
not involve blood.”). 
 55. WHITMAN, supra note 27, at 200; see also id. at 187 (“[T]o the extent 
that transportation substituted for execution, or other mitigating devices were 
used, the moral stakes were lower.  If blood punishments had been completely 
eliminated, there would have been much less need for the reasonable doubt 
instruction.  Indeed, it is perhaps not surprising that the reasonable doubt in-
struction emerged in the Old Bailey (the criminal court of London) in the 
early 1780s, precisely the years when the system of transportation had col-
lapsed in the wake of the American Revolution.”).  
 




cal record indicates that Americans did not simply inherit reasonable 
doubt from England, but used it earlier than did the English.  Instead, 
his history is valuable only if the forces and currents he identifies as 
producing the standard operated in a similar manner in America to 
the way they did in England.  His conclusions need to be examined 
under an American light, and this focus makes it dubious that his 
assertions can be applied to the original American meaning and pur-
poses of reasonable doubt. 
IV. EXAMINING THE CLAIMS UNDER AN AMERICAN LIGHT 
A.  Transportation 
Clearly, the suspension of English transportation in the 1780s 
cannot explain the presence of the standard in the 1770 Boston Mas-
sacre trial.  Perhaps that punishment’s hiatus forced out the rule in 
England;56 clearly, it did not in America.  Instead, Whitman’s history 
  
 56. Cf. Gallanis, supra note 49, at 963 (“Lacking better primary sources, I cannot 
warrant that there is no connection between the rising harshness of punishment 
and the use of the reasonable doubt instruction.  But the link between them re-
mains to be proven.”).  Whitman relies on the Old Bailey Session Papers (OBSP), 
“pamphlet accounts of criminal trials, printed and sold to members of the public.”  
Id. at 962.  Reports of the reasonable doubt instruction first appear in the OBSP in 
the 1780s.  As Thomas Gallanis points out, however, this source has limitations.  
The OBSP concentrated on the proceeding’s aspects that were most likely to catch 
a layperson’s interest.  For cost reasons, the reports were often minimal, especially 
before 1778.  Gallanis notes that the period of 1782 to 1790 brought lengthier 
reports and states, “Given the changes in size and detail of the OBSP, it is often 
hard to tell whether something first perceived in the mid-1780s is truly new or 
simply the result of fuller reporting.”  Id. at 962; see also George Fisher, The Ju-
ry’s Rise as Lie Detector, 107 YALE L. J. 575, 639 (1997) (“For now it is safe to 
assume, . . . that what the Sessions Paper reports probably did happen, but what it 
omits to mention might have happened too.”); c.f. Thomas Y. Davies, Selective 
Originalism: Sorting Out Which Aspects of Giles’s Forfeiture Exception to Con-
frontation Were or Were Not “Established At The Time Of the Founding”, 13 
LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 605, 618 n. 7 (2009) (“Because case reporting was quite 
unsystematic in earlier times, it is certainly possible that a doctrine could have 
developed in cases that were never reported and are now lost in time . . . . [O]ur 
knowledge of legal evolution is dependent on the happenstances of when doctrines 
were preserved in reported cases.”)  




has a bearing on the American development of reasonable doubt on-
ly if the forces other than transportation’s interruption that he identi-
fies had the same effect in the colonies that he asserts that they did in 
England.   
B.  Spiritual Anxieties 
Whitman’s central assertion, however, is not about transporta-
tion, but that because jurors had such strong spiritual anxieties in 
imposing blood punishments, jurors, acquitted if they had any 
doubts, rational or not, with the resulting acquittals forcing out the 
reasonable doubt standard.  It allowed for convictions that kept ju-
rors’ souls safe.  There are reasons, however, to doubt that this dy-
namic much affected American jurors.   
First, religion in general may not have had a particularly strong 
hold in eighteenth century America.  Thus, historian Stephen Prothe-
ro maintains, “Christianity was not particularly popular in the New 
World colonies.  Spiritual indifference was the rule . . . .” 57  This did 
change somewhat in the mid-eighteenth century, but, according to 
Prothero, many have misperceived the true extent of the religious 
fervor.   
 
The celebrated Great Awakening of the 1740s power-
fully reversed that decline in many locales, but its re-
vivals were not as widespread as many historians have 
claimed . . . . On the eve of the Revolution, only 17 per-
cent of adults were church members, and spiritual leth-
argy was the rule.58   
 
  
 57. STEPHEN PROTHERO, AMERICAN JESUS: HOW THE SON OF GOD BECAME A 
NATIONAL ICON 43 (2003). 
 58. Id. at 44.  But see John E. Smith et. al., Introduction in A JONATHAN 
EDWARDS READER vii (John E. Smith, Harry S. Stout & Kenneth P. Minkema, ed. 
1995) (noting that the early eighteenth century in America was “an age when reli-
gion predominated.”). 




And however extensive the revivals, their effect on jury trials can 
be doubted since at a time when jurors were male, women were ap-
parently more swept up in these religious awakenings than men.59 
Furthermore, the predominant theology in eighteenth century 
America seems to be fundamentally different from the religious 
teachings that Whitman describes as having produced the spiritual 
angst that resulted in reasonable doubt.  The beliefs he finds so in-
fluential stem from medieval Catholicism.60  While we may not al-
ways recognize the influences that compel us to act, it should give 
pause if the argument is that eighteenth century Americans, the Puri-
tans, the Presbyterians, the Baptists, the Anabaptists, the Quakers, 
and even the Anglicans as well as the Deists and the nonbelievers, 
were acting under ancient Catholicism’s power.  If they were, surely 
they were not consciously doing so.  
The concern over blood punishments and the safer way theology 
is based on the belief that salvation was won or lost by a person’s 
deeds.  This is at odds with much that was preached in eighteenth 
century America.  For example, Jonathan Edwards,61America’s most 
prominent theologian of that era, said time and again that salvation 
came through faith and God’s grace, not through good deeds.62  Ed-
wards stressed that man’s nature was inherently evil, and only the 
magnanimity of God’s mercy prevented a person from being 
  
 59. In a 1737 letter to Benjamin Colman, pastor of Boston’s Brattle Street 
Church, Jonathan Edwards stated, “I hope that 300 souls were savingly brought 
home to Christ in this town in the space of half a year (how many more I don’t 
guess) and about the same number of males as females; which, by what I have 
heard Mr. Stoddard say, was far from what has been usual in years past, for he 
observed that in his time, many more women were converted than men.” Id. at 65. 
 60. See WHITMAN, supra note 27, at 3. 
 61. See John E. Smith et. al., Introduction in JONATHAN EDWARDS READER, 
supra note 58, at vii (“Jonathan Edwards (1703–1758) is colonial America’s 
greatest theologian and philosopher.  During his life, he served as teacher, pastor, 
revivalist, missionary, and college president, in the process established himself as 
one of the most influential churchmen in the Anglo-American religious world.”). 
 62. E.g. JONATHAN EDWARDS READER, supra note 58, at 47 (“And thus it is that 
we are said to be justified by faith alone: that is, we are justified only because our 
souls close and join with Christ the Savior, his salvation, and the way of it; and not 
because of the excellency or loveliness of any of our dispositions or actions, that 
moves God to it.”). 




plunged into the abyss.63  Redemption was not earned by a person’s 
deeds as a desired good can be bought by money.  Salvation came 
through God, and man could only hope to obtain it through faith and 
being born again in Jesus.64  Good deeds, in this Protestant view, 
were secondary to faith and God’s grace.65  A person’s soul was 
fundamentally put in jeopardy not because of a bad deed, but be-
cause the person lacked the requisite faith.  Edwards was not alone; 
the theology of faith over good deeds was the dominant theme of the 
eighteenth century revivals.66  We might hope that in all eras jurors 
  
 63. See e.g., id. at 96 (“Your wickedness makes you as it were heavy as lead, and 
to tend downward with great weight and pressure towards hell; and if God should 
let you go, you would immediately sink and swiftly descend and plunge into the 
bottomless gulf, and your healthy constitution, and your own care and prudence, 
and best contrivance, and all your righteousness, would have no more influence to 
uphold you and keep you out of hell, than a spider’s web would have to stop a 
falling rock.”).  See also id. at 224–25 (noting that man has an “innate sinful de-
pravity of the heart . . . [which is man’s] natural or innate disposition . . . without 
the interposition of divine grace.  Thus, that state of man’s nature, that disposition 
of the mind, is to be looked upon as evil and pernicious, which as it is in itself, 
tends to extremely pernicious consequences, and would certainly end therein, were 
it not that the free mercy and kindness of God interposes to prevent that issue.”).  
 64. See, e.g., id. at 100–02 (“If you cry to God to pity you, he will be so far from 
pitying you in your doleful case, or showing you the least regard or favor, that 
instead that he’ll only tread you under foot . . . . How dreadful is the state of those 
that are daily and hourly in danger of this great wrath, and infinite misery!  But 
this is the dismal case of every soul in this congregation, that has been born again, 
however moral and strict, sober and religious they may otherwise be.”). 
 65. See, e.g., id. at 47 (“And we are justified by obedience or good works, only 
as a principle of obedience or a holy disposition is implied in such a harmonizing 
or joining [with Christ the Savior], and is a secondary expression of the agreement 
and union between the nature of the soul and the gospel, or as an exercise and fruit 
and evidence of faith . . . .”). See also id. at 170–71(“Christian practice is the most 
proper evidence of the gracious sincerity of professors, to themselves and others; 
and the chief of all the marks of grace, the sign of signs, and evidence of evidenc-
es, that which seals and crowns all other signs. . . . Not that there are no other good 
evidences of a state of grace but this. . . . [B]ut yet this is the chief and most proper 
evidence.”).  
 66. For example, the English evangelist, George Whitefield was on his seventh 
American revival tour when he died in Boston September 30, 1770, shortly before 
the Boston Massacre trials.  “Whitefield had by his fiery preaching in the 1740s 
infused with ascetic zeal a whole generation.”  ZOBEL, supra note 26, at 237.  And 
the basic message he presented from Georgia to New York was similar to Ed-
wards’.  Whitefield stated, “[G]ood works have nothing to do with our justification 
 




have had a concern over wrongly convicting an accused, but the 
more immediate spiritual concern of eighteenth century Americans, 
if they listened to those who preached to them, was that their innate, 
sinful natures would provoke God to sunder the spider’s web and 
plunge them into perdition.  One would think with that view of eter-
nal life that concern over blood punishments would be well down on 
the list of spiritual anxieties. 
C. The Acquittal Crisis 
Whitman’s thesis contends that the reasonable doubt instruction 
came in response to the jurors’ reluctance to convict.  This suggests 
that something like an acquittal crisis must have existed in the years 
preceding the emergence of the standard.  Whether an eighteenth 
century American acquittal crisis existed, however, seems impossi-
ble to determine.  Thus, nothing has been found to indicate that Mas-
sachusetts not-guilty rates precipitately increased, or increased at all, 
in the period immediately before the Boston Massacre trials.  Noth-
ing has been found to indicate that they did not.  The evidence, one 
way or the other, just does not seem to exist.    
Early American criminal trial records are incomplete.  Douglas 
Greenberg made an extensive study of criminal practice in colonial 
New York and examined surviving records of 5,297 cases, adding, 
however, that “as is readily apparent, this represents only a portion 
of all the cases that actually came before the courts.”67  Jack D. 
Marietta and G.S. Rowe have similarly studied criminal practice in 
early Pennsylvania.  They “undertook to count every crime recorded 
  
in [God’s] sight.  We are justified by faith alone . . . . Notwithstanding, good 
works have their proper place: they justify our faith, though not our persons; they 
follow it, and evidence our justification in the sight of men.”  SERMONS OF 
GEORGE WHITEFIELD 24 (2009); see also id. at xx (“[R]emember that you are 
fallen creatures; that you are by nature lost and estranged from God; and that you 
can never be restored to your primitive happiness, till by being born again of the 
Holy Ghost. . . .”).  
 67. DOUGLAS GREENBERG, CRIME AND LAW ENFORCEMENT IN THE COLONY OF 
NEW YORK, 1691–1776 37 (1974).  Greenberg later discusses a New York case 
described by another historian and then says, “It is interesting to note, moreover, 
that this case never appears in any of the surviving court records—another indica-
tion that mine is but a partial sampling of criminal defendants.”  Id. at 82 n. 9. 




in the extant justice records and other public sources.”68  But, of 
course, other documents might not have survived. 
Greenberg indicates that the limitations of his data make suspect 
comparisons across time periods.  He states, “A serious problem of 
chronological comparability is thereby built into this study, since 
there is no period for which there are surviving records for every 
court.”69  On the other hand, Marietta and Rowe do present decade-
by-decade information about Pennsylvania criminal cases.  A strik-
ing fact is that only a minority of accusations, from any of the dec-
ades, ended with the formal disposition of conviction or acquittal.  
Most dispositions could be labeled “other.”  Some were like civil 
cases and ended by formal or informal arbitration or mediation.  
Some were resolved when a judge imposed a bond on a defendant to 
guarantee future good behavior.  Some cases faded away for lack of 
resources or interest.  Some ended when an accused escaped from 
custody.70 
Greenberg’s study found something similar for New York.  He 
found that 48% of the cases ended with a conviction and 15% in ac-
quittals.  “The missing 37% of the 5,297 cases were never resolved 
at all . . . . They simply disappear from the records entirely before a 
verdict is recorded.  This is an essential point to keep in mind.”71   
In light of these dispositions, patterns, and the possibility of 
missing data, maybe the best way to analyze the information on what 
jurors were doing is to examine Marietta and Howe’s calculation for 
what they call the “simple conviction rate (SCR), which is the per-
cent of convictions among all charges brought to trial.”72  Those fig-
ures show a lower conviction rate in mid-eighteenth century Penn-
sylvania than at the end of the seventeenth century.73  They also 
show the 1730s conviction rate of 76.3% dropping to 67.5% in the 
1740s.74  Perhaps, although we have no evidence of anyone arguing 
  
 68. JACK D. MARIETTA & G.S. ROWE, TROUBLED EXPERIMENT: CRIME AND 
JUSTICE IN PENNSYLVANIA, 1682–1800 2 (2006). 
 69. GREENBERG, supra note 67, at 37. 
 70. See MARIETTA & HOWE, supra note 68, at 44–47. 
 71. GREENBERG, supra note 67, at 71. 
 72. MARIETTA & HOWE, supra note 68, at 45. 
73.  Id. at 46. 
74.  Id. 




this, that drop fueled a contention that there were too many “wrong” 
acquittals which helped lead to a pro-prosecution reasonable doubt 
standard decades later.  On the other hand, the conviction rate in 
Pennsylvania rose to 71.3% in the 1750s and stayed basically steady 
at that level for the rest of the century.  In other words, the convic-
tion rate had rebounded well before we know of any articulation of 
the reasonable doubt standard anywhere.75  All in all, it is hard to see 
this data as indicating an “acquittal crisis” that brought about a new 
standard for the burden of proof. 
D.  Other Explanations for “Wrong” Acquittals 
If there were early American “wrong” acquittals, the cause may 
have been something other than spiritual anxiety over blood punish-
ments.  Religious people with differing beliefs can be reluctant to 
have their actions result in an execution; the non-religious can feel 
the same.  Certainly, empathy for a defendant can be a factor in ac-
quittals, and this factor seems to have affected colonial jurors, as 
indicated by Pennsylvania infanticide prosecutions. 
A woman charged with killing a newborn could be tried for in-
fanticide.  The law presumed that a child was born alive, and the 
punishment was death.  The defendants were almost always young, 
single women, and indictments for the crime rose steady, especially 
after 1750.  Convictions, however, did not keep pace.  “Juries balked 
at assigning young women to death in infanticide cases and effec-
tively thwarted the law.”76  If the defendant showed that she had 
grieved for the death of the child or prepared for its birth, acquittals 
often followed.77 
Something other than spiritual anxieties over mistaken imposi-
tions of blood punishments was operating.   If the driving force was 
  
 75. Id. at 46.  Indeed, the lowest reported conviction rate was in the 1710s of 
59.7%, thirteen points below the rate for the previous decade.  The 1720s, howev-
er, saw the rate rebound to 74.6% with no change in the burden of proof as far as 
we know.  Id.  
 76. Id. at 116–17. 
 77. See id. at 117 (“If defendants in infanticide cases shed tears or were found to 
have prepared in any way for the coming of the child (‘benefit of linen,’ it was 
called), acquittal ordinarily followed.  Tears and ‘linen’ indicated to jurors that the 
woman presumably loved the child and regretted its demise.”).   




the jurors’ concern for their own souls, the acquittals would not have 
been affected by the defendants’ characteristics.  The remedy for this 
acquittal crisis was not to change the burden of proof.  No matter 
what that burden, the sympathy for the defendants would have re-
mained, and in all likelihood, so would have the “wrong” acquittals.  
Instead, the remedy was to alter the punishment, and that is what 
happened with imprisonment replacing death.  With this change and 
further reforms that allowed for greater prosecutorial flexibility in 
charging and for greater jury discretion in determining the punish-
ments, the conviction rate increased without any apparent change in 
the burden of proof.78 
E.  American Jurors as Finders of Fact 
Whitman views almost all eighteenth century acquittals as 
wrongful.  He maintains that trials were not about finding facts since 
it was clear that the defendants were guilty.  The proceedings only 
sought to have society, as represented by juries, render moral judg-
ments in order to punish those who had broken the law.79  Even if 
this were true for England, the situation in America appears different 
and appeared differently to eighteenth century Americans. 
For example, Douglas Greenberg’s examination of early New 
York criminal cases found that women were frequently accused of 
theft, a crime with a high acquittal rate.80  Many of these were un-
married women, who had difficulty in supporting themselves and 
were often seen as a threat to traditional family life.81  Greenberg 
maintains that, “the single woman was more likely than others of her 
sex to be an object of suspicion and antagonism—the natural social 
pariah.”82  These conditions provide an explanation for the large 
number of acquittals—many of those women were wrongly accused.  
  
 78. See MARIETTA & HOWE, supra note 68, at 116 (“In the first ten prosecutions 
following the law’s revision on infanticide, juries voted seven convictions.”).  
 79. See supra text accompanying note 50.  
 80. GREENBERG, supra note 67, at 79. 
 81. See id. at 80 (“Unlike single men, they often had no legitimate means of 
supporting themselves.  Moreover, they seemed to pose a threat to the stability of 
family life, since they might seduce husbands from the home and hearth to the 
tavern and bawdy house.”). 
 82. Id. 




Greenberg concedes that not every such verdict came from an impar-
tial consideration of the evidence, but that still  
 
[t]he high percentage of acquittals among women . . . is 
less mystifying if one takes into account the dispropor-
tionately high percentage of single women accused of 
crime, and the strong possibility that some of those ac-
cusations were unwarranted by the facts and closely re-
lated to the social anxieties of eighteenth-century life. . . 
. [T]he marital status of the accused provides the most 
persuasive available explanation . . . [of why more 
women were acquitted of theft than men.]83 
 
Greenberg draws a similar conclusion from data showing that 
there were more acquittals in New York City than the rest of the col-
ony.  He states, “Apprehension of suspects was easier in the city than 
elsewhere, but it was also less likely that those arrested would be 
guilty.  The process of accusation and arrest probably tended to be 
more arbitrary in New York.”84  He reasons that outside the city ar-
rests could be arduous, and constables were unlikely to apprehend 
people unless the officials were fairly sure of guilt.  In contrast, ar-
rests were made in the city on more tenuous grounds.   
 
Because constables were not required to travel long dis-
tances to make arrests, and because individuals were 
more easily located in the city, law-enforcement offic-
ers could be less selective about whom they apprehend-
ed . . . In other words, it was less important in New 
York City to be certain that an individual taken into 
custody was guilty.85   
 
The acquittal rate was greater in New York, not because jurors had 
more spiritual anxiety than jurors elsewhere about convictions, but 
because more of the charges in the city were dubious.  The trials, at 
  
 83. Id. at 82–83. 
84   Id. at 86. 
 85. Id. 




least in Greenberg’s eyes, were often about determining the facts and 
weighing the evidence, and verdict patterns indicate that all defend-
ants were not clearly guilty. 
Furthermore, those familiar with American law in the era when 
the reasonable doubt standard emerged, at least as indicated by 
James Wilson, saw trials as proceedings not merely to confirm what 
was already known with a guilty verdict, but to determine disputed 
facts.  Wilson, perhaps the most important legal thinker in eighteenth 
century America, was one of only six people to sign both the Decla-
ration of Independence and the Constitution, and his contributions at 
the constitutional convention were second to only those of James 
Madison.  He came to America in 1765 after being born and 
schooled in Scotland and was one of the best-educated people in the 
New World.86  Wilson had a large and successful legal practice in 
Philadelphia,87 was regarded as the father of the Pennsylvania Con-
stitution of 1790, and was an original justice of the Supreme Court.88    
He was appointed to the first law professorship at the College of 
Philadelphia, and, starting in 1790, he gave lengthy legal lectures 
that he hoped would lay the foundation for an American system of 
law.89  Although the lectures do not expressly discuss any control-
ling burden of proof, they do extensively discuss juries and trials.  In 
Wilson’s view, juries resolved guilt and innocence by determining 
facts.  Wilson said it was “of immense consequence . . . that jurors 
should possess the spirit of just discernment, to discriminate between 
the innocent and the guilt. . . .”90  Jurors “will be triers not only of 
facts; but also the credibility of the witnesses.  They will know 
whom and what to believe . . . .”91  Jurors were to use their reasoning 
to weigh the evidence.   
 
The testimony of one witness will not be rejected mere-
ly because it stands single; nor will the testimony of 
  
 86. See Robert Green McCloskey, Introduction in 1 THE WORKS OF JAMES 
WILSON 9 (1967) [hereinafter WILSON]. 
 87. Id. at 18. 
 88. Id. at 2. 
 89. Id. at 28–29. 
 90. Id. at 74. 
91. Id. at 332 




two witnesses be believed, if it be encountered by rea-
son and probability.  These advantages of a trial by jury 
are important in all causes: in criminal causes, they are 
of peculiar importance.92   
 
Wilson realized that facts often would not be clear because not all 
witnesses would tell the truth, and he gave “reasons for suspecting or 
rejecting testimony.”93  America entrusted jurors to make such de-
terminations. “In no case . . . does [the law] order a witness to be 
believed; for jurors are triers of the credibility of witnesses, as well 
as of the truth of facts.”94  
F.  The Importance of Juries to Americans 
If the spiritual terror among those who might serve as jurors was 
as strong as Whitman maintains, we might expect to find significant 
resistance to the jury system.  The opposite, of course, was true.  
Eighteenth century Americans embraced the system as central to 
their freedoms and derided and fought English denials or abridge-
ment of jury trials.95  The newly independent states guaranteed crim-
inal jury trials in their fundamental charters.  The main body of the 
  
 92. Id.. 
 93. WILSON, supra note 86, at 386. 
 94. Id. at 383.  While Whitman and Morano see this era as one limiting jury 
power, Wilson saw that judges were increasingly granting jurors more discretion 
in weighing credibility.  Wilson noted that “every intelligent person, who is not 
infamous or interested” could testify and that the judge applied these competency 
rules.  Id. at 545.  Wilson continued, however, that the line that made a person 
incompetent to testify was not clear.  Often that interest only affected the credibil-
ity of a witness.  Wilson, recognizing a legal trend that would continue, stated, “In 
doubtful cases of this description, the judges especially of late years, presume in 
favor of the province of the jury.  This is done with great reason.”  Id. 
 95. See Akhil Reed Amar, Sixth Amendment First Principles, 84 GEO. L. J. 641, 
681 (1996) (“No idea was more central to our Bill of Rights than the idea of the 
jury.  The only right secured in all state constitutions penned between 1776 and 
1787 was the right of jury trial in criminal cases . . . .”); see also Eben Moglen, 
Consider Zenger: Partisan Politics and the Legal Profession in Provincial New 
York, 94 COL. L. REV. 1495, 1520 (1994) (“British North Americans were willing 
to respond with organized violence when jury trial was interfered with by an asert-
edly sovereign Parliament in the 1760s and 1770s.”). 




Constitution guarantees criminal jury trials as, of course, does the 
Sixth Amendment.  Juries were considered essential.96  Our political 
history does not show the rabid fear of making the kinds of judg-
ments that Whitman maintains many jurors had.  Instead, Americans 
wanted juries, insisted upon juries, fought for juries, and counted 
juries a fundamental right. 
G.  An American Reluctance to Convict 
All this does not mean that American jurors did not dread con-
victing an accused, especially in a capital case.  James Wilson cer-
tainly recognized that reality, but his response was not to suggest 
making convictions easier.  Instead, he found the answer in his view 
of jury unanimity. 
Wilson asserted that the “conviction of a crime—particularly of a 
capital crime” required jury unanimity.97  On the other hand, in what 
might be a surprise to modern readers, acquittals required only one 
juror.  He stated:  
 
If a single sentiment is not for conviction; [sic] then a 
verdict of acquittal is the immediate consequence. . . . 
For by the law, as it has been stated, twelve votes of 
conviction are necessary to compose a verdict of con-
viction: but eleven votes of conviction and one against 
it compose a verdict of acquittal.98 
 
Wilson then asked a series of rhetorical questions aimed at the 
natural reluctance of jurors.  
 
  
 96. See JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANING: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE 
MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION 293 (1997) (“Americans [gave] two rights 
preeminent importance.  If the rights to representation and to trial by jury were left 
to operate in full force, they would shelter nearly all the other rights and liberties 
of the people.”). 
 97. WILSON, supra note 86, at 503; see also id. at 525 (“[W]e shall find no au-
thority to conclude, that, in civil causes, the verdict of a jury must be founded on 
unanimous opinion.”). 
 98. Id. at 531. 




Under this disposition of things, can an honest and con-
scientious juror dread or suffer any inconvenience, in 
discharging his important trust, and performing his im-
portant duty, honestly and conscientiously?  Under this 
disposition of things, will the citizens discover that 
strong reluctance, which they often and naturally dis-
cover, against serving on juries in criminal, especially 
capital cases?99 
 
Wilson was aware of jurors’ fears of rendering criminal judg-
ments, but he showed no concern that juries would acquit when they 
ought not.  He approvingly stressed the juror’s power to acquit.  
“The jury retain[s] an indisputable, unquestionable right to acquit the 
person accused, if, in their private opinions, they disbelieve the ac-
cusers.”100  Wilson did not present arguments to rein in jury discre-
tion to produce more convictions but, instead, stated that America’s 
unanimity rule favored acquittals.  The notion that this was an age 
when American jury powers were being circumscribed to make con-
victions easier is not supported by, and runs counter to, these eight-
eenth century views from a learned, knowledgeable, and experienced 
commentator.101 
  
 99. Id. 
100. Id. at 383. 
101. No doubt acquittals could be found to support the notion that early American 
jurors were reluctant to impose blood punishments.  But then, contrary instances 
should also be considered.  For example, the Portland, (now) Maine newspaper, 
Eastern Herald, of July 9, 1792, reported a murder conviction under the headline, 
“Trial and Condemnation of Joshua Abbot, Jun.”  Abbot, the story said, was in his 
sixties, a husband, and the father of six. Trial and Condemnation of Joshua Abbot, 
Jun., E. HERALD, July 9, 1792.  The previous February Moses Gubtail went to 
Abbot’s house and argued over a tool.  Id.  “Gubtail appeared to be in a violent 
passion, and told Abbot that he was ‘damn’d disobliging old fellow’ but that not-
withstanding this, he should have had the flax break had it not been for his 
‘damn’d old bitch of a wife.’”  Id.  Abbot ordered Gubtail out of the house, but 
Gubtail stood outside and yelled several times that he would “cuff” Abbot if Abbot 
came out.  Id.  An “exasperated” Abbot picked up a piece of an ox sled and struck 
Gubtail on the head.  Id.  Urged by his brother Benjamin, “who was present during 
the whole transaction, and who was the only witness of any importance in the 
cause,” Gubtail finally went home where he died within two days.  Id.  The result-
ing conviction came in spite of a vigorous defense.  Each of Abbot’s two attorneys 
 




V.   THE BOSTON MASSACRE TRIALS 
Perhaps the best crucible for testing out assertions about the ori-
gins of reasonable doubt, however, is to examine them in the context 
of the Boston Massacre trials.  If claims do not seem to make sense 
or ring true in the context of the first known use of the standard, they 
ought to be considered suspect.  And the Boston Massacre Trials do 
not support many of the assertions made about reasonable doubt’s 
development. 
The editors of John Adams’ legal papers, L. Kinvin Wroth and 
Hiller B. Zobel, present the basic facts of the shootings that led to 
the trials: 
British troops had been garrisoned in Boston since 
1768; thereafter friction between inhabitants and sol-
diers had increased steadily; this friction generated heat 
and even occasional sparks of violence; in the evening 
of 5 March 1770, the lone sentry before the Custom 
House on King Street became embroiled with a group 
of people as he stood his post; he called for help; in re-
sponse, six soldiers, a corporal, and Captain Thomas 
Preston marched down to the Custom House from the 
Main Guard; the tumult continued; the soldiers fired, 
their bullets striking a number of persons, of whom 
three died instantly, one shortly thereafter, and a fifth in 
a few days.102 
  
gave a lengthy summation.  Id.  “During which time, if the most clear and judi-
cious statement of evidence—if the profoundest knowledge of law—and if the 
utmost ingenuity in the application of it, could have prevailed, Abbot had escaped 
death.”  Id.  On the other hand, the prosecution summation “was short; but point-
ed, and fatal.”  Id.  After the trial judges gave instructions that “were lengthy in 
their observations—in which they discovered great ability, with a tincture of legal 
severity[,]” the jury received the case at one in the morning and pronounced the 
conviction at eight.  Id. This was not a jury reluctant to impose a blood punish-
ment, even though the verdict came as a shock to the community.  The newspaper 
reported, “There were nearly two thousand persons present at the trial—not two 
individuals of whom, perhaps, expected this bloody verdict.”  Id.  
102. ADAMS PAPERS, supra note 26, at 1. 




A.  Jurors Determining Disputed Facts 
About the resulting trials, Whitman asserts “that there was once 
again no uncertainty about the facts.”103  If he means that no one 
doubted that the eight particular British soldiers were involved in a 
shooting that left five dead, he is correct.  If, however, Whitman 
means that the guilt of the eight was clear, he is just wrong. 
Captain Preston was tried separately from the others, and his trial 
centered on whether he gave the order to fire.  Witnesses testified 
that he did so, but defense testimony disputed those assertions.104  
Hiller Zobel, in his study of the trials, states that the rebuttal evi-
dence was so strong that an acquittal became assured not because the 
defense’s case made it clear what happened, but because it created “a 
picture of confusion, noise and verbal threats. . . . [It] raised serious 
doubts that the order to fire came from Preston.”105  The acquittal 
came not because every one knew what happened, but the oppo-
site—because this was “a case so full of factual uncertainty and evi-
dentiary conflict.”106  The facts were in doubt even after the trial, and 
whatever the burden of proof, the acquittal was correct.107 
The second trial, Rex v. Wemms, the trial of the soldiers, contains 
the first recorded instance of an attorney arguing the reasonable 
doubt standard and its first recorded judicial instruction.108  The is-
sue of guilt was closer than in Preston’s trial.109  Under controlling 
law, once it was proved that a soldier killed a particular person, the 
  
103. WHITMAN, supra note 27, at 193. 
104. ZOBEL, supra note 26, at 249–50. 
105. Id. at 255–56. 
106. Id. at 256; see also id. at 198 (“Like most of the events during the confusion 
in King Street, the rate of firing is clouded with uncertainty.”). 
107. The prosecution probably did not know this before the trial.  The prosecuto-
rial office was a part time position, and no money was allocated for investigation.  
His job was solely to make the trial presentation.  “In other words, he was strictly 
a litigator, not an investigator.”  Id. at 105. 
108. This does not mean that the reasonable doubt standard did not appear in the 
Preston trial.  The surviving records of Preston are slenderer than for Wemms.  
While enough exists for a reasonably confident picture of much of what happened 
in Preston, only abbreviated notes are available for the attorneys’ summations and 
the judges’ instructions.  See id. at 249; ADAMS PAPERS, supra note 26, at 89–97. 
109. ZOBEL, supra note 26, at 268 (“[T]he question of guilt in the soldiers’ case 
was much closer than in Preston’s.”). 




burden was on him to show that the killing was justified, that is, that 
he acted in self-defense.110  Wemms focused on whether the soldiers 
justifiably feared for their safety before they fired.  The facts, how-
ever, were and remain murky.  The jurors’ job was not to confirm 
what was clear, but to make determinations about whether testimony 
was correct.  Thus, John Adams, in his defense summation, stated 
that witnesses could be, and were, mistaken.111  Judge Trowbridge 
instructed the jurors that they ought to reconcile testimony if they 
could, but if that were not possible, “settle the fact as you verily be-
lieve it to be.”112  Later, he noted that testimony indicated that one 
soldier did not fire and another fired at a boy and missed, but “the 
witnesses are not agreed as to the person who fired at the boy, or as 
to him who did not fire at all.”113  Similarly, that judge highlighted 
that all the evidence could not be correct.  For example, testimony 
indicated, “that there are two guns of eight not discharged and yet it 
is said seven were fired.  This evinces the uncertainty of some of the 
testimonies.”114 
Zobel concludes:  
 
Somehow it seems fitting that an event so historically in-
evitable and yet so basically insignificant should have 
taken place on a moonlit, night before scores of people, 
  
110. Id. at 242 (“Underlying both cases was the legal principle that, once the fact 
of killing had been proved, the killer bore the burden of convincing the jury that 
the homicide was legally justified.”)  Samuel Quincy in addressing the jury for the 
prosecution in Wemms stated, “It is a rule of law Gentleman, when the fact of kill-
ing is once proved, every circumstance alleviating, excusing, or justifying, in order 
to extenuate the crime must be proved by the prisoners, for the law presumes the 
fact malicious, untill [sic] the contrary appears in evidence.”  ADAMS PAPERS, 
supra note 26, at 156. 
111. See ADAMS PAPERS, supra note 26, at 261. (“[I]t is apparent, that witnesses 
are liable to make mistakes . . . . I am sure that you are satisfied by this time, by 
many circumstances, that [Mr. Bass] is totally mistaken in this matter . . . .”); see 
also id. at 265 (explaining that the witness Langford “is however most probably 
mistaken in this matter, and confounds one time with another, a mistake which has 
been made by many witnesses, in this case, and considering the confusion and the 
terror of the scene, is not to be wondered at.”). 
112. Id. at 295 
113. Id. at 298. 
114. Id. at 308. 




without leaving any two witnesses able to give the same 
account of what happened.  If the trials were attempts to 
establish the truth, they failed; no one yet knows what re-
ally happened.115   
 
What we do know is that the jury acquitted six soldiers and convict-
ed two of only manslaughter.116   
B.  Jurors’ Private Knowledge 
Unlike what Whitman suggests about eighteenth century trials, 
the jurors could not use their private knowledge in the Massacre tri-
als.117  Thus, defense attorney Josiah Quincy told the jury in an open-
ing statement:  
 
But let it be borne deep upon our minds, that the prison-
ers are to be condemned by the evidence here in Court 
produced against them, and by nothing else.  Matters 
heard or seen abroad, are to have no weight: in general 
they undermine the pillars of justice and truth.118  
  
Justice Trowbridge instructed the jurors that if any of them had rele-
vant knowledge of the case, they should be sworn and testify.119  He 
  
115. ZOBEL, supra note 26, at 303. 
116. ADAMS PAPERS, supra note 26, at 312–14.  Those two “prayed the Benefit of 
Clergy, which was allowed them, and thereupon they were each burnt in the hand, 
in open Court, and discharged.”  Id. at 314. 
117. Id. at 166. 
118. Id.  Quincy acknowledged that apparently damaging information had ap-
peared about the defendants, but Quincy gave lack of confrontation as a reason for 
the jurors to disregard it.  He said: 
It should be remembered, that we were not present to cross examine: and 
the danger which results from having this publication in the hands of 
those who are to pass upon our lives, ought to be guarded against.  We say 
we are innocent, by our plea, and are not to be denounced upon a new 
species of evidence, unknown in the English system of criminal law. 
 Id. 
119. Id. at 290 (“That if any of the jurors are knowing of the facts, they ought to 
inform the Court of it, be sworn as witnesses, and give their testimonies in Court, 
 




went on to state that the verdict was to be based on the evidence pre-
sented in court.   
 
Therefore as by law, you are to settle the facts in this 
case, upon the evidence given you in Court: you must be 
sensible, that in doing it, you ought not have any manner 
of regard to what you may have read or heard of the case 
out of court.120  
C.  Jurors’ Spiritual Anxieties 
The spiritual concerns that Whitman identifies as leading to 
wrongful acquittals and forcing out the reasonable doubt rule had no 
discernible role in the Massacre trials.  Nothing indicates that jurors 
were concerned about their souls for wrongly imposing a blood pun-
ishment.  Instead, Bostonians were told something quite different. 
The cry heard again and again was that the righteous should convict, 
not acquit, a cry supported by Biblical injunctions that in effect de-
manded blood.  Souls were at stake, not for imposing a blood pun-
ishment, but if one were not imposed. 
These views started to pervade the atmosphere even earlier than 
the Preston and Wemms trials.  Several weeks before the Boston 
Massacre, the increasing tensions in Massachusetts produced a con-
frontation between Ebenezer Richardson and an angry crowd.  Rich-
ardson fired his musket, wounding several and killing an eleven -
year- old boy.121  Within days, a board with biblical quotations was 
publicly posted.  To anyone who might later sit on Richardson’s ju-
ry, two of the sacred quotations were particularly applicable: “‘Thou 
shalt take no satisfaction for the life of MURDERER—he shall sure-
ly be put to death.’  And ‘Though Hand join in Hand, the Wicked 
shall not pass unpunish’d’”122 
  
to the end that it may be legal to their fellows, and the Court may know on what 
evidence the Jury’s verdict is founded.”).  
120. Id. at 291.  Trowbridge gave a similar injunction about the law.  See ADAMS 
PAPERS, supra note 26, at 291. (“[Y]ou must also be sensible, that you are to take 
the law from the Court, and not collect it from what has been said by People of 
Court, or published in the newspapers, or delivered from the pulpits.”). 
121. See ZOBEL, supra note 26, at 176. 
122. Id. at 178. 




Shortly after the Massacre, Boston clergy urged neither hesitancy 
nor mercy in condemning, but vengeance and convictions. 
The Sunday after the shootings, the young Reverend John 
Lathrop preached a violent sermon in the Old North Church 
on Genesis 3:10: ‘The voice thy brother’s blood crieth unto 
me from the ground.’  He spoke of ‘sorrow for the dead, who 
fell victims to the merciless rage of wicked men; indignation 
against the worst of murderers. . . .’  Another zealous divine, 
the Reverend Charles Chauncy, tried to convince one of the 
wounded to sue Preston for damages.  The man refused . . . . 
Chauncy was unimpressed.  ‘If I was to be one of Jury upon 
his trial,’ he said, ‘I would bring him in guilty, evidence or 
no Evidence.123 
Bostonians were citing Genesis 9:6, where God enjoins Noah, 
“Whoever sheds man’s blood, By man his blood shall be shed; For 
in the image of God He made man.”  At Richardson’s trial, held be-
tween the Massacre shootings and the resulting trials, the shorthand 
version of this verse was shouted out to Richardson’s jury as delib-
erations began:  “Blood requires blood.”124 
Appeals to this biblical blood injunction and other similar ones 
urging a killer’s condemnation were so prevalent that they were re-
peatedly addressed in the Massacre trials.  Thus, in the Wemms trial, 
Josiah Quincy’s defense summation acknowledged them, but 
stressed that the defendants “are not to be tried by the Mosaic law: a 
law, we take it, peculiarly designed for the government of a peculiar 
nation, who being in a great measure under a theocratical form of 
government, it’s [sic] institutions cannot, with any propriety, be ad-
duced for our regulation in these days.”125  
Quincy argued that the verse, “[w]hosoever sheddeth blood, by 
man shall his blood be shed” stated a general rule that could not be 
  
123. Id. at 216. 
124. Id. at 225.  The courtroom crowd said more to the jury.  “As the jury began 
filing out, the shouts increased.  ‘Remember, jury,’ someone yelled, ‘you are upon 
oath. . . . Damn him, don’t bring in manslaughter.’  ‘Hang the dog!  Hang him!’  
Damn him, hang him!  Murder no manslaughter.’”  Id.  
125. Josiah Quincy, Josiah Quincy’s Argument for the Defense, in ADAMS 
PAPERS, supra note 26, at 234 (quotations omitted).  




literally applied because otherwise a person “killing another in self-
defence, would incur the pains of death . . . a doctrine that certainly 
never applied under the Mosaical institution.”126  Quincy felt com-
pelled to address two more apparently condemnatory biblical pas-
sages, stressing that the defendants were only to be judged by the 
evidence and law presented in court.127 
John Adams’ summation indicated that a potential juror had been 
excused because that person thought that God’s words to Noah had 
to be followed.128  Adams, not surprisingly, was concerned that the 
biblical passages might still affect those on the jury and went on to 
say, “I am afraid many other persons have formed such an opinion . .  
. . but this is not the law which does not punish many kinds of kill-
ings, including those in self defense.”129 
The judges’ concern about the Old Testament passage was so 
strong that they also felt the need to address it.  Judge Trowbridge 
stated that jurors in the course of the year had heard the precept giv-
en to Noah about shedding blood and explicated:  
 
Whence it has been inferred, that whosoever volun-
tarily kills another, whatever the inducement, or 
  
126. Id. at 235. 
127. See id.  He said that “the murderer shall flee to the pit,” which begged the 
question whether the defendants were murderers “in the sense of our laws; for you 
recollect, that what is murder and what is not, is a question of law, arising upon 
facts stated and allowed.”  Similarly, his statement: “You shall take no satisfaction 
for the life of a murderer, which is guilty of death,” begged the same question.  
Quincy went on to state that the defense had no objection to this when properly 
applied.  “If we have committed a fault, on which our laws inflict the punishment 
of death, we must suffer.  But what fault we have cummitted [sic] you are to en-
quire: or rather you, Gentlemen, are to find the facts proved in Court against us, 
and the Judges are to see and consider what the law pronounces touching our of-
fence, and what punishment is thereby inflicted as a penalty.”  Id. 
128. See John Adams, Adams’ Argument for the Defense, in ADAMS PAPERS, su-
pra note 26, at 255 (“I take notice of this, because one gentleman nominated by 
the sheriff, for a Juryman upon this trial, because he said, he believed Capt. Pres-
ton was innocent, but innocent blood had been shed, and therefore somebody 
ought to be hanged for it, which he thought was indirectly giving his opinion in 
this cause.”).  The editors of the Adams Papers noted, “The individual has not 
been identified.”  Id. at 255 n.219. 
129. Id. at 255–56. 




provocation may be, is a murderer, and as such 
ought to be put to death.  But surely not only the 
avenger of blood, and he who killed a thief breaking 
up an house in the night, were exceptions to the 
general precept, but also he who killed another in 
his own defence.  Even the Jewish Doctors allowed 
this and that justly; because the right of self-defence 
is founded in the law of nature.130   
 
Trowbridge stressed and repeated that the defendants were not being 
tried under Jewish law, but under the common law.131 
Justice Oliver told the jurors that the command given to Noah 
that “hath lately been urged in the most public manner very indis-
criminately, without any of the softenings of humanity.”132  Oliver 
noted that Moses mentioned a similar precept, but  
 
that Moses was the best Commentator on his own 
laws, and he hath published certain restrictions on this 
law . . . . [T]o construe that law to Noah strictly, is 
only to gratify a blood thirsty revenge, without any of 
those allowances for human frailties which the law of 
nature and the English law also make.133 
 
  
130. Edmund Trowbridge, Trowbridge’s and Oliver’s Charges to the Jury, in 
ADAMS  PAPERS, supra note 26, at 288. 
131. Id. at 284 (“[I]t may not be improper, considering what has in the course of 
this year been advanced, published, and industriously propagated among the peo-
ple, to observe to you that none of the indictments against the prisoners are found-
ed on the act of this province, or the law given to the Jews, but that, all of the in-
dictments are at common law.  The prisoners are charged with having offended 
against the common law, and that only; by that law therefore they are to be judged, 
and by that law condemned, or else they must be acquitted.”). See also id. at 288  
(“[T]hese rules of the common law, are the result of the wisdom and experience of 
many ages.  However, it is not material in the present case, whether the common 
law is agreeable to, or variant from, the law given to the Jews, because it is certain, 
the prisoners are not in this Court to be tried by that law, but by the common law, 
that is according to the settled and established rules, and antient customs of the 
nation, approved for successions of ages.”). 
132. Id. 
133. Id. at 304. 




The contention at the heart of Whitman’s analysis, that reasona-
ble doubt emerged to aid convictions by salving jurors’ souls terri-
fied of wrongly convicting, is simply not supported by the Boston 
Massacre trials.  Whatever effect that spiritual anxiety had on the 
standard’s development in England, it does not seem to have had that 
effect on the first known use of the standard, which was in America.  
Instead, the spiritual anxiety at work when the standard was first 
articulated was just the opposite—that God-fearing jurors would feel 
religiously compelled to condemn, even if the facts and the applica-
ble law did not support a conviction.  The judicial concern in the 
Boston Massacre trials was that religion would produce an unreason-
ing conviction, not an acquittal.  
D.  The Reasonable Doubt Instruction as an Aid to Acquittals 
The conclusion that the purpose of the first known articulation of 
the reasonable doubt standard was to aid convictions comes by pars-
ing some trial participants’ words.  John Adams’ summation told the 
jury, “[T]he best rule in doubtful cases, is, rather to incline to acquit-
tal than conviction . . . . Where you are doubtful never act; that is, if 
you doubt of the prisoners guilt, never declare him guilty; that is al-
ways the rule, especially in cases of life.”134 
The prosecutor, Robert Treat Paine, seemingly responded by 
stating that English law was benign, a proposition which could best 
be understood by Coke’s observation that the law was  
 
the last improvement of Reason which in the nature of 
it will not admitt any Proposition to be true of which . 
. . there remains a doubt; if therefor in the examina-
tion of this Cause the Evidence is not sufficient to 
Convince beyond reasonable Doubt of the Guilt of all 
or any of the Prisoners by the Benignity and Reason 
of the Law you will acquit them, but if the Evidence 
be sufficient to convince you of their Guilt beyond 
reasonable Doubt the Justice of the Law will require 
you to declare them Guilty and the Benignity of the 
  
134. John Adams, Adams’ Argument for the Defense, in ADAMS PAPERS, supra 
note 26, at 243. 




Law will be satisfyed in the fairness and impartiality 
of their Tryal.135 
 
Anthony Morano concluded that Adams was stating the existing 
law.  The jury should “acquit if it doubted that the defendant was 
guilty.”136  Paine, in reply, however, was making a “novel plea” that 
a doubt compelling an acquittal had to be reasonable.137  Thus, Paine 
was urging the replacement of an any doubt standard with the rea-
sonable doubt standard, and in Morano’s version, Paine’s midwifery 
had some success.  “Paine’s innovation did influence one justice to 
break with tradition.”138  Justice Oliver instructed the jury that “if 
upon the whole, ye are in any reasonable doubt of their guilt, ye 
must then, agreeable to the rule of law, declare them innocent.”139 
Whitman finds Paine not so much an innovator, but an importer, 
bringing an idea into the law that had long been accepted elsewhere.  
Paine was expressing “the basic tension between certainty and doubt 
[that] had been intimately associated with moral theology for centu-
ries . . . .”140  Paine was merely enunciating the “safer path theology” 
going back more than a century.141  “That literature held that doubts 
that had to be obeyed were those that conformed to ‘reason.’  Indeed, 
the moralist literature had insisted for a hundred years that qualms of 
conscience not be allowed prevent the satisfactory workings of pub-
lic justice.”142 
If Whitman is correct that it was well accepted that doubts had to 
conform to reason, then Adams may have been saying the same 
thing as Paine.  Adams’ “doubt” may have been synonymous with 
Paine’s “reasonable doubt.”  If so, this reasonable doubt standard 
was not something new, invented to aid the prosecution, but just an-
other formulation for what already existed.  
  
135. Robert Treat Paine, Paine’s Argument for the Crown, in ADAMS PAPERS, 
supra note 26, at 271. 
136. Morano, supra note 11, at 517. 
137. Id. 
138. Id. at 518. 
139. Edmund Trowbridge, Trowbridge’s and Oliver’s Charges to the Jury, in 
ADAMS PAPERS, supra note 26, at 309. 
140. WHITMAN, supra note 11, at 194. 
141. Id. 
142. Id. at 193. 




What we can be reasonably certain about, however, is that no 
matter what Adams and Paine meant, the judge who gave that first 
known reasonable doubt charge was not giving a charge to make 
convictions easier.  While Justice Oliver’s language about reasona-
ble doubt might appear as prosecution friendly if it is viewed in iso-
lation, it does not when viewed in its context.  The jury instructions 
containing the reasonable doubt charge were not pro-prosecution 
but, really, commands to acquit. 
The prosecution had faced the difficulty that no witness had testi-
fied as to which particular soldier killed three of the victims.143  The 
prosecutor offered two theories why, even so, each defendant was 
still guilty of murder.144  First, Paine contended that the soldiers were 
an unlawful assembly, and each soldier was responsible for the as-
sembly’s deeds.145  Paine also maintained that each defendant was 
liable as a principal if the defendant aided, assisted, and abetted an-
other to do an unlawful act.146  Paine urged that the rapid firing sup-
ported the aiding and abetting theory because it indicated a prior 
agreement to shoot.  And even if the shooting did not show that, it 
was evidence of abetting “as one by firing encourages the others to 
do the like.”147 
Justice Trowbridge, who gave the first set of instructions, in es-
sence told the jury to reject Paine’s arguments.  The rapid firing did 
not indicate a prior agreement if the defendants were defending 
themselves.148  
  
143.See Robert Treat Paine, Paine’s Argument for the Crown, in Adams Papers, 
supra note 26, at 279. 
144.  Id. 
145. See id. (“But which of the other 5 prisoners killed the other 3 of the deceased 
appears very uncertain.  But this operates nothing in their favour if it appears to 
you what they were an unlawful Assembly for it has been abundantly proved to 
you by Numerous Authoritys produced by the Council for the Prisoners, that every 
individual of an Unlawful Assembly is answerable for the doings [of] the rest.”).   
146. See id. (“[A]ll that are present aiding assisting and abetting to the doing an 
unlawful act as is charged in the Several Indictments against the Prisoners are also 
considered as Principals.”). 
147. Edmund Trowbridge, Trowbridge’s and Oliver’s Charges to the Jury, in 
ADAMS  PAPERS, supra note 26, at 297. 
148. See id. (“The Council for the Crown insist, that the firing upon the people 
was an unlawful act, in disturbance of the peace, and as the party fired so near 
together, it must be supposed they previously agreed to do it; that agreement made 
 





If each of the party had been at the same instant so 
assaulted, as that it would have justified his killing 
the assailant in defence of his own life, and there-
upon each of them had at that same instant fired up-
on and killed that person assaulted him, surely it 
would not have been evidence of a previous agree-
ment to fire, or prove them to be an unlawful assem-
bly . . . .149   
 
Even if, the Justice continued, that provocation only mitigated mur-
der to manslaughter, the rapid shooting would not indicate a prior 
agreement or an unlawful assembly.150  Then, Trowbridge stressed 
that there was plenty of evidence of an assault that explained the 
rapid firing.   
 
You will therefore carefully consider what the sever-
al witnesses have sworn, with regard to the assault 
made upon the party of soldiers at the Custom house, 
and if you thereupon believe they were, before, and 
at the time of, their firing attacked by such numbers, 
and in such a violent manner, as many of the wit-
nesses have positively sworn, you will be able to as-
sign a cause for their firing so near together, as they 
did, without supposing a previous agreement so to 
do.151 
 
The judge addressed whether the shooting by one aided and abet-
ted the others by pointing out that since no soldier fired more than 
  
them an unlawful assembly, if they were not so before, and being so when they 
fired, all are chargeable with the killing by any one or more of them.  However 
just this reasoning may be, where there is no apparent cause for their firing, yet it 
will not hold good where there is.”).   
149. Id. 
150. See id. (“nor would it have been evidence of such agreement though the at-
tack was not as would justify the firing and killing, if it was such an assault as 
would alleviate the offence, and reduce it to manslaughter, since there would be as 
apparent a cause of the firing in one case as in the other . . . .”).  
151. Id. 




once, the one who fired last could not by that act have encouraged 
those who fired before.152  Furthermore, Trowbridge told the jury 
that a defendant did not unlawfully abet if he had a proper justifica-
tion for shooting,153 and the same held even if the provocation only 
mitigated a killing to manslaughter.154  He then stressed that soldiers 
not proven to have aided or abetted others could only be convicted if 
it were proved that a specific soldier killed a particular person.155  
There was only that kind of proof about two of the five victims and 
two of the defendants.  Thus, this instruction told the jurors that they 
should acquit all but two of the defendants if the soldiers had been 
under an attack that allowed for self-defense or mitigated a murder 
to manslaughter.  Finally, the judge, who had already pointed out the 
many witnesses who had testified to such provocation, dismissed 
any notion that a jury could not find such an attack.156  These jury 
instructions were, therefore, in essence a command to acquit six of 
the eight defendants.  Trowbridge said, “And as the evidence does 
not shew which three killed the three, nor that either of the six in 
particular killed either of the three, you cannot find the either of the 
six guilty of killing them or either [of] them.”157  
  
152. See id. (“As neither of the soldiers fired more than once, it is evident that he 
who fired last, could not thereby in fact, abet or encourage the firing of any of 
those who fired before him, and so it cannot be evidence of such abetment.”). 
153. Edmund Trowbridge, Trowbridge’s and Oliver’s Charges to the Jury, in 
ADAMS PAPERS, supra note 26, at 297–98 (“And if he who fired first and killed, 
can justify it, because it was lawful for him so to do, surely that same lawful act 
cannot be evidence of an unlawful abetment.”). 
154. See id. at 298 (“[Y]et if it appears he had such a cause for the killing as will 
reduce it to Manslaughter, it would be strange indeed if the same act should be 
evidence of his abetting another who killed without provocation, so as to make 
him who fired first guilty of murder.  The same may be said as to all the interme-
diate firings . . . .”). 
155. See id. (If the soldiers were a lawful assembly and did not unlawfully abet 
each, “they cannot be said to have in consideration of law killed those five persons 
or either of them, but must rest on the evidence of the actual killing: and, if so, 
neither of the prisoners can be found guilty thereof, unless it appears not that he 
was of the party, but that he in particular in fact did kill one or more of the persons 
slain.”). 
156. See id. (“[A]nd as the evidence stands, I don’t think it necessary to say how it 
would be in case the first person fired with little or no provocation.”). 
157. Id. 




Prosecution evidence, however, showed that William Montgom-
ery and Matthew Killroy each killed a particular victim.  Justice 
Trowbridge stated that a murder conviction for those two was proper 
only if they had fired without first being assaulted.  If there had been 
an assault that had immediately threatened the soldiers’ lives and 
they fired to preserve their safety, they should be acquitted.  If the 
assault did not place the soldiers’ lives in danger, then a verdict of 
manslaughter was appropriate.  Trowbridge continued by stressing 
that evidence allowed the jury to find self-defense,158 and the evi-
dence definitely allowed for no more than a manslaughter convic-
tion.  He said:    
 
But you must know, that if this part of soldiers in 
general were pelted, with snow-balls, pieces of ice 
and sticks, in anger, this, without more, amounts to 
an assault, not upon those that were in fact struck, 
but upon the whole party; and is such an assault as 
will reduce the killing to manslaughter.159 
 
This was not an instruction offering a spiritually safe path that 
led to a conviction for a blood punishment.  Instead, these were in-
structions that almost commanded an acquittal of murder.  Of course, 
Trowbridge is not the judge who gave the reasonable doubt instruc-
tion.  Justice Oliver did, but Oliver’s charge, which primarily adopt-
ed Trowbridge’s remarks, sought even more than the earlier instruc-
tions to have acquittals of all charges. 
Oliver started by castigating those in the community who had 
sought to prejudice the defendants,160 and urged the jury “to divest 
your minds of every thing that may tend to bias them in this 
  
158. See id. (If you believe some of the witnesses, “it will be sufficient to show, 
that his life was in immediate danger, or that he had sufficient reason to think 
so.”). 
159. Edmund Trowbridge, Trowbridge’s and Oliver’s Charges to the Jury, in 
ADAMS  PAPERS, supra note 26, at  299. 
160. Oliver specifically referred to a newspaper article, which also insulted the 
court, and said,  “I think I never saw a greater malignity of heart expressed in any 
one piece.” Id. at 302. 




cause.”161  He then said that because of Justice Trowbridge’s thor-
oughness, he had little to add to the homicide definitions,162 and rec-
ommended that the jurors first consider whether the soldiers or those 
confronting the soldiers were an unlawful assembly.163  His summary 
stressed the lack of doubt on a key issue:  
 
It would be too tedious to recite the numbers of tes-
timonies to prove a design to attack the soldiers . . . 
there are no less than thirty-eight witnesses to this 
fact, six of whom the council for the King have pro-
duced.  Compare them Gentlemen, and then deter-
mine whether or not there is any room to doubt of 
the numbers collected around the soldiers at the 
Custom house, being a riotous assembly.164   
 
Evidence instead showed that the crowd had committed provoca-
tive acts that justified the firing.165  He, again, echoed Trowbridge by 
noting that the lack of proof as to which particular defendant killed 
three of the victims was an evidentiary absence that required acquit-
tals.  “[T]his maxim of law cannot be more justly applied, than in 
this case, viz. That it is better that ten guilty persons escape, than one 
innocent suffer . . . .”166   
Oliver conceded that Montgomery had killed one of the victims.  
While Trowbridge left open the possibility of a manslaughter con-
viction for that soldier, Oliver indicated that Montgomery should be 
  
161. Id. at 303. 
162. See id. (“I should have given to you the definitions of the different species of 
homicide, but as my brother hath spoke so largely upon this subject, and hath pro-
duced so many and so indisputable authorities relative thereto, I would not exhaust 
your patience which hath so remarkably held out during this long trial.”). 
163. Id. at 304 (“I would recommend to you, Gentlemen, in order to your forming 
a just verdict in this cause, to satisfy yourselves in the first place, whether or not 
the prisoners at the bar were an unlawful assembly when they were at the Custom-
house, for on that much depends their guilt or innocence.”) 
164. Edmund Trowbridge, Trowbridge’s and Oliver’s Charges to the Jury, in 
ADAMS  PAPERS, supra note 26, at  306. 
165. Id. at 307–08. 
166. Id. at 308. 




totally acquitted.167  Oliver asserted that the attacks on Montgomery 
provided a legal justification for the killing.168  “[H]ere take the 
words and the blows together, and then say, whether this firing was 
not justifiable.”169  He concluded his evidence summary by down-
playing the importance of the proof against Killroy.170  Oliver, as he 
had in the Richardson trial, indicated that the jury should acquit en-
tirely.171 
Oliver’s reasonable doubt instruction came after this recital of 
the reasons why all should be acquitted.  He said that if the jury 
found that the soldiers were acting lawfully and only fired when  
 
there was a necessity to do it in their own defence, 
which I think there is a violent presumption of: and if, 
on the other hand, ye should find that the people who 
were collected around the soldiers, were an unlawful 
assembly, and had a design to endanger, if not take 
away their lives, as seems to be evident, from blows 
succeeding threatnings; ye must, in such case acquit 
the prisoners; or if upon the whole, ye are in any rea-
sonable doubt of their guilt, ye must then, agreeable 
to the rule of law, declare them innocent.172   
 
  
167. See id. 
168. Id. 
169. Id. 
170. Edmund Trowbridge, Trowbridge’s and Oliver’s Charges to the Jury, in 
ADAMS  PAPERS, supra note 26, at 308–09. 
171. In this portion of his charge where he urged a complete acquittal, Oliver was 
acting as he had in the Richardson trial.  See ZOBEL, supra note 26, at 224–25 
(explaining that the judges “agreed that Richardson, having acted in self-defense, 
could be held for nothing more than manslaughter . . . . Oliver went farther than 
the other judges; Richardson, he said, had committed no offense at all, not even 
manslaughter.”).  Opprobrium was heaped upon Oliver for his role in the Richard-
son trial, which drew the judge’s comment in the Preston trial.  Oliver “also re-
minded the [Preston] jury of the contempt he had personally received during Rich-
ardson’s trial.”  Id. at 265. 
172. Edmund Trowbridge, Trowbridge’s and Oliver’s Charges to the Jury, in 
ADAMS  PAPERS, supra note 26, at 309. 




Justice Oliver, a Royalist and Tory, opposed to what he saw as 
the Boston mob,173 did not mention reasonable doubt to aid the pros-
ecution.  Oliver’s instructions stated that there was a “violent pre-
sumption” in favor of justification, but even if the jurors did not 
agree with what was “evident,” that the defendants had proved self-
defense, the jurors still had to acquit if the jurors had a reasonable 
doubt about their guilt.174  The reasonable doubt instruction was not 
given to make a conviction easier, but was another arrow that told 
the jury that they should acquit.175 
VI. REASONABLE DOUBT AS ENLIGHTENMENT THINKING 
Barbara Shapiro and James Franklin present accounts of the rea-
sonable doubt’s development that are similar to each others and dif-
fer from Whitman’s.  In their views, the true driving force for the 
rule’s evolution came not from concerns over blood punishments, 
but instead from a complex interrelationship between legal develop-
ments and the epistemological advances in other disciplines, includ-
ing religion, philosophy, and science.176  These disciplines all shared 
a concern with determining when knowledge derived from the sens-
es “yield conclusions which were sufficiently true to serve as the 
basis for conduct of human affairs.”177   
The legal system first led the way.  Franklin, in The Science of 
Conjecture: Evidence and Probability Before Pascal, notes that sev-
enteenth century English law rejected the rigid notion that facts 
could be established by merely using presumptions or adding togeth-
  
173. See ZOBEL, supra note 26, at 4 (“the Tory Peter Oliver”); see also id. at 4 
(“Royalist”).  
174. Edmund Trowbridge, Trowbridge’s and Oliver’s Charges to the Jury, in 
ADAMS  PAPERS, supra note 26, at 309. 
175. Id. 
176. See BARBARA J. SHAPIRO, “BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT” AND “PROBABLE 
CAUSE” 2 (1991) (“[T]he judges confronted twin sources of epistemological guid-
ance.  One was the English religious tradition, particularly the casuistical tradition, 
which sought a rational method of decision making in everyday life.  The other 
was the scientific movement of Bacon, Boyle, and especially Locke and the empir-
ical philosophers, who sought to establish scientific truth from the evidence they 
gathered.”). 
177. Id. at 7. 




er partial proofs.178  Instead, that law recognized that trial proof was 
a matter of probabilities and that facts could not be established with 
absolute certainty or without doubt.  Even so, a high degree of cer-
tainty could and should be demanded.  Shapiro states that this Eng-
lish legal culture was “a widely admired mode of establishing correct 
beliefs in the world of ‘fact.’  During the early modern era the Eng-
lish legal system had produced a well-accepted epistemological 
framework and a method of implementing it that worked reasonably 
well in reaching judgments of ‘fact’ necessary to make important 
social decisions.”179  Because this jury system was highly regarded 
in English society, other fields took note of the methods for reaching 
“moral certainty” in the legal field.180  While the nomenclature var-
ied among the disciplines, they all concluded that “[t]here were three 
subcategories of knowledge, each possessing a different kind of cer-
tainty: physical, derived from immediate sense data; mathematical, 
established by logical demonstration such as the proofs in geometry; 
and moral, based on testimony and secondhand reports of sense da-
ta.”181  In this last category, knowledge could not be absolutely 
proved but still could be raised to a level much above mere opinion 
and form the basis for human conduct.182  “All the discourses of fact 
  
178. See JAMES FRANKLIN, THE SCIENCE OF CONJECTURE: EVIDENCE AND 
PROBABILITY BEFORE PASCAL 62 (2001) (“[S]ubtle distinctions among grades of 
presumptions, and fractions of proof, were ill adapted to explanation to juries.”). 
179. SHAPIRO, supra note 39, at 32. 
180. “[T]he absorption and spread of ‘fact’ in England was facilitated by wide-
spread familiarity with and esteem for lay fact finding juries.  Efforts by natural-
ists, historians, rationalizing theologians, and even novelists to rely on the credible 
testimony of firsthand witnesses thus built and were assisted by an already exist-
ing, legitimate, widely shared, and often glorified cultural practice.”  See id. at 
209.  For example, a basic principle of the judicial system spread, and “[a]ll the 
fact-oriented disciplines exhibited a preference for personal observation and a 
belief that the testimony of credible witnesses under optimum conditions could 
yield believable, even morally certain ‘facts.’”  Id. at 211. 
181. SHAPIRO, supra note 176, at 7–8.  Cf  id. at 41 (“[T]here are two realms of 
human knowledge. In one it is possible to obtain the absolute certainty of mathe-
matical demonstration . . . .  In the other, which is the empirical realm of events, 
absolute certainty of this kind is not possible.”).  
182. See id. at 7 (“The attempt to build an intermediate level of knowledge, short 
of absolute certainty but above the level of mere opinion, was made by an over-
lapping group of theologians and naturalists.”);  see also id. at 41 (“[J]ust because 
 




emphasized the quest for evidence of facts sufficient to reach ‘moral 
certainty.’”183   
A crucial step in reasonable doubt’s emergence was the devel-
opment of the “satisfied conscience” test, which, according to 
Shapiro, was the first English legal standard explicitly used for the 
evaluation of facts and testimony.184  The concept came from the 
English Protestant tradition that “insisted that the conscience in-
volved an act of the intellect, not the will . . . [, and] each person to 
be his own strictest judge.  The judgment of conscience thus could 
not involve deferring to the authority or the wishes of another per-
son.”185  
This English religious tradition was concerned with the overly 
scrupulous conscience since such a “doubtful conscience which sub-
stituted excessive suspicion for care would never find itself at 
rest.”186  Conscience, however, was a product of rationality and un-
derstanding and not of the passions or feelings.  Since conscience 
was a product of reason,187 however, a person seeking the solace of a 
right conscience did not have to reach mathematical certainty.  A 
satisfied conscience was achieved if the conscience was without rea-
sonable or rational doubt.  Shapiro says that the connection between 
the English religious formulations and the later legal development of 
  
absolute certainty is not possible, we ought not to treat everything merely as a 
guess or opinion.  Instead, in this realm there are levels of certainty, and we reach 
higher levels of certainty as the quantity and quality of evidence available to us 
increase.”). 
183. SHAPIRO, supra note 39, at 211.  See also id. at 46–47 (“History and law both 
were disciplines committed to determining the truth of past events . . . .  In history 
as in law, moral certainty was the highest certainty available for matters of fact.”). 
184. See SHAPIRO, supra note 176, at 13, 14 (“The ‘satisfied conscience’ standard 
became the first vessel into which were poured the new criteria for evaluating facts 
and testimony. . . . Satisfied conscience is central to the development of the be-
yond reasonable doubt standard.”).  See also id. at 41 (“The earliest standards we 
have identified were ‘satisfied belief’ and ‘satisfied conscience.’”). 
185. Id. at 15. 
186. Id. at 16. 
187. See id. at 16 (“It is important for us to emphasize that the judgment of con-
science was a rational decision . . . . [Religious figures] repeatedly insisted that 
conscience is a function of the understanding, not the passions. To go against con-
science is to go against reason.”).  




reasonable doubt can be seen in the words of Robert South, an An-
glican cleric who, like others,  
 
insisted that mathematical certainty of demonstration 
was not necessary in order to be assured of the right-
ness of one’s conscience.  It was sufficient ‘if he 
know it upon the grounds of a convincing probability, 
as shall exclude all rational grounds of doubting it.’  
The language of rational or reasonable doubt was thus 
part of the language of the right and sure conscience 
in England before it entered the legal sphere.188 
 
This notion of conscience spread from moral theology to philos-
ophy and science where it appeared most notably in the thinking of 
John Locke, who “links conscience with the understanding, not pas-
sions.”189  Locke’s work had a central role in formulating the philo-
sophical concept of fact,190 and he drew on legal processes to ad-
vance his arguments.191  The crucial insight of this Enlightenment 
age, as embodied in the work of Locke and others, was that 
knowledge could be advanced not merely through deductive thought, 
but also by induction; that knowledge could be gained not merely 
through mathematical logic, but also by applying reason to experi-
ence.  
 
The inductive approach, based ultimately on experi-
ence, had a special appeal in the age of Enlighten-
ment.  Basically, it implied an experiential test of 
knowledge or of system, the same kind of criterion of 
truth that in the sciences had become Newton’s ‘Proof 
  
188. Id. at 16–17 (quoting HENRY R. MCADOO, THE STRUCTURE OF CAROLINE 
MORAL THEOLOGY 77 (1949) (quoting Robert South, WORKS, sermon 23 (Oxford, 
1828).).   
189. SHAPIRO, supra note 39, at 17. 
190. See id. at 189 (“Locke’s Essay on Human Understanding (1690) played a 
central role in generalizing the concept of fact and giving it philosophical form and 
status.”). 
191. Id. at 191 (For Locke, “[l]egal practice and concepts clearly had philosophi-
cal application.”). 




by Experiments’ or a reliance on critical observa-
tions.192 
 
The intellectual flow between law and the other disciplines re-
versed.193  “During the seventeenth century, legal concepts played an 
important role in shaping empirical philosophy.  Now empirical phi-
losophy as formulated by Locke and his successors came to influ-
ence legal writing, creating a symbiosis between epistemology and 
the law of evidence.”194  For example, the first legal treatise on evi-
dence appeared in 1754.  This work, written by Sir Geoffrey Gilbert, 
who also wrote an abstract of Locke’s work, presented the law of 
evidence in a Lockean framework.  “The rules of evidence did not 
change substantially with Gilbert.  Instead of appearing as a series of 
ad hoc professional norms, however, they are now presented as built 
on a sound and systematic epistemological foundation,” which drew 
on the formulations of Locke and others.195 
When English judges started to formulate rules or burdens for re-
solving disputed matters of fact, according to Shapiro they turned to 
the other intellectual fields that were already developing or accepting 
such standards.  As a result, the law concluded that “[w]hen the . . . 
jurors reached a state of a ‘satisfied conscience’ or ‘moral certainty,’ 
conviction was appropriate.”196  These two terms were synony-
  
192. BERNARD COHEN, SCIENCE AND THE FOUNDING FATHERS: SCIENCE IN THE 
POLITICAL THOUGHT OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, BENJAMIN FRANKLIN, JOHN ADAMS 
& JAMES MADISON 58 (1995). 
193. See SHAPIRO, supra note 39, at 214 (“If the direction of influence in the sev-
enteenth century ran from law to natural history, it appears to have reversed in 
later centuries as writers on legal evidence began to draw on the authority of scien-
tific fact finding.”). Cf. FRANKLIN, supra note 178, at 365 (“By 1700 law had 
served its purpose for the mathematical theory of probability.  The service was 
never returned.  Legal probability has continued to exist, and it is accepted in legal 
theory that such notions as proof beyond reasonable doubt involve probability.  
But all attempts to quantify the concept have been resisted.”). 
194. SHAPIRO, supra note 39, at 193.  See also id. at 192 (“Locke’s Conduct of the 
Understanding perhaps provides the best summary of my argument for the appro-
priation of legal and historical fact determination by the virtuosi. . . .”). 
195. Id. at 193. 
196. Id. at 23. 




mous,197 and judges also used related formulations that were meant 
to convey the same standard.198  But, the satisfied conscience and 
moral certainty tests always conveyed a reasonable doubt stand-
ard.199  
 
Over time judges became increasingly likely to men-
tion doubts on the part of the jury.   From the mid-
eighteenth century the now familiar ‘beyond reason-
able doubt’ terminology of modern Anglo-American 
law was added to its cognates, ‘satisfied conscience’ 
and ‘moral certainty.’  The meaning of all these 
phrases was identical and they were used together.200   
 
In contrast to the assertion that the reasonable doubt rule was a 
new standard that made convictions easier by replacing an any doubt 
rule that permitted acquittals based on irrational or frivolous beliefs 
or feelings, Shapiro maintains reasonable doubt was merely a new 
formulation for the well-settled test.   
 
The term ‘moral certainty’ was taken to mean proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt.  If one had real doubts, 
moral certainty was not reached.  The term ‘beyond 
reasonable doubt’ was, I believe, not a replacement 
  
197. See id. at 23 (“The ‘satisfied conscience’ standard was synonymous with the 
term ‘moral certainty.’”). 
198. See id. (“Late-seventeenth-century judges often used expressions such as ‘if 
you are satisfied or not satisfied with the evidence’ or ‘if you believe on the evi-
dence.’ . . . During the early eighteenth century there was increasing reference to 
the understanding of jurors. . . . Understanding and conscience were concerned 
with the same mental processes.”);  see also SHAPIRO, supra note 176, at 20 (Early 
cases used a satisfied conscience formulation, but this satisfaction came “only 
when the reasoning faculties were exercised upon the evidence.” Over time, courts 
referred less to conscience and more to mind and belief.  “A guilty verdict was 
appropriate if the jurors ‘believed,’ an acquittal if they were not ‘satisfied.’”). 
199. See SHAPIRO, supra note 39, at 23 (When jurors “entertained reasonable 
doubts, they were to acquit.”). 
200. See id.;  see also SHAPIRO, supra note 176, at 20 (illustrating that the concept 
that jurors should convict only if “satisfied” or “fully satisfied” continued. “The 
requirement that the jury be ‘fully satisfied’ or ‘satisfied’ on the basis of the evi-
dence continues as a common feature.”).  




for the any doubt test but was added to clarify the no-
tions of moral certainty and satisfied belief. . . .  Rea-
sonable doubt was simply a better explanation of the 
satisfied conscience standard that resulted from in-
creasing familiarity with the moral certainty con-
cept.201  
 
Franklin essentially agrees with Shapiro that the reasonable doubt 
concept had been the foundation of the law long before that term 
emerged.  Franklin summarizes:  
 
Eventually all probabilistic concepts in English law 
were reduced to one word, reasonable.  The com-
mon understanding that the standard of proof in 
criminal trials should lie somewhere between suspi-
cion and complete certainty came to be expressed 
solely in the formula ‘proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt.’  Gradually, any question on the evidential re-
lation between facts became expressible in terms of 
what the reasonable man would think.202   
 
The reasonable doubt formulation may have emerged around 
1770, but the idea it expressed was the same as that contained in 
“moral certainty,”203 and that centuries-old moral-certainty term 
meant, as did the reasonable doubt standard which replaced it, to “a 
very high but not complete degree of persuasion.”204  The reasonable 
  
201. SHAPIRO, supra note 176, at 21.  See also id. at 41 (“The highest level of 
certainty in this empirical realm was called . . . ‘moral certainty,’ a certainty which 
there was no reason to doubt.”). 
202. FRANKLIN, supra note 178, at 62–63. 
203. See id. at 366 (“From around 1770, English law adopted the phrase ‘proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt’ (originally defined as equivalent to ‘moral certainty’) 
for the standard of proof required in a criminal case.”). 
204. Id. at 69 (“Jean Gerson, chancellor of the University of Paris around 1400 . . . 
seems to have been the first to introduce the term, occasionally still heard in Eng-
lish, ‘moral certainty’ . . . to mean a very high but not complete degree of persua-
sion.”); see also id. at 371 (“Johnson’s Dictionary of 1755 defines probability as 
‘Likelihood; appearance of truth; evidence arising from the preponderation of 
argument: it is less than a moral certainty’ . . . . ”). 




doubt standard, then, did not make convictions easier by replacing 
the any doubt standard.  Instead, reasonable doubt was just another 
formulation of a long-utilized standard that did not demand absolute 
certainty but did require a strong certitude based on reason. 
VII. JURY REFORMS, NOT FROM THE ENLIGHTENMENT, BUT FROM 
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS 
George Fisher’s historical study of the jury’s role in determining 
truth, however, casts a dubious eye on the assertion that epistemo-
logical advances in such fields as science, philosophy, and religion 
fueled jury developments.  Instead, jury reforms were “the product 
of political conflict, not intellectual growth.”205   
As an example, Fisher cites the notorious treason trials in late 
seventeenth century England, where convictions were obtained 
through perjury.  Parliament responded by providing treason defend-
ants rights that the common law had not granted, including the au-
thority to call sworn witnesses.  Fisher concludes that the lawmakers 
did not primarily adopt the reforms because of any new intellectual 
outlook.  He states:  
 
It is true that an evolving epistemology of the sort 
that Barbara Shapiro describes, which could deal 
more comfortably with conflicting evidence in the 
courtroom, might have given the Parliamentarians 
courage in the change they undertook. . . . But for the 
religious strife and consequent spate of treason trials 
of the late Stuart reigns, and but for the sufferings 
that notorious perjurers . . . inflicted on eminent men 
of both political persuasions, Parliament would not 
have granted criminal defendants the right to call 
sworn witnesses at the end of the seventeenth centu-
ry or, very likely, for decades to come.206  
 
  
205. See generally Fisher, supra note 56, at 615.  
206. Id. at 623–24. 




Fisher does not suggest that every change in jury practice resulted 
from a particular political controversy,207 but the underlying force 
for reform was not advancing epistemologies.  Instead, changes were 
made to keep the jury system appearing legitimate.208 
Whitman’s views to some extent coincide with the notion that a 
legitimacy concern brought changes to the jury.  He sees the reason-
able doubt standard emerging to counter the increasing illegitimacy 
that the system faced from wrongful acquittals.  On the other hand, 
as we have seen, nothing indicates that the American jury system 
was under attack because the guilty were being acquitted.209  As the 
“constitutionalization” of jury trials indicates, juries in America were 
seen as essential.  Furthermore, Fisher’s history has the jury’s legit-
imacy questioned because of wrongful convictions, not acquittals, 
with the response that more rights were granted to defendants, not 
more powers to the prosecution. 
Fisher may be right about abrupt changes in the system, especial-
ly those coming through statutes.  Such reforms may have had spe-
cific causes that produced political pressures, but the forces underly-
ing evolutionary changes, such as the formulations of the burden of 
proof, are not as readily identifiable and are, no doubt, more subtle.  
Epistemological advances permeating society can be important forc-
es for such transformations even if the intellectual developments 
have not left unambiguous blazes on the legal trail.  
VIII. AMERICAN REASONABLE DOUBT AND ENLIGHTENMENT 
THINKING 
Shapiro and Franklin’s accounts largely focus on developments 
in England, but their views also lead to an explanation for reasonable 
doubt’s first articulation across the Atlantic.  Enlightenment thought 
  
207. See id. at 703 (“It would be foolish to argue that each of these trends and 
events traces to a political or social controversy that operated outside the justice 
system.”). 
208. See id. at 704 (“I suggest that the most substantial force behind this enor-
mous historical trend has been the system’s concern with its own apparent legiti-
macy.”); see also id. at 705 (“The jury . . . promised a remarkably reliable source 
of systemic legitimacy.”). 
209. See supra text at Part IV.A–G. 




pervaded eighteenth century America.  Bernard Cohen, in Science 
and the Founding Fathers, points out that  
 
the American nation was conceived in a historical 
period that is generally known as the Enlighten-
ment, or the great Age of Reason, and science was 
then generally esteemed as the highest expression of 
human rationality. . . .  It is simply inconceivable 
that thinking men and women of the eighteenth cen-
tury would be uninfluenced by the ideals, the con-
cepts, the principles, and even the laws of the sci-
ence that Newton created or by other achievements 
in the physical and life sciences and medicine.210   
 
Cohen contends that the inductive approach to knowledge of science 
was especially attractive to Americans.   
 
The constant regard for the lessons of experience 
had to be significant to citizens of the New World in 
a way that was not the case for Europeans, simply 
because in the New World there was a conscious-
ness of a frontier, even for those who lived in urban 
centers or on farms and plantations far removed 
from the boundaries of the wilderness and the do-
mains of the Indians.  Woe to anyone who was so 
wedded to theory or abstractions as to neglect the 
hard facts of brute experience.211   
 
Certainly many eighteenth century Americans had knowledge of 
the twin beacons of the Enlightenment, John Locke and Isaac New-
ton.212  This came through formal education,213 but the knowledge 
  
210. COHEN, supra note 192, at 20. 
211. Id. at 57–58. 
212. See id. at 59 (“Two great intellectual heroes of that age were the philosopher 
John Locke and the scientist Isaac Newton, sometimes called the ‘twin luminaries’ 
of the Augustan Age.”). 
213. See id. at 99 (“All students of science in the days of Jefferson’s youth would 
have studied Newton’s Opticks . . . . [T]he Opticks was literally a handbook of the 
 




spread further because this was an American age that saw scientific 
findings being regularly reported in newspapers and presented in 
popular demonstrations and lectures.214 
Perhaps the strongest indication that Enlightenment precepts had 
permeated the society is that eighteenth century Americans could 
make references to the thinking of Newton and Locke without expli-
cation.  It was simply assumed that the audience would understand.  
For example, James Wilson, in his legal lectures, argued that society 
should be able to change its constitution.  He addressed the conten-
tion that an alterable constitution could lead to political instability by 
stating: 
 
The very reverse will be its effect.  Let the uninter-
rupted power to change be admitted and fully under-
stood, and the exercise of it will not lightly or wan-
tonly assumed.  There is a vis intertiae in publick 
bodies as well as in matter; and, if left to their natu-
ral propensities, they will not be moved without a 
proportioned propelling cause.215   
 
Wilson was referring, without further explanation, to the Newtonian 
principle that a body at rest remains that way without an external 
force.216  Cohen says about this passage:   
 
It is, I believe, significant that Wilson did not find a 
need for an explicit reference to Newton or for a 
mention of the Principia by name.  He apparently as-
sumed that his audience would be sufficiently 
  
method of experiment, showing not only how to devise and perform experiments, 
but also how to draw conclusions from them.”). 
214. Id. at 181 (“This was an age of great general interest in science, a subject 
reported regularly in the newspapers and brought to the attention of the curious 
through popular lectures and demonstrations.”). 
215. WILSON, supra note 83, at 305. 
216. See COHEN, supra note 192, at 36 (Wilson was “using Definition Three of 
Newton’s Principia, in which Newton introduced the concept of ‘vis Intertiae,’ or 
‘force of inertia,’ an ‘inherent’ force that exists in every variety of matter that 
causes a body to resist any change in its state of rest or motion.”). 




schooled in the Newtonian natural philosophy to 
recognize the source of his analogy.217 
 
The work of Jonathan Edwards further indicates the reach of En-
lightenment principles in eighteenth century America.  Edwards, 
who read widely in the philosophers and scientists of the age, 
“sought to reconcile piety with the new scientific and philosophical 
age demarcated by Newton and Locke.”218  His sermons, which no 
doubt reached many societal strata, contained reference to Newton 
and Locke by name with little or no exegesis of what they said.219  
Edwards simply assumed that the congregants would understand. 
Americans “believed science to be a supreme expression of hu-
man reason.”220  The sound methods of science could not only help 
explain the present world and make accurate predictions, 221 they, as 
trials seek to do, “could also retrodict past events . . . .”222  In this 
culture, it would have been remarkable if the standards used to gauge 
scientific testimony and witnesses did not affect the standards used 
to assess trial proceedings.223 
The effect of Enlightenment insights on American legal thinking 
are revealed when James Wilson’s legal lectures turned to the topic 
of obtaining knowledge from human affairs.  Wilson started with the 
distinction that “evidence, which arises from reasoning, is divided 
into two species—demonstrative and moral.”224  Demonstrative evi-
dence concerns abstract truths that are unchangeable.  In this realm, 
  
217. Id. at 38.  Similarly, Thomas Jefferson’s Notes on Virginia incorporates rules 
obtained from Newton without finding “a need to mention either the name of 
Newton or the title of his book. [Jefferson] assumed that Newton’s rules were so 
well known to his readers that to mention either Newton’s name or the title of his 
treatise would be supererogatory, a breech of good taste in rhetoric.”  Id. at 76–77. 
218. John E. Smith et al., Introduction to JONATHAN EDWARDS READER, supra 
note 58, at viii. 
219. See  JONATHAN EDWARDS READER, supra note 58, at 15, 194, 205, and 206. 
220. COHEN, supra note 192, at 279. 
221. See id. (“Science . . . represented knowledge that was certain. . . .  Scientific 
knowledge was based on sound method . . . .”). 
222. Id. 
223. See id. at 60 (“In an age in which reason was venerated, science was es-
teemed as the intellectual manifestation of human reason in action.”). 
224. WILSON, supra note 86, at 395. 




there are no degrees, and demonstrations may vary in their ease of 
comprehension, but they cannot be opposed to each other.  “If one 
demonstration can be refuted, it must be by another demonstration: 
but to suppose that two contrary demonstrations can exist, is to sup-
pose that the same proposition is both true and false: which is mani-
festly absurd.”225 
Other truths, however, are not demonstrative, but moral.  In this 
realm, conflicting proof can, and usually does, exist.  “On both sides, 
contrary presumptions, contrary testimonies, contrary experiences 
must be balanced. . . . Moral evidence is generally complicated: it 
depends not upon any one argument, but upon many independent 
proofs, which, however, combine their strength, and draw on the 
same conclusion.”226  A factual matter is not an area of absolute 
truth, but of probabilities that can lead to moral certainty.  “In moral 
evidence, we rise, by an insensible gradation, from possibility to 
probability, and from probability to the highest degree of moral cer-
tainty.”227  Wilson clearly did not see moral certainty as a merely 
legal construct; it applied to all of human knowledge, and when it 
reached the highest level, it produced a certainty equivalent to that of 
demonstrative proof.228  What is important here is that Wilson’s ap-
  
225. Id. at 396. 
226. Id. 
227. Id.  Wilson also stated that when a consequence follows an object, the mind 
begins to anticipate that result when the object occurs.  He continued: 
If the consequences have followed the object constantly, and the observa-
tions of this constant connexion have been sufficiently numerous; the ev-
idence, produced by this experience, amounts to a moral certainty.  If the 
connexion has been frequent, but not entirely uniform; the evidence 
amounts only to a probability; and is more or less probable, in proportion 
as the connexions have been more or less frequent.  
Id.at 389. 
228. Wilson said that concurrent testimonies could lead to a probability so strong 
that it was like demonstrative proof.  
 When, concerning a great number and variety of circumstances, there is 
an agreement in the testimony of many witnesses, without the possibility 
previous collusion between them, the evidence may, in its effect, be equal 
to that of strict demonstration.  That such concurrence could be the result 
of chance, is as one to infinite; or, to vary the expression, is a moral im-
possibility.   
Id. at 386. 




proach to matters of fact came not in response to some political 
event or from a concern that jurors too often acquitted.  Instead, his 
thinking clearly followed the path lit by the Enlightenment.  The 
same standards that applied to science applied to all matters of fact 
including those disputed at a trial.  Wilson’s views indicate that 
American legal thinking in the period when the reasonable doubt 
standard emerged was greatly influenced by Enlightenment thought 
about inductive reasoning and how and when to reach the necessary 
certainty to make decisions.   
That reasonable doubt was not something devised to salve the 
consciences of conviction-reluctant jurors but a general epistemolog-
ical standard is also indicated by its second known American articu-
lation.  In the 1790 case of Cowperthwaite v. Jones229 the Philadel-
phia branch of the Court of Common Pleas of Pennsylvania consid-
ered a motion for a new trial in a civil case.230  The presiding judge 
noted that the right of trial by jury required strong reasons to grant 
new trials so that judges did not replace jurors as the triers of facts.231  
The judge continued:  
 
A reasonable doubt, barely, that justice has not been 
done, especially in cases where the value or im-
portance of the cause is not great, appears to me to 
be too slender a ground for them.  But, whenever it 
appears with a reasonable certainty, that actual and 
manifest injustice is done, or that the jury have pro-
ceeded on an evident mistake, either in point of law, 
or fact, or contrary to strong evidence, or have gross-
ly misbehaved themselves, or given extravagant 
damages [a court should grant a new trial].232  
 
The court’s use of reasonable doubt, here, was not in a jury instruc-
tion, but was addressed to the judges themselves, and this early use 
could not have had the purpose of making convictions easier for ju-
rors fearing for their souls.  Instead, the court’s articulation was con-
  
229. 2 Dall. 55 (Pa. 1790). 
230. See generally id. 
231. Id. at 55 
232. Id. at 56. 




sistent with the Enlightenment notion that the standard had a wide 
application for determining when a matter had been well enough 
established for a particular action to be taken.233 
IX. REASONABLE DOUBT AS A NEW STANDARD 
The view that reasonable doubt emerged to make convictions 
easier sees the standard as a conceptually new one.  The Boston 
Massacre trials, however, suggest otherwise and that differing for-
mulations of jury certainty were seen as equivalent. 
Justice Trowbridge mingled an in-doubt and an if-you-are-
satisfied standard.234  At one point, he stated, “if upon a full consid-
eration of the evidence in the case, you should be in doubt, as to any 
one of the prisoners having in fact killed either of the persons that 
were slain,” you must consider whether a defendant aided and abet-
ted another’s killing.235  He stated one soldier’s killing was justifia-
  
233. The third known use of the reasonable doubt by an American court was in a 
jury instruction.  The court in the 1793 New Jersey burglary case of State v. Wil-
son, 1 N.J.L. 439 (1793), charged the jury, “It is, however, a good rule, and it is 
also a humane rule, to which every virtuous man will assent, that where reasonable 
doubts exist, the jury, particular in capital cases, should incline to acquit rather 
than condemn.”  Id. at 442.  The standard was a compassionate one to benefit the 
accused, according to the court, not one to bring convictions in a manner to ease 
jurors’ anxieties.  Cf. id.  The instructing judge went on to say, “If you entertain 
any doubts, I do not mean doubts wantonly raised, but such as arise from a delib-
erate consideration of the testimony, these doubts should be determined in favor of 
life—the prisoner should be acquitted.”  Id. at 444.  Here, there is the any doubt 
standard, but one immediately qualified so that all doubts did not apply.  See id.  
The court does not indicate that this formulation is different from a reasonable 
doubt, but instead seems to say that a doubt has to come out of the reasoning pro-
cess, that is, that it cannot be wanton and must come from “a deliberate considera-
tion.”  Id.  The court gave no hint that this was a new standard, but suggested an-
cient roots since, according to the court, all virtuous men agree with it, indicating 
that it had existed as long as virtuous men had existed.  See generally id.   
234. John Adams equated a satisfied mind with not having a doubt.  He told the 
jury about a witness whose testimony was not corroborated, “If you can be satis-
fied in your own minds, without a doubt, that [the witness] knew McCauley so 
well as to be sure, you will believe he was there.”  See John Adams, Adams’ Ar-
gument for the Defense, in ADAMS PAPERS, supra note 26, at 261. 
235. Edmund Trowbridge, Trowbridge’s and Oliver’s Charges to the Jury, in 
ADAMS  PAPERS, supra note 26, at 292.  See also id. at 290–91 (Trowbridge stated 
 




ble self-defense if the soldier’s life had been in danger and contin-
ued, “[if] you do not believe that was the case, but upon the evidence 
are satisfied” that the defendant was attacked without his life being 
in danger, then the defendant should be convicted of manslaugh-
ter.236  A few moments later, Trowbridge told the jury, “[i]f you are 
satisfied upon the evidence, that Killroy killed Gray, you will then 
enquire, whether it was justifiable, excusable, or felonious homicide 
. . . .”237  Thus, the jury was told that if “in doubt” that a defendant 
killed, consider aiding and abetting.  The jury was also told that if 
“satisfied” that a soldier did kill, then to decide whether the killing 
was justifiable or, if not, the degree of homicide.  Apparently, not 
being in doubt was the same as being satisfied about the evidence. 
These portions of the instruction did not explicitly clarify wheth-
er jurors were to use reason or be rational in assessing whether they 
were satisfied or in doubt, but elsewhere Trowbridge did instruct the 
jury to use reason.  He told jurors to reconcile testimony “if by any 
reasonable construction of the words it may be done.”238  He also 
told jurors that instead of concluding that contradictory evidence 
meant a witness had lied,  
if the thing said to be done be such as it may reason-
ably be supposed some might see and others not, by 
reason of their want of observation, or particular at-
tention to other matters there, as both may be true, 
you ought to suppose them to be so . . . .239   
Thus, according to Trowbridge, jurors were supposed to use reason 
to see if they were satisfied by the evidence and assess whether they 
were in doubt about the facts.  Trowbridge did not say that all of the-
se tasks were the same, but he certainly did not point to any distinc-
tions among them.240 
  
that the jury could give a general verdict, “but in cases of doubt, and real difficul-
ty, the Jury ought to state the facts and circumstances in a special verdict, that the 
Court upon farther consideration thereof, may determine what the law is there-
on.”). 
236. Id. at 299. 
237. Id. at 300. 
238. Id. at 294.  
239. Id. at 294–95. 
240. See id. at 282–309. 




Trowbridge was certainly not breaking new ground by suggest-
ing that jurors had to use reason to assess if they were satisfied that 
the evidence established guilt.  Jurors were also told that more than a 
generation earlier in the notorious New York slave conspiracy trials 
of 1741.241  There jurors were instructed that “if you should have 
sufficient reason in your own consciences to discredit [the prosecu-
tion witnesses], and that notwithstanding the weight of that evidence, 
you can think them, or any of them, not guilty, you will then say so 
and acquit them. . . .”242  The court then addressed the jury’s role in 
assessing a particularly important prosecution witness and stated that 
“if you give credit to her testimony, you will no doubt discharge a 
good conscience, and find them guilty; if you should have sufficient 
reason in your own minds to discredit her testimony, if you can think 
so, you must them acquit them . . . .”243  The notion that American 
jurors were to use reason in assessing evidence existed well before 
the 1770 proceedings. 
Justice Oliver, in the Massacre trials, of course, did explicitly 
talk about reasonable doubt, but he did not state or suggest that he 
was giving any standard different from Trowbridge’s instructions.  
Instead, as we have seen, Oliver several times indicated that he 
agreed with what Trowbridge had instructed.  If his use of reasona-
ble doubt had been intended to mean something different from what 
Trowbridge meant by a satisfied mind, being in doubt, and the use of 
reason, we might expect that Oliver would have said something ex-
plicit about the distinction. 
Finally, if Oliver was not just giving another formulation for an 
existing legal concept, but breaking with established principles and 
stating a new one that sought to aid convictions, we might expect to 
find contemporaries commenting on it at is emergence.244  Nothing 
in the Boston Massacre trials itself indicates that a new standard was 
being articulated, and, at least so far, no one has pointed out any ac-
count of those proceedings from that time that suggests an unprece-
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JOURNAL OF THE PROCEEDINGS 116–17 (Serena R. Zabin ed., 2004). 
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dented test was being argued and instructed.  Since these were not 
obscure, but closely watched trials, surely the absence of such com-
ment is noteworthy. 
X.   LESSONS FOR FINDING THE ORIGINAL MEANING OF AMERICAN 
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE RIGHTS 
A.  The Impossibility of Finding Definitive Original Meaning for an 
Evolved Right 
 
This exploration into the origins of the reasonable doubt standard 
was not undertaken to ascertain its original meaning, but for insights 
into searching for the original meaning of other constitutional crimi-
nal procedure rights.  Perhaps, the most important lesson is that 
when a right was not legislated, but evolved, finding its definitive 
original meaning is impossible.  The evolutionary steps of reasona-
ble doubt were not accompanied by explanations that might occur 
today when a statute is proposed and enacted.  We do not have cases 
from the standard’s first appearances delineating why it was being 
used.  Contemporaries did not write articles or books about its de-
velopment, and if they argued about it in court, we do not have those 
arguments.  
It is not just the lack of contemporary commentary, however, that 
is important.  Because the standard evolved, it had neither an indi-
vidual nor collective drafter.  Neither a person nor a specific body 
decided that the rule should exist.  We can look to no historical indi-
vidual or group who could have authoritatively stated the rule’s orig-
inal purpose, meaning, or intent.245  Professor Whitman captures an 
important point when he says about reasonable doubt that, conse-
quently, “[t]here is no original intent to interpret.  All that we can do 
  
245. See WHITMAN, supra note 27, at 210–11 (“[T]he phrase has no original 
drafter . . . . It emerged in a process of collective European rehashing of the pre-
cepts of Christian moral theology . . . . It was created not only by English jurists 
but also by English moralists—and by Italian and Spanish and French moralists 
and lawyers as well.”). 




is try to understand the rule in its original context, which is some-
thing quite different.”246   
Comprehending this context is difficult.  To do that, we have to 
shed our present day biases, but Professor Whitman maintains that 
we are unlikely to be able to do that because we have lost touch with 
the world that produced the reasonable doubt standard.247  This 
thought should produce humility for those seeking original meaning 
of criminal procedure rights.  When those who have devoted their 
impressive scholarly powers to capturing the lost world that pro-
duced the standard do not agree on the original purposes for that 
rule, surely only the hubristic among the rest of us can be positive 
about what that meaning was. 
If that is true for reasonable doubt, which has produced so much 
outstanding scholarship, it is likely true for other criminal procedure 
rights.  The Framers did not create the criminal procedure rights, but 
were instead protecting already existing rights.  If the Framers indi-
cated what they thought a particular right meant, then we might be 
able to seek the original meaning of the constitutional guarantee in 
the constitutional debates.  But, since they did not, we have to turn to 
the content of the right, as it existed in the framing era.  And since 
these were evolved rights, the difficulties apparent in finding the 
original meaning and purposes for the reasonable doubt standard 
appear for the specifically enumerated constitutional guarantees. 
Such rights had neither an individual nor collective author and did 
not have an original intent to interpret.  At most, we can seek to un-
derstand their evolution in their historical context with all the diffi-
culties that entails. 
B.  Searching Beyond Legal Texts 
The reasonable doubt scholarship indicates that we can only 
grasp reasonable doubt’s development by seeing the standard’s 
emergence in the broader context of a general eighteenth century 
epistemological search for how to determine facts from human re-
  
246. Id. at 211. 
247. See id. at 209 (“We have lost touch with that old moral world. . . . The older 
morality required judges to doubt their authority to punish, demanding that they 
regard the guilty as human beings like themselves.”). 




ports and observations.  The scholars do not agree on how the other 
disciplines affected the law, but they agree that we cannot truly un-
derstand the development of reasonable doubt merely by looking at 
judicial opinions and other legal writing.  The inquiry must be ex-
panded.  If that is true for reasonable doubt, it is also true for other 
criminal procedure rights concerned about the finding of facts from 
human actions and reports.  The search for a true understanding of 
the original meaning of such rights has to go beyond judicial opin-
ions, constitutional debates, and legal treatises into the epistemologi-
cal developments of the age. 
An example is the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee that “[i]n all 
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be 
confronted with the witnesses against him . . . .”248  Even though the 
Framers of the Constitution hardly discussed this provision,249 Craw-
ford v. Washington250 asserted that the Confrontation Clause “is 
most naturally read as a reference to the right of confrontation at 
common law, admitting only those exceptions established at the time 
of the founding.”251  As a result the Court searched for the Confron-
tation Clause’s content by examining the law as it existed at the time 
of the framing of the Bill of Rights, and the opinion lengthily dis-
cusses English cases, and a few American cases, from that era and 
before as well as various dictionary definitions.252  
Confrontation is concerned with the determination of facts at tri-
al.  The reasonable doubt scholarship indicates that the legal system 
was not standing alone in seeking how to make factual determina-
tions, but that the law was part of a broader epistemological move-
ment including philosophy, science, and religion that all influenced 
  
248. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
249. See Randolph N. Jonakait, The Origins of the Confrontation Clause: An Al-
ternative History, 27 RUTGERS L.J. 77, 77 (1995) (“The origins of the Confronta-
tion Clause are murky.  Early American documents almost never mention the 
right, and the traditional sources for divining the Framers’ intent yield almost no 
information about the Clause.”). 
250. 541 U.S. 36 (2004). 
251. Id. at 54; see also id. at 43 (“The founding generation’s immediate source of 
the [confrontation] concept . . . was the common law.”). 
252. See generally Randolph N. Jonakait, “Witnesses” in the Confrontation 
Clause: Crawford v. Washington, Noah Webster, and Compulsory Process, 79 
TEMP. L. REV. 155 (2006), for Crawford’s use of dictionary definitions. 




each other.  Other disciplines besides law were concerned with 
“hearsay” and “testimony” and who were proper witnesses and what 
evidence was reliable enough to form the basis for decisions.253  The 
scholarship about reasonable doubt’s development teaches that this 
general Enlightenment thinking needs to be studied for any true 
search into the original meaning and purposes of the Confrontation 
Clause and other criminal procedure rights concerned with finding 
facts.   
C.  American Original Meaning and English Sources 
The reasonable doubt scholarship also illustrates that we should 
not draw definitive conclusions about the original meaning of Amer-
ican criminal procedure rights from English sources.254  As we have 
seen, the available information indicates that the reasonable doubt 
standard emerged in America before England and that America did 
not simply adopt or inherit a standard that was first developed in 
England. 
Reasonable doubt is just another possibility illustrating that at 
least some American rights developed earlier and perhaps in differ-
ent forms from similar English procedures.  The prime example is 
the right to counsel, which was not granted in England in the eight-
eenth century, but was in America,255 to the applause of American 
legal thinkers.256 
  
253. Barbara Shapiro’s study of the development of “facts” in diverse disciplines 
including history, science, and religion in early England finds that “suspicion of 
secondhand or hearsay reports were characteristic of all the discourses of fact.”  
SHAPIRO, supra note 39, at 161.  See also id. at 211 (“All the fact-oriented disci-
plines exhibited a preference for personal observation and a belief that the testi-
mony of credible witnesses under optimum conditions could yield believable, even 
morally certain ‘facts.’  It favored first-person accounts that made vivid the ‘facts’ 
described.”). 
254. Cf. Mark deWolfe Howe, Juries as Judges of Criminal Law, 52 HARV. L. 
REV. 582, 583 (1939) (“[T]he historian cannot assume an explanation of American 
doctrine to be accurate simply because it is a precise and true statement of English 
theory.”). 
255. See Randolph N. Jonakait, The Rise of the American Adversary System: 
America Before England, 14 WIDENER L. REV. 323, 327 (2009) (“England did not 
permit full representation by defense attorneys until the middle decades of the 
nineteenth century. In contrast, early America not only did not restrict the role of 
 




The differences in American rights and procedures went beyond 
the right to counsel and knowledge of the American distinctiveness 
was not confined to the legal elite.  For example, the New York City 
newspaper The Royal Gazette257 published an article on October 22, 
1783, which was datelined London, August 5, and indicated it was 
reprinting an article from the Old Bailey Intelligencer.  The recycled 
English article praised a procedure in the new country.258  
 
The Americans, in adjusting their code of criminal 
law, have adopted one general rule of proceeding, 
which does honour to their humanity as well as their 
justice, which is, establishing by law the rule that no 
man shall be tried for a crime, unless he has notice 
served on him seven days previous to his trial of the 
nature of the indictment, together with the names and 
places of abode of the several witness produced to 
prove the fact.259   
  
defense attorneys, it guaranteed the right of counsel. It did this not only in the 
Sixth Amendment to the federal constitution, but also earlier in the state constitu-
tions after Independence -and even before the Revolution, in a number of the col-
onies.”).  
256. For example, Zephaniah Swift in his 1796 treatise about Connecticut law 
stated that the English law had been rejected in Connecticut.   
We have never admitted that cruel and illiberal principle of the common 
law of England, that when a man is on trial for his life, he shall be refused 
counsel, and denied those means of defence, which are allowed, when the 
most trifling pittance of property is in question.  The flimsy pretence, that 
the court are to be counsel for the prisoner will only heighten our indigna-
tion at the practice: for it is apparent to the least consideration, that a 
court can never furnish a person accused of the crime with the advice, and 
assistance necessary to make his defence.  
ZEPHANIAH SWIFT, A SYSTEM OF THE LAW OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT 398–
99 (1796).  See also WILSON, supra note 86, at 702 (noting that both the United 
States and Pennsylvania granted a full right of counsel while England did not and 
stating, “This practice in England is admitted to be a hard one, and not to be very 
consonant to the rest of the humane treatment of prisoners by the English law.”).  
257. This newspaper was published by James Rivington and was preceded by 
Rivington’s New-York Gazette and Rivington’s New-York Loyal Gazette.  See 
THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF NEW YORK CITY 811 (Jackson, Kenneth T. ed. 1995). 
258. The Royal Gazette, Oct. 22, 1783. 
259. Id. 





Obviously this framing-era writer believed that American proce-
dures and rights were not simply the same as those in England and 
that Americans at least sometimes had greater, desirable protections. 
Americans reading this article no doubt saw the same.  When a few 
years later Americans were adopting constitutional rights, surely 
they were not just incorporating narrower, less protective English 
rights than Americans already had. 
The original meaning of American rights cannot be assumed to 
be found solely in English sources when American rights developed 
in advance or independently from those in England, but this conclu-
sion only highlights the difficulty in finding the original American 
rights.  Our knowledge of what happened in eighteenth century 
American courts is so scant that it is often impossible to truly find 
that original American meaning.   
The reasonable doubt scholarship provides an important caution-
ary lesson.  Reasonable doubt is one of the rare times when we have 
a relevant and detailed early American source.  The Boston Massa-
cre trials, and their context, teach that conclusions about the stand-
ard’s development that might appear valid when only English 
sources are examined seem dubious when viewed in the American 
light.  Most often, however, we do not have good sources about early 
American criminal procedure.  That should not mean that by default 
that we rely on English sources to find the original American mean-
ing and purposes of American rights.  Instead, the lack of infor-
mation should make us humble.  Without that information, we can-
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“Common sense is not so common.” 
-Voltaire1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The question of whether an invention is an obvious variation of 
existing technology is one that has troubled courts for decades.  
From its roots in nineteenth century case law to the recent Supreme 
Court decision KSR v. Teleflex, Inc.,2 the doctrine of obviousness has 
waxed and waned—moving through a variety of judicially-created 
tests to a current state that is still far from perspicuous.  
This paper will examine obviousness through a particular lens: 
the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO,” “PTO”) tool 
known as “official notice”—the practice of declaring a patent appli-
cation’s claims unpatentable as obvious based on undocumented 
reasoning, such as the common sense or common knowledge of a 
person having ordinary skill in the art to which the application per-
tains.3  After KSR, using unsubstantiated common sense-based ra-
tionales for rejecting patent claims is considered a completely valid 
practice.4  However, a line of obviousness cases, including one from 
the United States Supreme Court, stands for the polar opposite posi-
tion—that declaring a patent invalid as obvious without underlying 
prior art support does not comport with the standards of the Admin-
istrative Procedure Act.5  Unfortunately, this contradiction leaves 
patent practitioners and the federal district courts to reconcile dia-
metrically opposed holdings, especially when a case involves official 
notice.   
Part II of this paper will give a brief history of general obvious-
ness jurisprudence up to the Supreme Court’s KSR decision in 2007.  
Next, Part III will introduce the reader to the obviousness inquiry 
through the eyes of a USPTO examiner by presenting a hypothetical 
  
 1. VOLTAIRE, DICTIONNAIRE PHILOSOPHIQUE (1764). 
2.  550 U.S 398 (2007). 
3.  See MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 2144.03 (8th ed. Rev. 8, 
July 2010) [hereinafter MPEP]. 
4.  See, e.g., KSR, 550 U.S. at 421. 
5.  Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150 (1999). 
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patent application scenario and defining various terms of art.  Part IV 
will introduce the concept of formal official notice at the USPTO, 
including an examination of the official agency guidelines for the 
practice, and will present a judicial history of official notice.  Part V 
will return to KSR, presenting more recent Federal Circuit obvious-
ness cases and introducing the problems that the current jurispru-
dence brings about.  Finally, Part VI will conclude with potential 
solutions to the issue, arguing that the judiciary should hold the 
USPTO to task in providing evidence that an invention is in fact ob-
vious.  
II. A BRIEF HISTORY OF OBVIOUSNESS JURISPRUDENCE: TOWARD A 
FLEXIBLE APPROACH TO THE § 103 INQUIRY 
In 1952, Congress passed the Patent Act, which specifies many 
requirements that an applicant must fulfill to obtain a patent—best 
mode, patentable subject matter, written description, enablement, 
and novelty, to name a few.6  However, the most frequently litigated 
section of the Patent Act mandates that, to obtain a United States 
patent, one must present an invention that is nonobvious.7  Specifi-
cally, the statute mandates that: 
A patent may not be obtained . . . if the differences between 
the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art are 
such that the subject matter as a whole would have been ob-
vious at the time the invention was made to a person having 
ordinary skill in the art . . . .8   
Interestingly, though the nonobviousness requirement of § 103 is 
currently mandated by statute, before 1952, the nonobviousness re-
quirement was developed and enforced by the federal courts.9  In 
1850, the Supreme Court decided Hotchkiss v. Greenwood,10 holding 
that some form of inventive ingenuity greater than that held by 
  
 6. See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. §§ 101–103 (2010). 
 7. Id. § 103(a) (2010). 
 8. Id. 
 9. See id. 
 10. 52 U.S. 248 (1850). 
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someone familiar with the art is needed for patentability.11  Hotch-
kiss involved a rather simple technological improvement: the substi-
tution of clay or porcelain for wood or metal in a doorknob.12  The 
Court held that such an improvement was “the work of the skilful 
mechanic, not that of the inventor,” and held that the patent at issue 
was invalid.13  Notably, although Hotchkiss did not specifically re-
cite the word “nonobviousness,” it did emphasize the idea of the or-
dinary knowledge of one of skill in the art when attempting to define 
“invention.”14 
A. Graham v. Deere and the TSM Test: Defining the Obviousness 
Standard 
Over a decade after Congress’s codification of the nonobvious-
ness requirement, the Supreme Court again took on the nonobvious-
ness principle in Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas City15 in an 
effort to define a discernable judicial and administrative standard for 
§ 103’s application.16  Graham involved the validity of an issued 
patent drawn to a field plow improvement, which the Court ultimate-
ly deemed obvious in view of the prior art.17  More important than 
the ultimate invalidity determination, however, was the obviousness 
test the Court formulated.  The Graham standard, which is used to 
this day both in the federal courts and at the USPTO included three 
technical factors, commonly referred to as the “primary Graham 
factors”:  
Under section 103, [1] the scope and content of the prior art 
are to be determined; [2] differences between the prior art 
and the claims at issue are to be ascertained; and [3] the level 
  
 11. Id. at 267 (“[U]nless more ingenuity and skill . . . were required . . . than 
were possessed by an ordinary mechanic acquainted with the business, there was 
an absence of that degree of skill and ingenuity which constitute essential elements 
of every invention.”). 
 12. Id. at 249.    
 13. Id. at 267. 
 14. See id. at 266 (“The difference is formal, and destitute of ingenuity or inven-
tion.”). 
 15. 383 U.S. 1 (1966). 
16.  Id. at 18. 
 17. Id. at 21, 37. 
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of ordinary skill in the pertinent art resolved.  Against this 
background, the obviousness or nonobviousness of the sub-
ject matter is determined.18  
After Graham, the USPTO, district courts, and the Federal Cir-
cuit were left to apply the Graham test in a coherent manner.  Unfor-
tunately, at the outset, consistent application of the test was rather 
difficult.19  In an effort to cure this challenge during the second half 
of the twentieth century, the Federal Circuit layered a test over the 
Graham standard: the “teaching, suggestion, or motivation test”—
often referred to as the “TSM test.”20  Under the TSM test, “[t]he 
party seeking patent invalidity based on obviousness must . . . show 
some motivation or suggestion to combine . . . prior art teachings.”21 
The TSM test was not, in theory, limited to explicit teachings—
courts could also employ more nebulous “implicit” nods to a teach-
ing, suggestion, or motivation in the prior art.22  Before 2007, the 
Federal Circuit had identified two such implicit sources to satisfy the 
TSM test: the particular nature of the problem the patent-at-issue 
was attempting to remedy and the general knowledge of a person 
having ordinary skill in the art (“PHOSITA”).23   
  
 18. Id. at 17. 
 19. See Graham, 383 U.S. at 18 (“This is not to say, however, that there will not 
be difficulties in applying the nonobviousness test. . . . The difficulties, however, 
are comparable to those encountered daily by the courts in such frames of refer-
ence as negligence and scienter, and should be amenable to a case-by-case devel-
opment.”). 
 20. See, e.g., KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 407 (2007). 
 21. Al-Site Corp. v. VSI Int’l, Inc., 174 F.3d 1308, 1323–24 (Fed. Cir. 1999).  
One of the newly-created Federal Circuit’s first and clearest pronouncements of 
the existence of the TSM test was its decision in ACS Hospital Sys., Inc. v. Mon-
tefiore Hospital, 732 F.2d 1572, 1577 (Fed. Cir. 1984), in which the court held 
that “[u]nder section 103, teachings of references can be combined only if there is 
some suggestion or incentive to do so.” (emphasis added).  
 22. In re Sernaker, 702 F.2d 989, 994 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (reviewing the prior art to 
determine if “all or any of the references would have suggested (expressly or by 
implication) the possibility of achieving further improvement by combining such 
teachings along the line of the invention in suit . . . .”) (emphasis added). 
 23. See In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 987–88 (Fed. Cir. 2006); In re Rouffet, 149 
F.3d 1350, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 1998); Pro-Mold & Tool Co. v. Great Lakes Plastics, 
75 F.3d 1568, 1574 (Fed. Cir. 1996). 
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This “implicit reasoning” is not to say that courts or examiners 
were permitted to manufacture a motivation—the reasoning must 
have been clearly articulated and the basis for such an implication 
must have had a concrete and identifiable foundation.24  Therefore, 
even though a court or examiner could rely on an implicit TSM test 
justification, the implication must have ultimately traced back to an 
explicitly articulated theory or underpinning in the body of prior art 
available to a PHOSITA.25  As a consequence, an explicit prior art 
articulation ultimately arose from a correct employment of the im-
plicit TSM doctrine, and one can argue that, at the end of the day, 
drawing a line between implicit and explicit TSM reasoning was 
extremely difficult if not impossible.  In effect, therefore, the strong-
est showing of a teaching, suggestion, or motivation to combine pri-
or art references under § 103 lay in an explicit prior art pronounce-
ment, while an implicit reasoning tended to raise the judicial brow if 
not clearly supported by its own explicit backing in some form of 
prior art.26 
B. KSR v. Teleflex, Inc.: The Supreme Court Validates “Common 
Sense” as a Premise for Obviousness Rejections 
In 2007, the Supreme Court handed down its decision in KSR In-
ternational Co. v. Teleflex Inc.27—a decision that undoubtedly made 
an initial determination of obviousness easier to justify.  KSR in-
volved the validity of a patent issued to Steven J. Engelgau and ex-
clusively licensed to Teleflex that claimed an electronic device at-
tached to an adjustable car pedal that controlled the vehicle’s throttle 
through the on-board computer.28  The prior art of relevance in KSR 
included: (1) an adjustable pedal patent issued to Asano, wherein 
one pivot point or the pedal remained fixed; (2) a sensor patent is-
sued to Smith, which placed a sensor on a pedal assembly to prevent 
  
 24. See, e.g., In re Kahn, 441 F.3d at 988. 
 25. See id.  
 26. See In re Kahn, 441 F.3d at 988; In re Oetiker, 977 F.2d 1443, 1447 (Fed. 
Cir. 1992) (“There must be some reason, suggestion, or motivation found in the 
prior art whereby a person of ordinary skill in the field of invention would make 
the combination.”) (emphasis added); infra note 50 and accompanying text. 
 27. 550 U.S. 398 (2007). 
 28. Id. at 405–06. 
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wire wear; and (3) an adjustable pedal patent issued to Rixon, which 
claimed the placement of an electronic sensor in the pedal footpad.29  
The trial court found the Engelgau patent obvious at summary 
judgment.30  Applying the primary Graham factors, the court found 
“little difference” between the prior art and the Engelgau patent-at-
issue, holding that the Asano prior art patent taught almost every-
thing claimed in the Engelgau patent, and the remaining claim fea-
tures were revealed in other prior art.31  Applying the mandated TSM 
test, the court found a motivation to combine the prior art references 
because:  
(1) [T]he state of the industry would lead inevitably to com-
binations of electronic sensors and adjustable pedals, (2) 
Rixon provided the basis for these developments, and (3) 
Smith taught a solution to the wire chafing problems in Rix-
on, namely, locating the sensor on the fixed structure of the 
pedal.32   
Teleflex appealed the trial court ruling, and the Federal Circuit 
reversed, reasoning that the district court had not been strict enough 
in its application of the TSM test.33  The Federal Circuit held that 
looking to any conceivable motivation to combine prior art refer-
ences was not enough to satisfy the TSM test.34  Instead, the court 
stated that the prior art must address the “precise problem that the 
patentee was trying to solve,” because otherwise “the problem would 
not motivate an inventor to look at those references.”35 
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to both expound on the va-
lidity of the TSM test and, if it was to survive, to formulate its cor-
rect application in the future.36  First, in reversing the Federal Cir-
cuit, the Court flatly rejected the court’s rigid approach to the TSM 
test and stated that, when applied in a flexible manner, the TSM test 
  
 29. Id. at 408–09. 
 30. Id. at 412. 
 31. Id. at 413. 
 32. Id. 
 33. KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 413 (Fed. Cir. 2007).  
 34. Id. at 413–14. 
 35. Id. at 414 (citing, in first quotation, Teleflex, Inc. v. KSR Int’l Co., 119 F. 
App’x 282, 288 (Fed. Cir. 2005)).  
 36. See id. at 407. 
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is valid and consistent with the Court’s precedent.37  Expounding on 
the test’s correct application going forward, the Court stated that 
“[t]he obviousness analysis cannot be confined by a formalistic con-
ception of the words teaching, suggestion, and motivation, or by 
overemphasis on the importance of published articles and the explic-
it content of issued patents.”38  Rather, the Court held, “[r]igid pre-
ventative rules that deny factfinders recourse to common sense . . . 
are neither necessary under our case law nor consistent with it.”39 
This pronouncement would seem to depart from a tradition in the 
decades leading up to the KSR decision wherein a teaching, sugges-
tion, or motivation was most often considered grounded when sup-
ported by a direct and explicit mention in a published document.40  
Instead, by declaring such a judicial demand for support in publica-
tions or issued patents unwarranted—and declaring “common sense” 
a viable source of a motivation to combine prior art references—the 
Court opened the door for a tidal wave of new common sense-based 
motivation to combine arguments for those seeking to invalidate a 
patent as a defense in an infringement suit. 
Finally, the Court declared: 
When there is a design need or market pressure to solve a 
problem and there are a finite number of identified, predicta-
ble solutions, a person of ordinary skill has good reason to 
pursue the known options within his or her technical grasp.  
If this leads to the anticipated success, it is likely the product 
not of innovation but of ordinary skill and common sense.41 
  
 37. See id. at 415 (“Throughout this Court’s engagement with the question of 
obviousness, our cases have set forth an expansive and flexible approach incon-
sistent with the way the Court of Appeals applied its TSM test here.”). 
 38. Id. at 419 (emphasis added). 
 39. KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 421 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (emphasis 
added).  Additionally, the Court addressed the issue of “common sense” of the 
PHOSITA when it stated that “[c]ommon sense teaches . . . that familiar items 
may have obvious uses beyond their primary purposes, and in many cases a person 
of ordinary skill will be able to fit the teachings of multiple patents together like 
pieces of a puzzle.” Id. at 420. 
 40. See supra Part II.A. 
 41. KSR, 550 U.S. at 421 (emphasis added).   
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Ultimately, applying the correct analysis to the case’s facts, the 
Court stated that “[t]he proper question to have asked was whether a 
pedal designer of ordinary skill, facing the wide range of needs cre-
ated by developments in the field of endeavor, would have seen a 
benefit to upgrading Asano with a sensor.”42  The Court concluded 
that a PHOSITA would have seen this benefit,43 and remanded the 
case.44  Thus, the upshot of the Court’s KSR opinion was that “com-
mon sense” of a PHOSITA could serve as a valid foundation for an 
obviousness rejection by an examiner or satisfaction of the TSM test 
by a court.45   
III. TEACHING, SUGGESTION, OR MOTIVATION ON THE GROUND: A 
HYPOTHETICAL  
As discussed above, to prove obviousness in the pre-KSR world, 
an examiner or patent validity challenger needed to come forward 
with some teaching, suggestion, or motivation to combine references 
under the TSM test, which was most often found explicitly in the 
prior art.46  A USPTO practice known as official notice, which al-
lowed an examiner to reject a claim as obvious without providing 
such a teaching, suggestion, or motivation, seemed to fly in the face 
of this notion.47  Before moving on to a discussion of the USPTO’s 
seemingly violative official notice policy, however, it will be im-
portant to understand what the obviousness inquiry looks like in the 
trenches—as most often undertaken by a patent examiner at the 
USPTO.48   
  
 42. Id. at 424. 
 43. Id. at 425 (“The prior art discussed above leads us to the conclusion that 
attaching the sensor where both KSR and Engelgau put it would have been obvi-
ous to a person of ordinary skill.”). 
 44. Id. at 428. 
 45. See, e.g., id. at 421. 
 46. See Federal Trade Commission, To Promote Innovation: The Proper Balance 
of Competition and Patent Law and Policy, ch. 4 at 12 (quoting Professor John 
Duffy as stating that the feel of the case law is that the courts only recognize 
teachings from the prior art). 
47.  See MPEP § 2144.03. 
 48. Of course, this is the same inquiry undertaken by federal district courts, the 
BPAI, and the Federal Circuit.  However, because the vast majority of patent ap-
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Let us consider a hypothetical patent application, which discloses 
two features, A and B.  The patent examiner to which the application 
is assigned then reads the application and begins a search for prior 
art that teaches A and B.  The easy case for the patent examiner, of 
course, is when he or she discovers a piece of prior art that teaches 
both A and B, which renders the claims unpatentable as anticipated 
under 35 U.S.C. § 102.49  The more difficult and more frequent case, 
however, occurs when a first reference teaches A and a second refer-
ence teaches B.50  To properly reject the patent application’s claims, 
however, the examiner is not permitted to simply cite the first and 
second references and declare the claims unpatentable.  Instead, the 
examiner must go one step further—providing a reason, most often 
stated in the prior art, why the PHOSITA would have been motivat-
ed to look to and combine the first and second references to arrive at 
the invention claimed in the application.  In essence, this stated mo-
tivation provides the “glue” for a proper § 103 obviousness rejec-
tion—affixing feature A and B together in such a way that satisfies 
the TSM test.  In practice, this “glue” comes directly from the lan-
guage of the first or the second reference, but it may also be taken 
from an independent third source. 
To make the process a bit clearer, let us imagine another hypo-
thetical patent application, filed by an inventor, Ingred.  Inventor 
Ingred’s patent application teaches a polysilicon gate terminal for a 
transistor with a gate terminal length of forty-five nanometers.  In-
gred’s application is assigned to Examiner Evan.  Evan reads In-
gred’s patent application and begins a prior art search.  During the 
search, Evan finds two relevant prior art patents, a patent to Anna 
and a patent to Brian.  Anna’s patent teaches a polysilicon gate ter-
minal for any transistor.  Brian’s patent teaches a metal gate terminal 
with a length of forty-five nanometers and states that decreasing the 
gate terminal length from previously longer gate lengths in transis-
  
plications are not litigated, the most relevant inquiry for the typical patentee is that 
of the patent examiner. 
 49. See 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2010). 
 50. See Gregory N. Mandel, Patently Non-Obvious: Empirical Demonstration 
that the Hindsight Bias Renders Patent Decisions Irrational, 67 OHIO ST. L.J. 
1391, 1398 (2006). 
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tors increases computer processor speed and decreases overall physi-
cal processor size.  Here, Evan can properly reject Ingred’s claims as 
obvious because Anna teaches a polysilicon gate terminal and Brian 
teaches a gate terminal length of forty-five nanometers.  Further-
more, Brian teaches a motivation to combine the references: decreas-
ing the gate terminal length of a transistor increases the processor 
speed and decreases overall physical processor size.  Therefore, in 
this instance there exists an explicitly stated motivation that a 
PHOSITA could look to, and Examiner Evan could cite, in order to 
combine the prior art references. 
However, let us assume arguendo that the Brian patent, or any 
other prior art for that matter, does not explicitly teach that decreas-
ing the gate terminal length increases processor speed or decreases 
overall physical processor size.  Instead, let us assume that a com-
puter processor designer with ordinary skill at the time Ingred ap-
plied for her patent would have known that processor speed increas-
es with a decreasing gate length.  Let us further assume that this 
knowledge is based solely on a decade-old trend of shrinking transis-
tor gate lengths in the processor design field, but that the positive 
effects of the shrinking had not been explicitly documented or scien-
tifically explained in the prior art.  Rather, the ordinary processor 
designer at the time considered it common sense that shrinking pro-
cessor gate lengths led to a better-performing processor.  If Evan 
rejects Ingred’s claims based on the combination of Anna and Bri-
an’s patents, the motivation to combine would not be based on any 
readily-available and citable proposition in a piece of prior art.  Ra-
ther, the glue holding the pieces of prior art together for purposes of 
the § 103 rejection would consist of the “common sense” of the 
PHOSITA.  After KSR, such a motivation would justify an obvious-
ness rejection, so long as Evan clearly laid out his reasoning for us-
ing common sense as the glue.51   
Of course, the KSR Court upheld this practice of rejecting claims 
when common sense or common knowledge of the PHOSITA served 
as the examiner’s cited motivation to combine.  This practice is not 
as new as KSR may have made it seem, however.  In fact, the 
  
 51. See, e.g., Perfect Web Techs., Inc. v. InfoUSA, Inc., 587 F.3d 1324, 1329 
(Fed. Cir. 2009). 
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USPTO examining corps has a long history of rejecting claims under 
§ 103 based on a motivation to combine or a claim element that does 
not have an explicit footing in prior art.  It is known as the examiner 
taking “official notice.”52 
At the outset, it is important to understand that official notice 
may take two forms in an obviousness rejection.  First, an examiner 
may take official notice that the PHOSITA would have been moti-
vated to combine two prior art references based on a subjective rea-
soning articulated by the examiner.  This, of course, was the case 
with Examiner Evan’s official notice in the hypothetical above.  This 
article will refer to these instances of official notice, taken to provide 
a motivation to combine prior art, as “motivational official notice.” 
Second, the examiner may take official notice that one of an ap-
plicant’s claim elements is well known in the art.  For example, in 
the hypothetical above, if Examiner Evan could not locate a prior art 
reference that taught a polysilicon transistor gate, he might take offi-
cial notice that polysilicon is often used as the transistor gate con-
ductor.  For purposes of this article, this type of official notice will 
be called “referential official notice.”  
Last, it is important to understand that the difference between a 
formal examiner invocation of official notice—be it motivational or 
referential—and an implicit finding of fact by an examiner or court 
based on common sense or common knowledge of the PHOSITA is 
truly negligible.  Explaining the difference is an exercise of seman-
tics: if an examiner chooses to formally take official notice, he or she 
places the words “official notice” in an office action; if he or she 
does not, but does not support his or her finding of fact on an explicit 
prior art teaching, the result is the same.  For clarity, however, this 
article will call the latter case “quasi-official notice”—a wonderful 
example of which can be found in the facts of KSR, presented above. 
  
 52. See MPEP § 2144.03. 
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IV. OFFICIAL NOTICE 
A. MPEP Official Notice Policy 
Official notice was developed in an effort to further several prac-
tical goals of the USPTO—decreasing patent pendency and the pa-
tent backlog, and increasing agency efficiency and flexibility of ex-
aminers’ analyses.53  The USPTO’s current policy on official notice 
is found in the Manual of Patent Examining Procedure (“MPEP”), 
which serves as the prudential guide for USPTO examiners when 
examining patent applications.54  In the MPEP, the USPTO conspic-
uously treats official notice, stating that “[i]n certain circumstances 
where appropriate, an examiner may take official notice of facts not 
in the record or rely on ‘common knowledge’ in making a rejection, 
however such rejections should be judiciously applied.”55   
The MPEP goes on to define both the substantive and procedural 
requirements of proper official notice practice.56  First, the MPEP 
explains the proper procedure for patent prosecution when the exam-
iner takes official notice in an obviousness rejection.  If an examiner 
does so, “[t]o adequately traverse such a finding, an applicant must 
specifically point out the supposed errors in the examiner’s action, 
which would include stating why the noticed fact is not considered 
to be common knowledge or well-known in the art.”57  If the appli-
cant traverses the examiner’s claim of official notice, the ball is in 
the examiner’s court to “provide documentary evidence in the next 
Office action if the rejection is to be maintained.”58  However, if the 
applicant fails to traverse the examiner’s use of official notice “the 
examiner should clearly indicate in the next Office action that the 
common knowledge or well-known in the art statement is taken to be 
  
 53. See, e.g., Lance Leonard Barry, Did You Ever Notice?  Official Notice in 
Rejections, 81 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 129, 130–32 (Feb. 1999).; John 
S. Goetz, An “Obvious” Misunderstanding: Zurko, Lee and the Death of Official 
Notice (Part I), 86 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 150, 154 (Feb. 2004). 
 54. MPEP § 2144.03. 
 55. Id. 
 56. See id. 
 57. Id.; see also 37 C.F.R. § 1.111(b) (2011). 
 58. MPEP § 2144.03; see also 37 C.F.R. § 1.104(c)(2) (2011). 
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admitted prior art because applicant . . . failed to traverse the exam-
iner’s assertion of official notice . . . .”59 
Next, as to substance, the MPEP states: 
It would not be appropriate for the examiner to take official 
notice of facts without citing a prior art reference where the 
facts asserted to be well known are not capable of instant and 
unquestionable demonstration as being well-known.  For ex-
ample, assertions of technical facts in the areas of esoteric 
technology or specific knowledge of the prior art must al-
ways be supported by citation to some reference work recog-
nized as standard in the pertinent art. . . .  
It is never appropriate to rely solely on “common 
knowledge” in the art without evidentiary support in the rec-
ord . . . [and] an assessment of basic knowledge and common 
sense that is not based on any evidence in the record lacks 
substantial evidence support.60  
Furthermore, in its “summary” of proper official notice practice, 
the MPEP states that “any facts so noticed should be of notorious 
character and serve only to ‘fill in the gaps’ in an insubstantial man-
ner which might exist in the evidentiary showing made by the exam-
iner to support a particular ground for rejection.”61  Therefore, if an 
examiner takes official notice as to common sense or common 
knowledge of the PHOSITA, there must exist some form of explicit 
proof in the prior art to support the examiner’s assertion of fact.62 
However, the MPEP also discusses the situation where official 
notice is taken and it is unsupported by documentary evidence of any 
kind.  The MPEP mandates that, “[i]f such notice is taken, the basis 
for such reasoning must be set forth explicitly,” and, further, that 
“[t]he examiner must provide specific factual findings predicated on 
sound technical and scientific reasoning to support his or her conclu-
sion of common knowledge.”63  But this apparent examiner mandate 
  
 59. MPEP § 2144.03. 
 60. Id. (second emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
 61. Id. 
 62. See id. 
 63. Id. 
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to utilize unsupported iterations of official notice is undermined by 
the MPEP’s admission that such practice is only founded upon “cer-
tain older cases.”64  Indeed, the most recent court decision that the 
MPEP cites to support this practice is In re Soli,65 which was decid-
ed by the U.S. Court of Customs and Patent Appeals (“CCPA”) 
nearly twenty years before the creation of the Federal Circuit.66  
Therefore, although the MPEP leaves the window open slightly for 
unsupported assertions of official notice, the modern validity of this 
practice is greatly diminished by the lack of recent case law condon-
ing it and the requirement that the examiner set out his or her reason-
ing with specific findings of fact, which ultimately may require the 
examiner to resort to a prior art citation.   
B. Judicial Development of Official Notice 
The current USPTO policy on official notice embodied in the 
MPEP is the result of a rich history of specific Federal Circuit case 
law on the subject that has been intermingled with and borrowed 
from general obviousness cases such as Graham and KSR.  As ex-
plained in Part III, the difference between quasi-official notice—as 
seen in KSR—and formal or explicit official notice is truly negligi-
ble; the difference being purely a matter of whether the words “offi-
cial notice” appear in the prosecution history of a particular patent.  
It is natural, therefore, that the body of official notice case law paral-
lels § 103 jurisprudence in that it has been rather inconsistent over 
the past half century—at times hinting at a policy favoring judicial 
deference to unsupported examiner official notice decisions, and at 
other times demanding that the official notice be based on an under-
lying prior art teaching in the record. 
Like the doctrine of obviousness itself, official notice finds its 
roots in case law.  In 1961, the CCPA decided In re Knapp-Monarch 
Co.,67 a trademark case that stated that “[j]udicial notice permits 
  
 64. Id. 
 65. 317 F.2d 941 (C.C.P.A. 1963). 
 66. MPEP § 2144.03.  The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit was created 
by the Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25 
(1982). 
 67. 296 F.2d 230 (C.C.P.A. 1961). 
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proof by evidence to be dispensed with where common knowledge 
supports the truth of a proposition.”68  Furthermore, the Knapp court 
explained that 
Judicial notice also may be taken of facts ‘though they are 
neither actually notorious nor bound to be judicially known, 
yet they would be capable of such instant and unquestionable 
demonstration, if desired, that no party would think of im-
posing a falsity on the tribunal in the face of an intelligent 
adversary.’69 
In 1969, the CCPA expanded its jurisprudence on “judicial no-
tice”—which, in USPTO terms, is essentially an antiquated synonym 
for official notice—to the patent realm in In re Bozek.70  In Bozek, 
the CCPA upheld an examiner’s rejection, which was based on im-
plicit reasoning from a cited prior art patent that did not “specifically 
suggest[] the combination” of prior art.71  The court went further, 
stating that an examiner can rely “on a conclusion of obviousness 
‘from common knowledge and common sense of the person of ordi-
nary skill in the art without any specific hint or suggestion in a par-
ticular reference.’”72  Therefore, at the outset, the CCPA did not 
require that an examiner or the Board of Patent Appeals and Inter-
ferences (“BPAI”) base their use of official notice on a citable prior 
art proposition.  
However, a year later in 1920, the court retreated from its Bozek 
position in a seminal official notice case, In re Ahlert.73  After citing 
a patent to Ronay and referring to a patent to Van Swaal, the BPAI 
affirmed the examiner’s obviousness rejection, and “took judicial 
notice of the fact that it is common practice to postheat a weld after 
the welding operation is completed and held that to apply the heat to 
heat treat a weld does not distinguish patentably over Ronay, who 
  
 68. Id. at 232 (citing WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE Vol. IX, § 2565 (3d ed. 1940)). 
 69. Id. (emphasis added). 
 70. 416 F.2d 1385 (C.C.P.A. 1969). 
71.  Id. at 1390. 
 72. Id. (emphasis added). 
 73. 424 F.2d 1088 (C.C.P.A. 1970); see MPEP § 2144.03. 
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applies heat to weld the parts together or Van Swaal, who shows 
applying heat to a rail to heat treat the rail.”74   
In upholding the BPAI’s rejection and use of judicial notice, the 
CCPA in Ahlert laid out foundational principles of judicial notice in 
patent cases.75 Echoing Knapp, the court stated that the facts assert-
ed by official notice must be instantly available and unquestionable 
in validity.76  Further, the court cautioned that its rule on judicial 
notice “is not, however, as broad as it first might appear, and [the 
CCPA] will always construe it narrowly and will regard facts found 
in such manner with an eye toward narrowing the scope of any con-
clusions to be drawn therefrom.”77  Most importantly, the court held 
that a court or examiner must ultimately cite to a prior art document 
that sets out the facts underlying the use of official notice.78  
Over the next thirty years, the Federal Circuit routinely required 
that reasoning underlying an examiner’s invocation of official notice 
should be clearly articulated and founded on some objective teach-
ing, but also departed from Ahlert in some cases—leaving the door 
open for more subjective official notice formulations.79  Specifically, 
this line of cases reinforced the notion that a motivation to combine 
references could be “implicit,” or inferred from (1) knowledge of 
those skilled in the art or (2) from the nature of the problem to be 
solved80—both of which ultimately amount to official notice if used 
without a citation.  For example, in a 1992 decision, the Federal Cir-
cuit stated that an examiner may properly establish a motivation to 
combine prior art references “only by showing some objective teach-
ing in the prior art or that knowledge generally available to one of 
ordinary skill in the art would lead that individual to combine the 
relevant teachings of the references.”81  Indeed, as one commenter 
  
 74. In re Ahlert, 424 F.2d at 1090 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 75. Id. at 1091–92. 
 76. Id. at 1091. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. at 1091–92. 
 79. See, e.g., id. 
 80. See, e.g., Pro-Mold & Tool Co., Inc. v. Great Lakes Plastics, Inc., 75 F.3d 
1568, 1573 (Fed. Cir. 1996). 
 81. In re Fritch, 972 F.2d 1260, 1265 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (emphasis added).  Of 
course, this statement comports with the pre-KSR formulation of the TSM test as 
articulated above.  See sources cited supra note 16. 
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has noted, “[u]nder Federal Circuit case law [before KSR], a deci-
sion-maker [could] rely on an implicit suggestion or motivation to 
combine prior art references—the suggestion or motivation [did] not 
need to be recorded or documented.”82  However, in two particular 
pre-KSR opinions in the past decade, In re Zurko IV,83 and In re 
Lee,84 the Federal Circuit brought the official notice and TSM in-
quiry squarely in the realm of objectivity. 
C. In re Zurko: Show Us the Evidence 
In re Zurko IV, a 2001 Federal Circuit decision, established the 
proper standard of review for USPTO findings of fact, and was es-
sentially an administrative law decision at its core.85  Additionally, 
however, the case involved an unsupported motivation to combine 
that implicated both motivational and referential official notice, and 
an unusually lengthy procedural history.86   
Zurko’s invention was drawn to a computer system that involved 
“verifying a trusted command using both trusted and untrusted soft-
ware.”87  Trusted software is typically more expensive and involves 
more lines of code than untrusted software, so a user is able to save 
money and disk space when untrusted software is partially used in 
the place of trusted software.88  Specifically, Zurko’s invention al-
lowed the user to communicate with a trusted environment along a 
trusted communication path by using untrusted software to perform a 
command parsing step before that command is sent along the trusted 
path.89  Additionally, the application claimed that the parsed com-
mand was displayed for the user for verification before the system 
executed the command.90   
  
 82. Gregory N. Mandel, Patently Non-obvious II: Experimental Study on the 
Hindsight Issue Before the Supreme Court in KSR v. Teleflex, 9 YALE J.L. & 
TECH. 1, 29 (2006). 
 83. In re Zurko (Zurko IV), 258 F.3d 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2001). 
 84. In re Lee, 277 F.3d 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
 85. See Zurko IV, 258 F.3d at 1384. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. at 1382. 
 88. Id.  
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. 
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The examiner rejected Zurko’s claims under § 103 based on the 
combination of two prior art references: the UNIX operating system 
and a program called FILER 2.2.91  The UNIX prior art previously 
taught the use of trusted and untrusted code in a singular system.92  
The FILER 2.2 reference taught requesting a user to confirm the ex-
ecution of a potentially dangerous command instruction.93  The prior 
art, did not, however, explicitly teach the execution of the command 
along a trusted path.94  Instead, in rejecting Zurko’s claims, the ex-
aminer took quasi-referential official notice, asserting that “it is basic 
[common] knowledge that communication in trusted environments is 
performed over trusted paths”—and the BPAI affirmed this finding 
of fact.95  As to the motivation to combine the references, the BPAI 
upheld the examiner’s conclusion that such a motivation existed, 
taking motivational official notice that it “would have been nothing 
more than good common sense” to combine UNIX, FILER 2.2, and 
the fact from the examiner’s referential official notice.96   
On appeal to the Federal Circuit in Zurko I,97 the Federal Circuit 
held that the BPAI’s conclusions were clearly erroneous, and re-
versed the BPAI’s rejection.98  Specifically, the Zurko I court took 
issue with the BPAI’s finding that the prior art of record explicitly 
taught or implied the practice of utilizing a trusted pathway for user 
command confirmation.99  After the decision, the USPTO Commis-
sioner requested an en banc Federal Circuit rehearing of the case to 
determine the proper standard of review, arguing that the Adminis-
trative Procedure Act (“APA”)100 mandated that the Federal Circuit 
must employ the substantial evidence or arbitrary and capricious 
standard of review.101  The en banc panel in Zurko II, however, held 
  
 91. In re Zurko (Zurko IV), 258 F.3d 1379, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2001). 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. at 1382–83. 
 94. See id. at 1383. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. at 1383. 
 97. In re Zurko (Zurko I), 111 F.3d 887 (Fed. Cir. 1997). 
 98. Id. at 889. 
 99. Id. 
100. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2010). 
101. Zurko IV, 258 F.3d at 1381. 
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that it had correctly employed review for clear error in Zurko I, and 
affirmed the original panel’s decision.102 
The Commissioner then petitioned the Supreme Court for re-
view, and the Court granted certiorari as to the proper standard of 
review for BPAI findings at the Federal Circuit.103  In Zurko III,104 
the Supreme Court reversed the Federal Circuit, holding that BPAI 
decisions must be reviewed under the standards of review contem-
plated in the APA.105  In its opinion, the Court drew a distinction 
between court review of another court’s decision and a court review-
ing an agency decision—and determined that the APA standards of 
review clearly governed the latter, and that the clearly erroneous 
standard governed the former.106  Importantly, the Court also recog-
nized and spoke to an anomaly that its decision might have created, 
stating: 
An applicant denied a patent can seek review either directly 
in the Federal Circuit or indirectly by first obtaining direct 
review in federal district court.  The first path will now bring 
about Federal Circuit court/agency review; the second path 
might well lead to Federal Circuit court/court review, for the 
Circuit now reviews Federal District Court factfinding using  
a “clearly erroneous” standard. . . . 
We are not convinced, however, that the presence of the two 
paths creates a significant anomaly.  The second path per-
mits the disappointed applicant to present to the court evi-
dence that the applicant did not present to the PTO.107 
Additionally, the Court emphasized that the clear error and APA 
standards of review were nearly indistinguishable in practice: 
The court/agency standard, as we have said, is somewhat less 
strict than the court/court standard.  But the difference is a 




104. Dickinson v. Zurko (Zurko III), 527 U.S. 150 (1999). 
105.  See id. at 165. 
106.  Id. at 164. 
107. Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
2012 A LITTLE COMMON SENSE IS A DANGEROUS THING 183 
gle instance in which a reviewing court conceded that use of 
one standard rather than the other would in fact have pro-
duced a different outcome.108 
Therefore, although the Zurko III court mandated that the Federal 
Circuit apply an APA standard of review on direct appeals from the 
BPAI, it acknowledged that the difference in the clearly erroneous 
and APA standards of review is negligible.109   
On remand, the Federal Circuit was able to make a final determi-
nation as to the USPTO’s assertions of fact in their invocations of 
official notice in Zurko IV.  However, the court only found it neces-
sary to address the referential official notice in its opinion.110  As to 
the BPAI’s assertion that the basic knowledge or common sense of 
the PHOSITA would supply the trusted path teaching, the court held 
that the finding lacked substantial evidence support, stating: 
With respect to core factual findings in a determination of pa-
tentability . . . the Board cannot simply reach conclusions 
based on its own understanding or experience—or on its as-
sessment of what would be basic knowledge or common 
sense.  Rather, the Board must point to some concrete evi-
dence in the record in support of these findings.  To hold 
otherwise would render the process of appellate review for 
substantial evidence on the record a meaningless exercise.111 
Therefore, the Federal Circuit ultimately reversed the USPTO’s 
assertion of fact, one without a citation to an explicit source, as lack-
ing substantial evidence.  However, although the court had now set-
tled that referential official notice must be supported at the USPTO 
by an explicit teaching in the prior art, the court did not explicitly 
  
108. Id. at 162–63. 
109. See id.  Interestingly, the Court did not mandate which APA standard of 
review—substantial evidence or arbitrary and capricious—applied to BPAI ap-
peals surrounding findings of fact.  Before the Federal Circuit was able to rehear 
the case on remand from the Supreme Court, the court decided this question in In 
re Gartside, 203 F.3d 1305, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2000), holding that it would apply 
substantial evidence review to these findings. 
110. Zurko IV, 258 F.3d at 1384. 
111. Id. at 1386 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
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extend the same requirement to instances of motivational official 
notice until a year later in In re Lee.112 
D. In re Lee: The Federal Circuit Applies Zurko 
The invention in In re Lee was drawn to a method of automati-
cally displaying functions of a display and allowing the user to 
tweak the display functionality.113  The examiner cited two pieces of 
prior art in rejecting the claims, a patent to Nortrup and the Thunder-
chopper Helicopter Operations Handbook for a video game.114  
However, neither reference mentioned a user adjusting any display 
or audio functionality, and during the initial prosecution, the exam-
iner did not provide a teaching, suggestion, or motivation to combine 
the references.115  However, in the Examiner’s Answer at the BPAI, 
the examiner attempted to remedy this omission, stating that the 
combination:  
[W]ould have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art 
since [Thunderchopper’s] demonstration mode is just a pro-
grammable feature which can be used in many different de-
vices for providing automatic introduction by adding the 
proper programming software, and that another motivation 
would be that the automatic demonstration mode is user 
friendly and it functions as a tutorial.116   
The BPAI sided with the examiner, reasoning that “[t]he conclu-
sion of obviousness may be made from common knowledge and 
common sense of a person of ordinary skill in the art without any 
specific hint or suggestion in a particular reference.”117 
On appeal at the Federal Circuit, Lee asked for review of the 
USPTO’s findings as to its § 103 rejections.  The court found the 
USPTO’s motivation to combine inadequate under the APA—
holding that the conclusory justification for the rejection based on a 
  
112. 277 F.3d 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
113. Id. at 1340. 
114. Id. at 1340–41. 
115. Id. at 1341. 
116. Id. 
117. Id. 
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“common sense” reasoning did not fulfill the USPTO’s obligation.118  
Indeed, as the court stated, “[c]ommon knowledge and common 
sense, even if assumed to derive from the agency’s expertise, do not 
substitute for authority when the law requires authority.”119 
Ultimately, therefore, Lee expanded the Federal Circuit’s holding 
in Zurko IV to motivational official notice—holding the USPTO’s 
feet to the fire by requiring that, under the APA, a motivation to 
combine must point to some explicit teaching in the prior art if it is 
to be upheld as proper.  As the court stated, “[t]his factual question 
of motivation is material to patentability, and could not be resolved 
on subjective belief and unknown authority.”120  After Zurko and 
Lee, it would seem that objective official notice—and, indeed, possi-
bly official notice in general—would become a remnant of the 
USPTO’s past.  However, the practice remained intact through 2007, 
and was arguably resurrected with the Supreme Court’s holding in 
KSR and the Federal Circuit’s KSR progeny. 
V. OBVIOUSNESS JURISPRUDENCE AT THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT AFTER 
KSR 
After KSR, the Federal Circuit, federal district courts, the BPAI 
at the USPTO, and patent examiners themselves have been left to 
discern what the “common sense” of a PHOSITA entails practically.  
As examined above, KSR held that common sense could serve as a 
valid reason to reject a patent under § 103 and satisfy the TSM test.  
However, now that this paper has thoroughly examined official no-
tice practice, one can conclude that the KSR ruling conflicts drasti-
cally with the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the APA in Zurko 
III, the Federal Circuit’s Zurko IV and Lee opinions, the MPEP’s 
current guidelines, and traditional tenets of official notice practice in 
cases like Kubin and Oetiker.  Before moving on to examine this 
conflict further and propose possible solutions to the quandary, it is 
important that one first becomes familiar with some important Fed-
  
118. In re Lee, 277 F.3d 1338, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
119. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
120. Id. at 1343–44. 
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eral Circuit cases after KSR and the current guidelines by which the 
USPTO abides when determining obviousness under § 103. 
A. Leapfrog and Perfect Web:  Expanding Common Sense 
Starting in Leapfrog Enterprises, Inc. v. Fisher-Price, Inc.,121 its 
first application of the KSR standard, the Federal Circuit has empha-
sized further that the obviousness inquiry and the TSM test are not 
slaves to explicit prior art teachings.  The patent-at-issue in Leapfrog 
was an electronic toy that assisted children in learning phonetical-
ly.122  The invention worked by displaying letters in a particular or-
der and eliciting a sound when certain letters were pressed.123  Addi-
tionally, a processor in the toy communicated with a “reader,” an 
electronic component that would decipher the identity of the set of 
letters to the processor.124  The trial court found that the only feature 
in the patent-at-issue not found in the prior art was the reader.125  
However, the court also held that the “knowledge of one of ordinary 
skill in the art” provided the motivation to add a reader to the com-
bination of the invention claimed in the Bevan patent and the 
SSR.126 
On appeal to the Federal Circuit, Leapfrog argued that there ex-
isted insufficient evidence on the record for the court to find a moti-
vation to combine the Bevan patent, the SSR, and the reader.127  
Naturally, Fisher-Price argued that, after KSR, a motivation to com-
bine references did not need to stem from the prior art references.128  
The Federal Circuit agreed with Fisher-Price, applying the “common 
sense” principle from KSR in stating that:  
An obviousness determination is not the result of a rigid for-
mula disassociated from the consideration of the facts of a 
  
121. 485 F.3d 1157 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
122. Id. at 1158. 
123. Id. 
124. Id. 
125. Id. at 1162. 
126. Id. at 1159. 
127. Leapfrog Enters., Inc. v. Fisher-Price, Inc., 485 F.3d 1157, 1160 (Fed.. Cir. 
2007). 
128. Id. 
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case.  Indeed, the common sense of those skilled in the art 
demonstrates why some combinations would have been ob-
vious where others would not.129   
The court held that a PHOSITA would have recognized adding a 
reader would have provided a simpler user experience and would 
have afforded the claimed invention added marketability to chil-
dren.130  In sum, based on a common sense-based motivation to 
combine prior art teachings—akin to an invocation of motivational 
official notice—the court agreed that the patent was invalid under 
§ 103.131   
Over the past couple of years, the court has consistently reaf-
firmed its Leapfrog holding and continued to expand the strength of 
implicit common sense rationales as valid motivations to combine.132  
Arguably the most aggressive stance on this principle—and the most 
relevant for the purpose of deciphering the status of current official 
notice jurisprudence—came in 2009 with the Federal Circuit’s deci-
sion in Perfect Web Technologies, Inc. v. InfoUSA, Inc.133  Perfect 
Web involved a Perfect Web patent drawn to a method of emailing 
bulk messages to certain groups of individuals, assessing the num-
bers of emails sent, and repeating these steps—sending more emails 
until a minimum numbers of messages had been sent.134  The validi-
ty of the patent was challenged at the trial court level, where the 
court determined that the patent’s claims were invalid under 
§ 103.135  Specifically, the court found that although the step of re-
peating the email message transmissions was not explicitly taught in 
the prior art, “the final step is merely the logical result of common 
sense application of the maxim [to] ‘try, try again.’”136   
  
129. Id. at 1161 (emphasis added). 
130. Id. at 1162. 
131. Id. 
132. See, e.g., Wyers v. Master Lock Co., 616 F.3d 1231, 1245 (Fed. Cir. 2010); 
Ball Aerosol & Specialty Container, Inc. v. Limited Brands, Inc., 555 F.3d 984, 
993 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
133. 587 F.3d 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
134. Id. at 1326. 
135. Id.  
136. Id. at 1327. 
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On appeal at the Federal Circuit, Perfect Web challenged the 
USPTO’s quasi-use of referential official notice on the “try, try 
again” maxim and argued that the PTO did not present a valid moti-
vation to combine to support its rejection.137  Furthering the Federal 
Circuit’s marked departure from Zurko and Lee, the court affirmed 
the district court’s rejection, holding that:  
[W]hile an analysis of obviousness always depends on evi-
dence that supports the required Graham factual findings, it 
also may include recourse to logic, judgment, and common 
sense available to the person of ordinary skill that do not 
necessarily require explication in any reference or expert 
opinion.138   
Though this holding drastically departed from precedent, the 
Perfect Web court recognized the ambiguity and attempted to ad-
dress it.139  Ultimately, however, it sidestepped the difficult issue and 
claimed that its reasoning was valid because, even in the wake of 
Zurko and Lee, “though common knowledge and common sense do 
not substitute for facts, they may be applied to analysis of the evi-
dence.”140   
The only specificity that the court mandated was that, when in-
voking common sense in a quasi-official notice manner, all the court 
or examiner must do is clearly lay out its reasoning, placing no limit 
on the reasoning’s subjectivity.  Specifically, the court held that 
“[t]he analysis that should be made explicit refers not to the teach-
ings in the prior art of a motivation to combine, but to the court’s 
analysis.”141  Therefore, in Perfect Web, the Federal Circuit, with the 
help of KSR, reopened the door for myriad common sense ration-
ales—whether they originate at the USPTO in the form of explicit 
motivational or referential invocations of official notice,142 quasi-
  
137. Id at 1327–28. 
138. Id. at 1329 (emphasis added). 
139. Perfect Web Techs., Inc. V. InfoUSA, Inc., 587 F.3d 1324, 1328–29 (Fed. 
Cir. 2009). 
140. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
141. Id. at 1330 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
142. In In re Gleizer, 356 Fed. App’x 415 (Fed. Cir. 2009), the Federal Circuit 
briefly opined on the proper post-KSR obviousness inquiry when an examiner 
expressly invokes official notice.  The court’s treatment of official notice in 
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official notice findings, or at the federal district courts in validity 
litigation. 
Partially in response to the ambiguity created by KSR and its ap-
plication in Perfect Web, the USPTO published interim guidelines 
for the examination of patents for obvious subject matter on Septem-
ber 1, 2010.143  The guidelines recognize the inherent inconsistency 
between In re Lee and KSR, and suggest that Lee may no longer be a 
viable holding, “insofar as Lee appears to require a strict basis in 
record evidence as a reason to modify the prior art.”144  Instead, the 
guidelines echo language from Perfect Web and Ball Aerosol which 
both held that for a court or an examiner to supply a properly “ex-
plicit” reasoning simply means that they articulate the common 
sense, common knowledge, reasoning, inferences, or creative steps 
that the PHOSITA would have employed to render a particular claim 
obvious.145  Additionally, although the guidelines do not explicitly 
mention official notice practice, as explained above, the doctrines of 
obviousness and official notice have a fundamentally interwoven 
relationship, as official notice serves as a still viable means by which 
an examiner may reject a claim under § 103 based on common sense 
or common knowledge. 
B. The Inherent Contradiction Between KSR and Official Notice 
Several foundational conflicts exist with the post-KSR obvious-
ness standard and the stated USPTO official notice policy.  On one 
hand, Zurko IV stands for the proposition that all USPTO findings of 
  
Gleizer, however, was unfortunately brief and lacked meaningful bite because it 
was able to uphold the official notice on procedural grounds—namely, because the 
applicant did not object to the examiner’s invocation during prosecution. Id. at 
420.  However, it is telling that the court seemingly would have upheld the official 
notice on the merits, citing Leapfrog and stating, “[a]n obviousness determination 
is not the result of a rigid formula disassociated from the consideration of the facts 
of a case” and “common sense of those skilled in the art demonstrates why some 
combinations would have been obvious where others would not.”  Id. at 420–21.  
This would seem to reaffirm the notion that, naturally, as general obviousness 
goes, so goes official notice. 
143. Examination Guidelines Update: Developments in the Obviousness Inquiry 
After KSR v. Teleflex, 75 Fed. Reg. 53643 (Sept. 1, 2010). 
144. Id. 
145. See MPEP § 2144.03. 
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fact, including the existence of a motivation to combine, must be 
supported by substantial evidence and must point to an explicit 
teaching in the prior art.  On the other hand, KSR and its progeny 
stand for the proposition that such findings of fact are proper absent 
explicit prior art support.  Therein lies the problem as official notice 
currently stands: is an unsupported assertion of fact by an examiner 
citing only common knowledge or common sense of the PHOSITA 
proper, or must there be prior art support?   
Though it attempts to address the problem, the MPEP is of no 
practical help as currently written.  The MPEP reiterates that the 
APA substantial evidence standard applies to examiner invocations 
of official notice and cites Zurko IV on several occasions, stating that 
“an assessment of basic knowledge and common sense that is not 
based on any evidence in the record lacks substantial evidence sup-
port.”146  However, the current official notice section of the MPEP 
does not once cite KSR or its progeny, which stand for the polar op-
posite position on the matter—that in fact no such prior evidence is 
needed to sustain a determination of obviousness.147  Therefore, alt-
hough the USPTO official notice policy seems to ultimately require 
an underlying prior art document, after KSR, it appears no such prior 
art document is necessary. 
Instead, obvious jurisprudence has settled on allowing examiners 
to reject patent claims on their understanding of what constitutes 
common knowledge or common sense, so long as they explain their 
reasoning, no matter how subjective that reasoning may be.  Though 
the USPTO has not spoken directly to this issue as to formal official 
notice practice, it is natural that such reasoning would be allowed 
with formal invocations of official notice as well as quasi-official 
notice situations.  As a practical result, it is much easier for an exam-
iner to justify use of official notice after KSR, but if he or she were to 
consult the MPEP on the matter, this conclusion would not seem so 
plain.   
Of course, allowing examiners recourse to subjectivity enhances 
the values that official notice was created to further: agency efficien-
cy, a reduced patent backlog, and flexibility in analysis.  However, 
  
146. MPEP § 2144.03. 
147. See id. 
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these positive justifications for official notice come at a cost of prop-
er agency action as defined in Zurko and Lee by denying patent ap-
plicants a potential property interest without an explanation as to 
which explicit evidence the agency is relying upon to come to its 
decision.  Therefore, the current quandary surrounding obviousness 
has a tangible impact on applicants, USPTO patent examiners, dis-
trict courts, and patent practitioners alike. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
As to the ultimate solution to the current doctrinal problem, the 
USPTO, Congress, or the judiciary could individually attempt to 
fashion a workable solution.  First, as to the USPTO, as proposed in 
the previous section, the agency could update its MPEP official no-
tice guidelines to more accurately portray the post-KSR obviousness 
landscape.  However, this solution would be purely superficial, as 
the underlying conflict between Zurko and KSR still exists.  Alterna-
tively, Congress could consider a bill that sets out what it deems to 
be the correct obviousness and official notice procedure to be applied 
by the USPTO and the courts.  However, the likelihood that such a 
bill would be passed by Congress, let alone be introduced, seems 
very low given the limited success of similar patent reform bills in-
troduced in the past decade. 
This, of course, leaves the judiciary.  The Federal Circuit is clear 
on where it stands on motivations to combine based on common 
sense and common knowledge—after Perfect Web, such findings are 
clearly proper in the court’s opinion.  However, the solution to this 
problem will likely not come from the Federal Circuit.  After all, the 
conflict between Zurko III and KSR is a conflict between Supreme 
Court opinions, which calls for a Supreme Court solution.  In KSR, 
the Supreme Court failed to properly comprehend the effect of its 
decision on administrative procedure as it specifically relates to the 
problem with which it was presented—proper § 103 practice—and 
unintentionally affected the role of official notice in patent prosecu-
tion and litigation that may eventually stem from such prosecution.  
Therefore, the ultimate solution to the official notice problem lies in 
the Court granting certiorari on an obviousness case implicating 
common sense as a motivation to combine and taking KSR a step 
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further.  This step would likely require the Court to expressly over-
rule its Zurko III decision and understand that they must properly 
interpret the APA as it relates to obviousness review.   
Alternatively, the Court could take a step back from its deferen-
tial stance in KSR and require that all determinations of obviousness 
must ultimately be supported by some explicit teaching in the prior 
art.   
Practically, this solution serves as the best course on which the 
Court should steer § 103 jurisprudence.  The fact of the matter is, if a 
fact is so well-known as to consider it common knowledge, someone 
has likely written it down.  If it has not been written down, the fact 
that supports the invention is more than likely deserving of patent 
protection.  To keep the obviousness inquiry in the realm of subjec-
tivity—based on the not-so-common benchmark of common sense—
unnecessarily undermines the validity of issued patents and arguably 
places too much power in the hands of a single examiner, a decision-
maker with often insufficient training and expertise to be wholly 
conversant in the technology that they are examining. 
Indeed, as In re Ahlert held, and as the current MPEP section on 
official notice states:  
Official notice unsupported by documentary evidence should 
only be taken by the examiner where the facts asserted to be 
well-known, or to be common knowledge in the art are capa-
ble of instant and unquestionable demonstration as being 
well-known.148   
The USPTO should keep the bar high when it comes to official 
notice invocation and hold its examiners’ feet to the fire when it 
comes to supporting assertions of fact—because without underlying 





148. MPEP § 2144.03. 
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